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Resumo
O crescimento da dependeˆncia na utilizac¸a˜o de servic¸os informa´ticos em redes de larga-
escala demanda sistemas que fornec¸am um servic¸o correcto e ininterrupto. Por este motivo,
algoritmos tolerantes a faltas bizantinas (BFT) teˆm recebido considera´vel atenc¸a˜o nos u´ltimos
anos. A ideia fundamental destes algoritmos e´ replicar um determinado servic¸o num conjunto
de servidores, assegurando a sua operac¸a˜o contı´nua mesmo na presenc¸a de um nu´mero limitado
de servidores faltosos. Cada servidor e´ uma re´plica, uma ma´quina de estados determinı´stica que
executa operac¸o˜es em resposta a requisic¸o˜es realizadas por clientes.
Para que servic¸os replicados sejam tolerantes a faltas, modos comuns de falhas devem
ser evitados, essa e´ a principal motivac¸a˜o desta tese. Mais especificamente, a tese trata de
falhas causadas por desastres naturais, falta de energia e ataques fı´sicos. Para que a ocorreˆncia
destas falhas afecte um nu´mero limitado de servidores e´ necessa´rio distribuir as re´plicas
geograficamente. Esta distribuic¸a˜o, requer que os locais onde se situam as re´plicas sejam
conectados por uma rede de larga-escala (WAN), como a Internet.
Infelizmente, quando as re´plicas esta˜o distribuı´das geograficamente o desempenho dos
algoritmos BFT actuais e´ afectado pelas limitac¸o˜es de largura de banda e lateˆncias heteroge´neas,
tı´picas em redes de larga-escala. A fim de tratar destas limitac¸o˜es esta tese introduz novos
algoritmos BFT que sa˜o simultaˆneamente eficientes e seguros. Alguns destes algoritmos sa˜o
baseados em um modelo de faltas hı´brido, por exemplo, parte do sistema e´ considerado seguro
pela sua construc¸a˜o. Uma importante contribuic¸a˜o desta tese e´ a definic¸a˜o e concretizac¸a˜o de
um servic¸o confia´vel mı´nimo: o gerador de identificador u´nico e sequencial (USIG).
A tese descreve como concretizar algoritmos de consenso bizantinos com 2 f +1 processos,
usando um algoritmo de reliable multicast que requer um componente confia´vel, uma abstrac¸a˜o
do USIG. O servic¸o USIG e a primitiva de reliable multicast sa˜o aplicados como componentes
nucleares na concretizac¸a˜o de dois novos algoritmos BFT introduzidos nesta tese: MinBFT e
MinZyzzyva. Estes algoritmos sa˜o mı´nimos em termos de nu´mero de re´plicas, complexidade do
componente confia´vel e nu´mero de passos de comunicac¸a˜o.
A fim de mitigar os ataques de degradac¸a˜o de desempenho esta tese propo˜e o uso de um
prima´rio rotativo, definindo assim um novo algoritmo BFT, o Spinning. Ale´m de ser menos
vulnera´vel a ataques causados por prima´rios faltosos, o Spinning atinge um de´bito similar ao
algoritmo base. Finalmente, os mecanismos e te´cnicas desenvolvidos ao longo desta tese sa˜o
combinados com o objectivo de definir o EBAWA, um novo algoritmo BFT que e´ adequado para
suportar a execuc¸a˜o de servic¸os replicados em redes de larga-escala.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: sistemas distribuı´dos, toleraˆncia a intruso˜es, confiabilidade,
seguranc¸a, toleraˆncia a faltas bizantinas
Abstract
The growing reliance on wide-area services demands highly available systems that provide
a correct and uninterrupted service. Therefore, Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) algorithms have
received considerable attention in the last years. A service is replicated over several servers and
can survive even in the presence of a bounded number of Byzantine failures.
The main motivation for this thesis is that for a replicated service to be fault-tolerant,
common mode failures have to be avoided. More specifically, the thesis is concerned with
common mode failures caused by natural disasters, power outages and physical attacks, which
have to be prevented by scattering replicas geographically. This requires the sites where the
replicas reside to be connected by a wide-area network (WAN) like the Internet.
Unfortunately, when the replicas are distributed geographically the performance of current
BFT algorithms is affected by the lower bandwidths, and the higher and more heterogeneous
network latencies. In order to deal with these limitations this thesis introduces novel BFT
algorithms that are simultaneously efficient and secure. Some algorithms of this thesis are based
on a hybrid fault model, i.e., considering that a part of the system is secure by construction. A
notable contribution of this thesis is the definition and implementation of a minimal trusted
service: the Unique Sequential Identifier Generator (USIG).
The thesis describes how to implement a 2 f + 1 Byzantine consensus algorithm using a
2 f + 1 reliable multicast algorithm that requires a trusted service, that is an abstract version
of the USIG. Then, the USIG service and the reliable multicast primitive are applied as a core
component to implement two novel BFT algorithms introduced in this thesis: MinBFT and
MinZyzzyva. These BFT algorithms are minimal in terms of number of replicas, complexity of
the trusted service used, and number of communication steps. In order to mitigate performance
degradation attacks, this thesis proposes the use of a rotating primary defining a novel BFT
algorithm, Spinning, that is less vulnerable to attacks caused by a faulty primary and attains a
throughput similar to the baseline algorithm in the area.
Finally, the mechanisms and techniques developed in this thesis are combined in order to
define EBAWA, a novel BFT algorithm that is suitable for supporting the execution of wide-area
replicated services.
KEY-WORDS: distributed systems, intrusion tolerance, dependability, security, Byzantine
fault tolerance
Resumo Estendido
Com a difusa˜o dos servic¸os informa´ticos de larga escala e´ necessa´rio o desenvolvimento
de sistemas que fornec¸am disponibilidade, confiabilidade e de´bito significativo para atender os
requisitos de sistemas de alta demanda.
A toleraˆncia a intruso˜es e´ um paradigma de seguranc¸a que tem recebido atenc¸a˜o recen-
temente e promete satisfazer estes requisitos. Este paradigma reconhece a dificuldade em
construir sistemas completamente seguros e confia´veis, por isso, utilizando esta abordagem
ataques e intruso˜es sa˜o permitidos porque sa˜o tolerados. Sistemas tolerantes a intruso˜es
geralmente sa˜o construı´dos utilizando algoritmos tolerantes a faltas bizantinas (BFT). A ideia
fundamental destes algoritmos e´ permitir que um determinado servic¸o continue operacional
mesmo na presenc¸a de componentes que exibam comportamento arbitra´rio.
A investigac¸a˜o em toleraˆncia a faltas bizantinas e´ focada no desenho de sistemas dis-
tribuı´dos baseados em protocolos de troca de mensagens e que geralmente utilizam te´cnicas de
replicac¸a˜o. A abordagem de ma´quina de estados e´ uma te´cnica de software para tolerar faltas
utilizando hardware comum. Nesta abordagem, cada servidor conte´m uma co´pia do servic¸o,
clientes acedem o servic¸o atrave´s de um algoritmo de replicac¸a˜o que assegura que mesmo
na presenc¸a de falhas o servic¸o continua operacional. Estes algoritmos tipicamente requerem
3 f + 1 re´plicas para tolerar f servidores bizantinos, por exemplo, 4 re´plicas para tolerar um
servidor faltoso.
O servic¸o replicado e´ considerado mais confia´vel que um servic¸o centralizado se cada
um dos servidores e´ protegido utilizando as melhores pra´ticas actuais e se os servidores
na˜o compartilham as mesmas vulnerabilidades. Para que os servidores falhem de forma
independente e´ necessa´rio que as re´plicas possuam diferentes sistemas operacionais, diferentes
softwares, etc. Isto envolve um custo adicional considera´vel para cada re´plica, na˜o apenas em
termos de hardware mas especialmente em desenvolvimento de software, aquisic¸a˜o e gesta˜o.
Para tolerar desastres naturais, ataques em larga escala como ataques de negac¸a˜o de servic¸o
distribuı´do e´ necessa´rio tambe´m a diversidade em termos de localizac¸a˜o geogra´fica. Re´plicas
devem ser distribuı´das em diferentes sı´tios conectados por uma rede de larga escala.
Os actuais algoritmos BFT possuem um bom desempenho em redes locais mas a sua
complexidade em termos de mensagens limita a escalabilidade em redes de larga escala (WAN)
que tipicamente possuem limitac¸o˜es de largura de banda, lateˆncias heteroge´neas e partic¸o˜es.
Algoritmos BFT sa˜o geralmente baseados em algoritmos de consenso por isso os efeitos
causados por atraso na comunicac¸a˜o entre as servidores e´ ampliado uma vez que sa˜o necessa´rias
mu´ltiplas trocas de mensagens para que as re´plicas acordem sobre a operac¸a˜o a ser executada.
Ale´m disso, nestes algoritmos os clientes devem esperar pela maioria das respostas a fim
de realizar uma votac¸a˜o sobre os resultados retornados pelos servidores, consequentemente
a lateˆncia efectiva pode ser limitada pela re´plica mais lenta.
Algoritmos BFT geralmente confiam numa re´plica prima´ria (ou lı´der) que e´ responsa´vel em
definir a ordem das requisic¸o˜es que devem ser executadas. Em redes de larga escala esta re´plica
prima´ria torna-se um ponto de estrangulamento que limita o de´bito do sistema. Algoritmos
que utilizam uma replica prima´ria sofrem de um padra˜o de comunicac¸a˜o desbalanceado uma
vez que a re´plica prima´ria tende a processar mais mensagens que as demais. Ale´m disso, uma
re´plica prima´ria faltosa pode degradar o desempenho do sistema deixando-o quase inutiliza´vel.
O objectivo desta tese e´ lidar com as limitac¸o˜es dos actuais algoritmos BFT em ambientes
de larga escala fornecendo algoritmos que apresentam alto desempenho em WANs. Estes
algoritmos permitem a construc¸a˜o de servic¸os confia´veis mesmo na presenc¸a de ataques,
intruso˜es ou a destruic¸a˜o fı´sica de algum dos sites.
Alguns destes algoritmos sa˜o baseados em um modelo de faltas hı´brido. Este modelo
assume que diferentes partes do sistema pode ter diferentes modos de falhas. Por exemplo,
assume-se que a maior parte do sistema pode falhar de forma arbitra´ria, incluindo faltas
maliciosas, com excepc¸a˜o de poucos componentes que sa˜o considerados seguros pela sua
construc¸a˜o. Uma importante contribuic¸a˜o desta tese e´ a definic¸a˜o e concretizac¸a˜o de um servic¸o
confia´vel mı´nimo: o gerador de identificador u´nico e sequencial (USIG). O USIG conte´m
basicamente um contador e uma func¸a˜o de assinatura digital. Esta simplicidade e´ importante
uma vez que a complexidade dos sistemas e´ a causa da maior parte das vulnerabilidades
inseridas nas fases de desenho e concretizac¸a˜o, permitindo que ataques sejam bem sucedidos.
A tese descreve como concretizar algoritmos de consenso bizantinos com 2 f +1 processos,
usando um algoritmo de reliable multicast que requer um componente confia´vel. O componente
confia´vel utilizado e´ uma abstracc¸a˜o do servic¸o fornecido pelo USIG. Esta e´ uma contribuic¸a˜o
relevante uma vez que o consenso e´ um problema de reconhecida importaˆncia teo´rica e
pra´tica na a´rea de sistemas distribuı´dos. O servic¸o USIG e a primitiva de reliable multicast
sa˜o aplicados como componentes nucleares na concretizac¸a˜o de dois novos algoritmos BFT
introduzidos nesta tese: MinBFT e MinZyzzyva.
MinBFT segue o padra˜o de comunicac¸a˜o do algoritmo refereˆncia nesta a´rea, o PBFT. A
re´plica prima´ria utiliza contadores confia´veis fornecidos pelo USIG para atribuir identificadores
u´nicos a`s requisic¸o˜es dos clientes. Estes identificadores sa˜o utilizados para assegurar que todas
as re´plicas correctas consideram a mesma sequeˆncia de mensagens e concordam sobre a ordem
de execuc¸a˜o das requisic¸o˜es. O segundo algoritmo - MinZyzzyva - e´ baseado em especulac¸a˜o,
servidores executam requisic¸o˜es dos clientes sem executar um algoritmo de consenso. As
re´plicas optimisticamente adoptam a ordem de requisic¸o˜es proposta pela re´plica prima´ria (que
utiliza o USIG) e respondem imediatamente para o cliente. Estes dois algoritmos sa˜o mı´nimos
em termos de nu´mero de re´plicas, complexidade do componente confia´vel e nu´mero de passos
de comunicac¸a˜o.
A fim de mitigar os ataques de degradac¸a˜o de desempenho esta tese propo˜e o uso de um
prima´rio rotativo, definindo assim um novo algoritmo BFT, o Spinning. Ale´m de ser menos
vulnera´vel a ataques de degradac¸a˜o de desempenho, o Spinning atinge um de´bito similar ao
algoritmo base e e´ mais eficiente que outros algoritmos que toleram este tipo de ataque.
Finalmente, os mecanismos e te´cnicas desenvolvidos ao longo desta tese sa˜o combinados
com o objectivo de definir o EBAWA, um novo algoritmo BFT adequado para suportar a
execuc¸a˜o de servic¸os replicados em redes de larga-escala. O EBAWA tem um reduzido nu´mero
de passos de comunicac¸a˜o, e´ o primeiro algoritmo BFT para WANs que requer apenas 2 f + 1
re´plicas e introduz uma se´rie de mecanismos focados em prover bom desempenho em redes de
larga escala.
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1
Introduction
With the diffusion of wide-area computer services there is an increasing need to build
systems that provide high availability, high reliability and high throughput for highly demanding
services. One security paradigm that gained momentum recently, promising to satisfy these
requirements, is intrusion tolerance (Fraga & Powell, 1985; Verissimo et al., 2003). This
approach recognizes the difficulty in building a completely reliable and secure system, therefore
instead of trying to prevent every single intrusion, the latter are allowed, but tolerated. Intrusion-
tolerant systems contain mechanisms that prevent intrusions from generating failures.
The main motivation for new security paradigms like intrusion tolerance has been the poor
state of security in the Internet, yearly reported in documents like (Gordon et al., 2006). How-
ever, a more recent motivation is a great concern about the security of critical infrastructures.
Critical infrastructures consist of physical and information technology facilities, networks and
services whose disruption would have a serious impact on the health, safety or economic well-
being of populations. Often, these infrastructures are indirectly connected to the Internet, thus
exposed to the same types of threats as home-banking, online shops or personal computers
(Verissimo et al., 2006). However, they have a much higher socio-economic value than most
Internet systems. Some of them, for instance nuclear plants, are even safety-critical because
their failure may cause human deaths and serious harm to the environment. Therefore, using
mechanisms that raise the protection of these infrastructures to a new level is a fundamental
issue.
Critical infrastructures usually rely on data for several important purposes. For instance,
stored monitoring data is critical for the right commands to be done by human operators at the
right moment. If this data is unavailable or modified with the malicious intent of making the
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operators do wrong operations, the physical infrastructure may not function correctly or even be
physically damaged. Therefore, critical infrastructures require highly-resilient fault-, intrusion-
and disaster-tolerant services that function correctly even under harsh cyber-attacks that manage
to corrupt some of the computers involved.
Intrusion-tolerant or Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) algorithms tackle this problem by
allowing critical services, like storage and processing of monitoring data, to continue to operate
correctly even if some of their components are compromised by malicious attackers (Amir
et al., 2006; Amir et al., 2008a; Castro & Liskov, 2002; Chun et al., 2007; Clement et al., 2009;
Cowling et al., 2006; Correia et al., 2004; Kotla et al., 2007; Yin et al., 2003; Mao et al., 2009;
Vandiver et al., 2007; Preguic¸a et al., 2008). Research in Byzantine fault tolerance has been
centered in designing distributed systems, based on message-passing protocols and they are
usually built using replication techniques. The state machine approach is a software technique
for tolerating failures using commodity hardware (Schneider, 1990). The critical service to be
made Byzantine fault-tolerant is modeled by a state machine. Copies of the state machine are
placed on different servers and clients access the service through a replication algorithm which
ensures that, despite failures, the service continues operational. These algorithms typically
require 3 f + 1 replicas to tolerate f Byzantine servers, e.g., 4 replicas to tolerate one faulty
(Castro & Liskov, 2002).
The resilience of the replicated system is based on the assumption that replicas fail
independently, but this is true only if they do not have common vulnerabilities. This
involves using different replicas, different operating systems, different application software, etc.
(Littlewood & Strigini, 2004). In order to tolerate natural disasters and large-scale attacks like
distributed denial-of-service, there should be also diversity in terms of geographical location,
i.e., replicas have to be deployed in different sites connected by a wide-area network (WAN).
Current BFT algorithms perform well on local area networks (LANs) but their message
complexity limits their ability to scale to WANs, which typically have lower bandwidth,
higher and heterogeneous latencies, and exhibit partitions. BFT algorithms are usually
agreement-based, therefore the effects of networks with non-negligible communication delays
are magnified since servers need multiple rounds of message exchange to reach an agreement.
Moreover, in these algorithms clients must wait for the majority of the replies in order to do a
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voting on the output of the servers, consequently the effective service latency may be limited
by the slowest replicas.
BFT algorithms usually rely on a primary replica (or leader) that is in charge of defining
the order in which client requests are executed. In large scale environments, the primary replica
becomes a bottleneck that limits the system throughput. Furthermore, leader-based algorithms
lead to an unbalanced communication pattern that limits the utilization of bandwidth available
in the network links (Mao et al., 2008), and it has been shown that a faulty primary can degrade
the performance to let the replicated service so slow that it is barely usable (Amir et al., 2008a).
The limitations of current BFT algorithms on wide-area networks constitute the main motivation
of this thesis, which presents replication algorithms that are efficient in WANs and stable even
if under attack.
1.1 Objective and Contributions
The thesis was developed within the Navigators group of the Large-Scale Informatics
Systems Laboratory (LASIGE), at the Informatics Department of FCUL. The objective of this
thesis is to cope with the limitations of current BFT algorithms in large-scale environments,
providing algorithms that present high performance on wide-area networks. These algorithms
allow the implementation of highly-resilient services in WANs even if there are cyber-attacks,
intrusions or the physical destruction of some of the sites. The main contributions of this thesis
are summarized in the next sections.
Byzantine Consensus with 2f+1 Processes
Byzantine consensus in asynchronous message-passing systems has been shown to require
at least 3 f + 1 processes to be solvable in several system models (e.g., with failure detectors,
partial synchrony or randomization). Recently a couple of solutions to implement Byzantine
fault-tolerant state machine replication using only 2 f +1 replicas have appeared (Correia et al.,
2004; Chun et al., 2007). This reduction from 3 f +1 to 2 f +1 is possible with a hybrid system
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model, i.e., by extending the system model with trusted/trustworthy components that constrain
the power of faulty processes to have certain behaviors.
This thesis presents how to implement a 2 f + 1 Byzantine consensus algorithm using a
2 f + 1 reliable multicast primitive that requires trusted/trustworthy components. A notable
contribution of this thesis is the definition and implementation of a minimal trusted service –
Unique Identifier Generator (USIG) – which is much simpler than the services used by the
above mentioned BFT algorithms. USIG contains basically a counter plus a digital signature
scheme. This simplicity is important once complexity and extensibility of current computer
systems is the cause of exploitable software bugs and configuration mistakes.
Minimal Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Based on the USIG service, this thesis presents two BFT algorithms, MinBFT and
MinZyzzyva, that are minimal in several senses. First, they require only 2 f +1 replicas, instead
of the usual 3 f + 1. The above mentioned need of avoiding common mode failures requires
diversity of software of the replicas, which involves additional considerable costs per replica,
in terms not only of hardware but especially of software development and management. Then,
reducing the number of replicas has a significant impact in the system cost. Second, the trusted
service (USIG) in which this reduction of replicas is based is arguably minimal, so it is simple
to verify and implement. Third, in nice executions the two algorithms run in the minimum
number of communication steps for non-speculative and speculative algorithms, respectively 4
and 3 steps.
MinBFT follows the communication pattern of PBFT (Castro & Liskov, 2002). The
fundamental idea of MinBFT is that the primary uses trusted counters to assign sequence
numbers to client requests. This is used to guarantee that all non-faulty replicas take into
account the same messages and, ultimately, agree on the same order for the execution of the
requests.
The second algorithm – MinZyzzyva – is based on speculation, i.e., on the tentative
execution of the clients’ requests without previous agreement on the order of their execution.
MinZyzzyva is a modified version of Zyzzyva (Kotla et al., 2007), the first speculative BFT
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algorithm. In MinZyzzyva, replicas optimistically adopt the order of requests proposed by the
primary and respond immediately to the client, without reaching agreement on the order of
the requests. The performance evaluation shows that, even with the trusted component access
overhead, MinBFT and MinZyzzyva can have better throughput than Castro and Liskov’s PBFT,
and better latency in networks with non-negligible communication delays.
Byzantine Fault tolerance with a Rotating Primary
Most Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication (BFT) algorithms have a primary
replica that is in charge of ordering the clients requests. Recently it was shown that this
dependence permits a faulty primary to degrade the performance of the system to a small
fraction of what the environment allows (Amir et al., 2008a). Besides, as mentioned above, in
a WAN it is difficult to detect that the primary is faulty or that the latency and/or bandwidth of
its communication with the other replicas has become a bottleneck for the service performance.
This thesis presents Spinning, a novel BFT algorithm that mitigates performance attacks
by changing the primary after every batch of pending requests is accepted for execution. This
novel mode of operation reduces the message complexity, which makes it suitable to run in
WANs. Spinning follows the communication pattern of PBFT with three communication steps.
It has no view change operation, since views are always changing anyway, but it has a merge
operation, which is in charge of putting together the information from different servers to decide
if requests in views that “went wrong” are to be executed or not.
We assess the advantages of Spinning comparing it with related protocols both experimen-
tally and analytically. We show experimentally that rotating the primary does not impair the
performance of the system, but instead brings some throughput gains in fault-free executions.
The rotating primary is a simple and effective strategy to make a BFT replication algorithm
tolerate performance attacks from malicious servers. Finally, we show analytically that
Spinning presents important advantages when compared with other solutions to deal with
performance attacks.
6 CAPI´TULO 1. INTRODUCTION
Efficient Byzantine Fault Tolerance on Wide-Area Networks
There are a few BFT algorithms in the literature that were proposed specifically for WANs
(Amir et al., 2006; Mao et al., 2009). These algorithms follow a “fate-sharing” model, in which
servers communicate through the WAN but clients send requests only to their local server via a
LAN. This lets clients within a site unable to use the system if the local server is compromised.
This thesis presents and evaluates a novel BFT algorithm called EBAWA that requires
fewer communication steps, fewer replicas and has better throughput and latency than others
in literature. EBAWA has a flexible architecture. While previous works about BFT replication
in WANs consider that clients are in the same site than servers (e.g., in the same data center), in
EBAWA clients can be placed anywhere, increasing the resilience of the replicated service.
EBAWA is based on Spinning, MinBFT and a set of mechanisms focused in improving
performance in WANs. Like Spinning, EBAWA constantly rotates the primary letting it mostly
unaffected by certain performance degradation attacks, and does load balancing by distributing
the burden of ordering requests by all the servers. EBAWA uses the USIG trusted service from
MinBFT to reduce the number of communication steps of the agreements. This number is an
important metric for the delay of the communication tends to have a major impact in the latency
of any distributed algorithm. EBAWA uses several mechanisms that have an important impact
in the performance: asynchronous views, batches of messages, and skip messages. The goal of
these mechanisms is to reduce the number of messages sent and the overhead of cryptographic
operations. This reduces the latency of the algorithm, as seen by the clients, and improves the
throughput because there are less messages being processed.
A thorough evaluation of performance has shown that EBAWA is competitive with other
BFT algorithms in LAN environments, while outperforming all of them in several WAN
settings, most especially with the higher heterogeneity of a real WAN.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
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• Chapter 2 gives the context in which the thesis appears and presents related work in the
literature.
• Chapter 3 presents how to implement a 2 f + 1 Byzantine consensus algorithm using a
2 f +1 reliable multicast algorithm. The chapter presents the USIG service and its design
based on COTS components.
• Chapter 4 shows the implementation of two BFT algorithms using the USIG service,
MinBFT and MinZyzzyva. The chapter shows how the minimal trusted service can be
used in order to improve the performance and the scalability of BFT algorithms.
• Chapter 5 gives the implementation of another BFT algorithm, Spinning, that uses
a rotating primary in order to tolerate the performance attacks and to improve the
algorithm’s performance.
• Chapter 6 takes a final step towards the definition of an efficient BFT algorithm for
wide-area networks. It combines the best attributes of the previous algorithms, using the
minimality of MinBFT with the rotating coordinator of Spinning, and other mechanisms
in order to obtain an efficient and simple BFT algorithm suitable for WANs.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and discusses some future work.
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2
Context and Related Work
Intrusion tolerance has been proposed for some years now as a paradigm for computer
systems security (Fraga & Powell, 1985; Verissimo et al., 2003; Lala, 2003). The idea is to
apply the fault tolerance paradigm in the domain of systems security, accepting that malicious
faults (attacks, intrusions) can not be entirely prevented, and that highly resilient systems have
to tolerate these faults.
This chapter presents the context in which the thesis appears. The document presents
state machine replication algorithms that can be used to implement highly-resilient services for
critical infrastructures based on intrusion tolerance. The chapter starts by giving an overview
of concepts related to intrusion tolerance and discusses the relation between the dependability
and the security areas. The following sections present a survey on Byzantine-resilient state
machine replication, covering different aspects like number of replicas, resilience to attacks,
and performance on wide-area networks.
One of the main contributions of this thesis is the definition and implementation of a
minimal trusted service employed in the design of BFT algorithms in order to improve their
performance and scalability. Due to the simplicity of this component, it is possible to implement
it even with COTS trusted hardware, such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) (Trusted
Computing Group, 2007a). Therefore, the last section of this chapter presents the notion of
trusted computing and its evolution, since the first works that deal with software protection
until the current specifications provided by the Trusted Computing Group.
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2.1 Intrusion Tolerance
The complexity and extensibility of current computer systems have been causing a plague
of exploitable software bugs and configuration mistakes. Accordingly, the number of cyber-
attacks has been growing making computer security as a whole an important research challenge.
To meet this challenge several Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms have been proposed.
The main idea of these algorithms is to allow a system to continue to operate correctly even
if some of its components exhibit arbitrary, possibly malicious, behavior (Amir et al., 2006;
Castro & Liskov, 2002; Chun et al., 2007; Correia et al., 2004; Cowling et al., 2006; Fraga &
Powell, 1985; Kotla et al., 2007; Li & Mazieres, 2007; Martin & Alvisi, 2006; Reiter, 1995; Yin
et al., 2003). These algorithms have already been used to design intrusion-tolerant services such
as network file systems (Castro & Liskov, 2002; Yin et al., 2003), cooperative backup (Aiyer
et al., 2005), large scale storage (Adya et al., 2002), secure DNS (Cachin & Samar, 2004),
coordination services (Bessani et al., 2008), database management systems (Vandiver et al.,
2007; Preguic¸a et al., 2008), certification authorities (Zhou et al., 2002) and key management
systems (Reiter et al., 1996).
Byzantine fault-tolerant systems are usually built using replication. The state machine
approach is a generic replication technique to implement deterministic fault-tolerant services.
It was first defined as a means to tolerate crash faults (Schneider, 1990) and later extended for
Byzantine/arbitrary faults (Reiter, 1995; Castro & Liskov, 2002). The algorithms of the latter
category are usually called simply BFT. There are, however, other algorithms in the literature
that are Byzantine fault-tolerant but that provide weaker semantics, e.g., registers implemented
with quorum systems (Malkhi & Reiter, 1998; Martin et al., 2002). When we speak about BFT,
we do not include these.
2.1.1 Properties
Dependability is the property of a computer system that allows reliance to be justifiably
placed on the service that it delivers. Many concepts of intrusion tolerance are derived from the
dependability area. This body of research defines a set of paradigms – including fault tolerance
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– and its aim is to obtain a set of fundamental properties (Avizienis et al., 2004):
• Availability – readiness of the systems to provide a correct service during a time interval.
• Reliability – continuity of provision of a correct service.
• Safety – absence of catastrophic consequences on the users and the environment.
• Integrity – absence of improper system alteration.
• Maintainability – ability to undergo modifications and repairs.
These dependability properties are also used in the intrusion tolerance area that, in order to
attend the security requirements, also includes the following properties of the security area:
• Authencity – refers to the truthfulness of origin. If a message identifies its author, it is
authentic if it was truly authored by that entity.
• Confidentiality – the absence of disclosure of information by unauthorized users.
Disclosure of information is hard to detect so it is usually prevented using cryptographic
mechanisms.
2.1.2 Fault Models
Dependability aims at preventing the failure of the system. A system failure occurs when
the delivered service deviates from fulfilling the system function. Failures are caused by errors.
Errors occur at runtime when some part of the system enters an unexpected state due to the
activation of a fault. Faults are defects, an incorrect step, process, or data definition which
causes the system to perform in an unintended or unanticipated manner. Faults can be a bug in
a program, a configuration problem, and an interaction originated from an external system or
a user. Note that an error may not necessarily cause a failure, for instance an exception may
be thrown and the overall operation of the system still behaves conforming to the specification.
The basic scheme described above is called fault-error-failure chain. As a general rule, a fault
when activated can lead to an error which may lead to another error or a failure.
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In the context of intrusion tolerance, the fault-error-failure chain was extended to include
the notion of attack, vulnerability and intrusion. The AVI composite fault model was developed
in the MAFTIA project (Verissimo et al., 2000; Adelsbach et al., 2002; Verissimo, 2003).
A vulnerability is a fault in the system that can be exploited with malicious intent, i.e., a
program bug or a misconfiguration. An attack is a malicious operational fault attempted
with the objective of exploiting vulnerabilities, for instance, a malicious user that manages
to guess a privileged account password. An intrusion is a result of a successful attack on a
vulnerability, e.g., a malicious user with a privileged account password penetrates the system
violating the security properties. This intrusion may cause an error which can later cause the
system failure. An intrusion campaign is the sequence of attack→ vulnerability→ intrusion,
occurring recursively in a coherent chain of events generated by an intruder. Figure 2.1 presents
the AVI composite fault model.
vulnerability
(fault)
intrusion
(fault)
error
failure
Intruder
designer/
operator
Intruder
attack
(fault)
Figura 2.1: The AVI composite fault model.
Faults can be classified in several types according to different criteria. In the context of
this thesis we are interested in the intent of the fault: accidental or intentional. The algorithms
presented in this thesis consider malicious intentional faults, also called Byzantine faults. The
classical fault tolerance defines the omissive and assertive fault models (Verissimo & Rodrigues,
2001). Omissive fault models include those faults in which the component does not interact
as specified. The assertive fault models comprise faults in which the component interact as
specified but the service delivered is semantically or syntactically invalid.
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In intrusion tolerance, malicious faults can be simultaneously omissive and assertive,
therefore, in this area it is assumed an arbitrary fault model that encompasses both previous fault
models. The reason is the difficulty of constraining or predicting the behavior of adversaries
that attempt to corrupt the system performing malicious faults. In fact, this arbitrary model is
the most adequate to represent the adversary intelligence.
A fault model can also be classified as controlled and hybrid, considering the system
architecture and the interaction between components. A controlled fault model specifies
qualitative and quantitative bounds on component faults. For example, we can assume for
a given system, only crash failures (e.g., crash of servers) or omission failures (e.g., loss of
packets in the network). An arbitrary fault model specifies no qualitative or quantitative bounds
on failures of the components. However, faults in systems are inevitable, therefore, usually it is
specified the number of components that can fail, e.g., less than one third of the components.
Hybrid fault models assume that different parts of the system can have different failure type
distributions. For instance some components of a system can exhibit a fail controlled behavior,
i.e., only crash faults, whilst the remainder of the system is still allowed to fail arbitrarily.
We call these components simply wormholes following Verissimo’s nomenclature (Verissimo,
2006). Wormholes are enhanced components with properties usually not available in the rest
of the environment. The design and implementation of the these components has to enforce the
fault model in order to avoid that naive assumptions about a component’s behavior be a target
to attackers.
For some algorithms in this thesis – presented in the Chapters 3, 4 and 6 – it is assumed
a hybrid fault model. Other examples of hybrid models can be found in earlier works
such as (Powell et al., 1988; Verissimo et al., 1997; Correia et al., 2002). We assume a
trusted/tamperproof component that provides the USIG service (detailed in the Chapter 3).
Each server contains a local trusted/tamperproof component that provides a correct service. The
hybrid fault model states that servers can deviate arbitrarily from their specification. However,
the USIG service is tamperproof, i.e., always satisfies its specification, even if it is in a faulty
server.
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2.1.3 Time Models
A distributed system is considered synchronous if bounds of processing delays, message
delays and drift rate among local clocks exist and are known. Due to the timing assumptions,
this model is not practical to be used in intrusion-tolerant systems, especially in unpredictable
environments like the Internet. Moreover, these timing assumptions are susceptible to be
attacked. An attacker can delay processors, messages and clocks. Therefore, the research in
the intrusion tolerance has been centered in asynchronous and partial synchronous models.
A system is considered asynchronous if there are no bounds on communication and
processing delays. Assuming this kind of model is very important in order to prevent the success
of attacks against time. On the other hand, the FLP impossibility result (Fischer et al., 1985),
states that no deterministic protocol can solve consensus in an asynchronous system if a single
process can fail by crashing.
In order to deal with this limitation, some works have proposed intermediate models,
designated as partial-synchronous models (Christian & Fetzer, 1998; Verissimo & Almeida,
1995; Chandra & Toueg, 1996; Chandra et al., 1996) making additional assumptions. The
partial-synchronous models were introduced by (Dwork et al., 1988). For instance such model
can state that in all executions of the system, there is a bound ∆ and an instant GST (Global
Stabilization Time), so that every message sent by a correct server to another correct server at
instant u > GST is received before u+∆, with ∆ and GST unknown. The intuition behind this
model is that the system can work asynchronously (with no bounds on delays) most of the time
but there are stable periods in which the communication and processing delays are bounded. In
practice this stable period has to be long enough for the algorithm to terminate, but does not
need to be forever. This assumption of partial synchrony is needed to guarantee the termination
of BFT algorithms (Castro & Liskov, 2002; Aiyer et al., 2005; Cowling et al., 2006; Kotla et al.,
2007; Amir et al., 2008a). Other works proposed alternative solutions, such as failure detectors
(Chandra & Toueg, 1996).
2.1. INTRUSION TOLERANCE 15
2.1.4 Mechanisms and Techniques
The development of a dependable system requires a set of techniques and mechanisms.
The main goal of these techniques and mechanisms is to avoid system failures, or at least to
reduce the number of system failures. The dependability area uses four classes of techniques:
prevention, forecasting, tolerance and removal of faults.
Fault prevention – precludes that faults are incorporated into a system. This can
be accomplished by using development methodologies whose intent is to eliminate the
circumstances by which faults arise (e.g. software inspection).
Fault removal – is divided into two categories: removal during development and removal
during use. Removal during development requires verification of the dependability properties
during the development process. Detected faults are removed before the system is deployed.
Once systems have been deployed, it is necessary to detected failures and to remove them
obeying a maintenance cycle.
Fault forecasting – estimates the presence, creation and consequences of faults.
Fault tolerance – refers to the use of techniques that allow a system to deliver the required
service even in the presence of faults. It is carried out by error processing and fault treatment.
Error processing consists in removing errors from the computational state (if possible before
the failure occurrence) and is based on the following mechanisms:
1. error detection that identifies states being erroneous;
2. error diagnosis that assesses the damage caused by detected errors;
3. error recovery that substitutes an erroneous state by an error-free state, using one of the
following three methods: (i) compensation or masking (contains enough redundancy
to mask an error); (ii) forward recovery (finds a new state from which th system can
operate). (iii) backward recovery (substitutes an erroneous state by an error-free state
already occupied prior to error occurrence).
Fault treatment aims at preventing faults being re-activated and requires the following
mechanisms:
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1. fault diagnosis that consists of identifying the cause, location and nature of the errors;
2. fault isolation that prevents the re-activation of the faults performing physical or logical
exclusion of the faulty components from further participation in service delivery;
3. reconfiguration which either switches in spare components or reassigns tasks among non
failed components.
All these techniques and mechanisms provide a common framework used to implement
both, fault and intrusion-tolerant systems. The Figure 2.2 shows how a combination of these
techniques can be used in order to cope with security events. Attack prevention consists in
employing techniques to avoid or minimize the action of intruders, e.g., firewalls. Vulnerability
prevention can be obtained using adequate design practices. Vulnerability removal includes to
detect and to remove vulnerabilities correcting software bugs or misconfiguration, disabling
unused network services, etc. Intrusion prevention can be obtained with special devices that
vulnerability removalvulnerability
(fault)
intrusion
(fault)
error
failure
Intruder
designer/
operator
Intruder
attack
(fault)
vulnerability prevention
attack prevention
intrusion prevention
intrusion tolerance
Figura 2.2: Intrusion tolerance mechanisms and the AVI model.
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monitor network and/or system activities for malicious or unwanted behavior and can react, in
real-time, to block or prevent those activities, e.g., intrusion prevention and detection systems.
All these mechanisms can prevent intrusions but some attacks may still be able to activate
vulnerabilities causing an intrusion, therefore intrusion tolerance is still needed. Intrusion
tolerance is usually obtained with replicated components using error masking techniques.
The focus of this thesis is the use of compensation through the redundancy of software
and hardware in order to obtain error masking. We use active replication, also called the state
machine approach, which is a generic fault tolerance mechanism that provides error masking
and is used to implement deterministic services (Schneider, 1990).
The state machine approach consists of replicating a service in a group of servers. Each
server maintains a set of state variables, which are modified by a set of operations. These
operations have to be atomic (they can not interfere with other operations) and deterministic
(the same operation executed in the same initial state generates the same final state), and the
initial state must be the same in all servers. The properties that a state machine replication
algorithm has to enforce are:
• safety – all correct servers execute the same requests in the same order;
• liveness – all correct clients requests are eventually executed.
Research has shown that in general a system which tolerates f accidental faults must have
2 f + 1 replicas (Schneider, 1990). The extra replicas are used as evidence to decide which of
the replicas are correct and which are faulty. Special cases can improve these bounds (Lamport,
2003). It is not difficult to see that the minimum number of replicas required is three: if one
replica has a fault, it is possible to know which replica is faulty by comparing the state of the
three replicas, the faulty one presents a different state. Two replicas are not enough because
there is no way to know which replica is the faulty one.
In order to tolerate Byzantine faults, the number of replicas has to be increased to 3 f + 1
and messages have to be signed using cryptographic primitives. A little deduction shows that
the minimum number of replicas is four: considering three replicas A (faulty), B and C; the first
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client sends a command <WRITE x = 1 > and gets replies from A and B. The second client
sends a command <READ x > and gets replies from A and C; The server A attempts to create
equivocation by replying x = 0. The faulty server A convinces the correct server C to execute
different requests. As a result one client sees x = 1 whereas the other client sees x = 0. Several
algorithms to implement the state machine approach tolerating Byzantine, possibly malicious,
faults have been designed and some of them are presented in the Section 2.2.
2.1.5 Diversity
Intrusion tolerance is usually obtained by replicating the system in a set of servers, which
behave according to the system specification even if there are intrusions in up to a certain
threshold of the replicas.
For tolerating attacks and intrusions, the replicas can not be identical and share the same
vulnerabilities, otherwise causing intrusions in all the replicas would be almost the same as in
a single one. Therefore, there has to be diversity among the replicas, i.e., replicas shall have
different operating systems, different application software, etc. (Littlewood & Strigini, 2004;
Obelheiro et al., 2006). If each replica is protected using the current best practices, and there is
diversity, the overall system is ensured to be more trustworthy than if it was centralized. On the
other hand, this involves additional considerable costs per-replica, in terms not only of hardware
but especially of software development, acquisition and management.
BASE is a replication technique that enables an opportunistic form of diversity taking
advantage of distinct, off-the-shelf implementations of common services (Castro et al.,
2003). The existence of standard protocols that provide identical interfaces to different
implementations (e.g. ODBC and NFS) simplifies this replication technique and keeps the cost
of implementing adapters and conversion functions low. BASE describes a methodology to
implement these adapters and conversion functions by defining a common abstract service state
and how each operation manipulates the state. BASE defines functions that are used to map
from the concrete state of each implementation to the common abstract state. This replication
approach reduces the development and maintenance costs and also the long time-to-market.
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2.2 Intrusion-Tolerant State Machine Replication
Recent works have demonstrated that BFT algorithms are a promising technique for using
redundancy to improve integrity and availability. The Castro and Liskov work has brought a
new impulse to research in this area by showing that BFT systems can be practical (Castro &
Liskov, 1999). Kotla et al. proposed Zyzzyva, an algorithm that uses speculation to reduce
the cost and simplify the design of Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication (SMR)
(Kotla et al., 2007). Amir et al. (Amir et al., 2008a) showed that BFT leader-based algorithms
are vulnerable to performance degradation attacks, while Clement et al. (Clement et al., 2009)
proposed a set of techniques to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
These works present algorithms that influenced in some way this thesis, therefore they are
described in the next sections.
2.2.1 PBFT – Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) is an algorithm proposed to support the
implementation of efficient intrusion-tolerant services using the state machine approach (Castro
& Liskov, 1999). In the PBFT algorithm a service is replicated in a set of servers and clients
submit requests to these servers. The service tolerates f malicious servers out of 3 f +1. Servers
move through a succession of configurations called views. In a view one replica is the primary
and the others are backups. The system model assumes a partial-synchronous model in order
to assure the liveness of the algorithm. The authenticity of the messages exchanged by the
algorithm is protected with signatures based on public-key cryptography or message digests
produced with collision-resistant hash functions.
The algorithm works basically as follows: (1) A client sends a request of an operation to all
servers; (2) The primary multicasts the request in a PRE-PREPARE message to the replicas; (3)
When a replica receives a PRE-PREPARE message, it validates the message and then multicasts
a PREPARE message; (4) When a correct replica receives 2 f +1PREPARE messages, it sends a
COMMIT message; (5) Each replica that receives 2 f +1 COMMIT messages accepts and executes
the request; (6) The client waits for f +1 matching replies from different replicas to accept the
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result.
A replica validates a PRE-PREPARE message if the signatures in the request and the PRE-
PREPARE message are correct and if the PRE-PREPARE message was created by the primary of
the current view. The primary replica defines the order in which client requests are executed by
all replicas. When the primary is suspected to be faulty, a view-change protocol is executed in
order to provide liveness by allowing the system to make progress. View changes are triggered
by timeouts that prevent replicas from waiting indefinitely for requests to be executed.
Periodically replicas exchange CHECKPOINT messages with a proof of their current state.
When a replica collects 2 f +1 CHECKPOINT messages with the same state signed by different
replicas, it learns that at least 2 f + 1 replicas have progressed and all messages related with
earlier requests can be discarded. In terms of performance, PBFT is often considered the
baseline of today’s Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms, probably because it was the first efficient
algorithm in the area and many others derive from it, e.g., (Amir et al., 2008a; Clement et al.,
2009; Cowling et al., 2006; Kotla et al., 2007). A comparison of these BFT algorithms using
a simulator in (Singh et al., 2008) analyses the effects of changes in the costs of cryptography
operations, workloads, network conditions and faults, showing that one-size-fits-all algorithms
may be hard to design.
2.2.2 Zyzzyva – Speculative Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Zyzzyva is a Byzantine state machine replication algorithm that explores speculation in
order to reduce the overhead caused by the agreement protocol (Kotla et al., 2007). In
Zyzzyva, replicas optimistically adopt the order of requests proposed by the primary and
respond immediately to the client, without reaching agreement on the order of the requests.
Thus, replicas can become inconsistent when the primary is faulty. In these cases, clients detect
these inconsistencies and help the replicas to converge on a single total ordering of requests.
Zyzzyva is executed by 3 f + 1 replicas and also uses the concept of views. In each view
one server is designated as a primary and the others are backups. In normal operation a client
sends a request to the primary, the primary forwards the request to the replicas, and they execute
the request and send their responses to the client.
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The response sent by the servers contains the result of the operation requested by the client.
The client only accepts a result when it receives a sufficient number of matching responses
(3 f +1), to ensure that all correct replicas have executed the request and all preceding requests
in the same order. Therefore, the servers send responses that include the result and the history.
The history is the sequence of all requests executed by a replica prior to and including this
request.
Clients wait for 3 f + 1 matching responses during a time interval. If a client receives
between 2 f + 1 and 3 f matching responses then it sends these 2 f + 1 matching responses in
a message to all replicas. This set of messages composes a commit certificate that proves that
2 f + 1 replicas agree on the order that the requests were executed. Hence, only when 2 f + 1
replicas acknowledge receiving a commit certificate, the client accepts the result and acts on it.
If the client receives fewer than 2 f +1 responses, then it retransmits the request to all replicas
and during a time interval replicas wait that the request is ordered. If the primary does not order
the request replicas there is a view change and a new primary is chosen.
If the primary is faulty, replicas can become temporarily inconsistent with one another, but
when clients detect these inconsistencies in the responses, they help correct replicas to converge
on a single total ordering of requests. To do this, replicas have to perform rollback of some
executed requests. The amount of information about the state that is stored by each replica is
limited by a checkpoint mechanism that also reduces the cost of performing view changes.
The performance results presented by Zyzzyva show that speculation can improve the
performance of existing BFT protocols in fault-free settings. On the other hand, in networks
with heterogeneous latency among client and replicas Zyzzyva tends to perform similarly to
a two-phase quorum protocol like HQ (Cowling et al., 2006). Besides, for some kind of
applications performing rollback of operations is not practical.
2.2.3 Prime – Byzantine algorithms under attacks
BFT algorithms derived from PBFT, like Zyzzyva, are based on a primary (or leader) server
that is in charge of ordering client requests (Cowling et al., 2006; Kotla et al., 2007; Clement
et al., 2009). In these BFT algorithms, servers move through a succession of configurations
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called views. Each view has a primary. Often, the primary server remains the same as long as
no faults are detected. When a subset of the servers suspects that the primary is faulty, they
choose another server to be the primary.
This basic scheme has been shown to be vulnerable to performance attacks by Amir et al.
(Amir et al., 2008a). More precisely, these authors have shown two attacks that can degrade
the performance of PBFT and other BFT leader-based algorithms to let them so slow that they
are barely usable. Byzantine-resilient replication algorithms satisfy safety under any conditions
and provide liveness under certain conditions, normally during periods of sufficient synchrony.
In the first attack, called pre-prepare delay, a faulty primary delays the ordering of requests
from some of the clients, causing a considerable increase of the latency of those requests and
a great reduction of the throughput. Leader-based algorithms like PBFT impose a maximum
delay on the execution of requests, but only on the first request of the queue of pending requests,
so a faulty primary can process one request at a time, strongly delaying most requests. In the
second attack, timeout manipulation, faulty servers manage to increase the timeouts used by the
algorithm, seriously degrading the performance of the system. These attacks also apply to some
of the algorithms that derive from PBFT, like Zyzzyva, or that use PBFT as a component, like
Byzantium (Preguic¸a et al., 2008).
Amir et al. propose a performance-oriented metric to evaluate BFT algorithms and present
Prime, a Byzantine-resilient state machine replication that performs according to this metric
(Amir et al., 2008a). The Prime replication algorithm establishes the total order of requests in
two phases. In the first phase, each server disseminates requests received from the clients to
the other servers and coordinates an agreement protocol, which preorders those requests. In the
second phase, the primary coordinates a global ordering algorithm, which establishes a total
order on batches of preordered requests. Prime also defines a reconciliation phase assuring
that all correct servers receive requests even when malicious servers preorder requests without
sending them to all servers.
Prime uses a suspect-leader mechanism that is in charge of (1) dynamically determining
how fast a timely leader should perform, (2) monitoring the performance of the current leader,
and (3) suspecting the leader if it is not performing fast enough. Together with the two phases
replication algorithm, the suspect-leader mechanism makes the system able to detect several
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performance attacks and change the leader when it degrades the performance of the system.
The performance evaluation shows that in fault-free cases Prime has a greater latency than
PBFT algorithm due to the additional communications steps. However, under performance
degradation attacks Prime showed to be much more robust than PBFT.
2.2.4 Aardvark – Making BFT Systems Tolerate Byzantine Faults
The main motivation for the implementation of the Aardvark algorithm was the existence
of some vulnerabilities in BFT state machine replication algorithms (Clement et al., 2009).
Although some recent algorithms, like Zyzzyva, have reduced the cost of BFT replication, their
optimizations have introduced vulnerabilities making these algorithms not tolerate Byzantine
faults properly. In fact, a single faulty client or a server can increase the service latency reducing
significantly the throughput of the system.
In order to improve their performance, some BFT algorithms use vectors of message
authentication codes (MACs) for authentication, rather than digital signatures (Castro & Liskov,
1999; Cowling et al., 2006; Kotla et al., 2007). Vectors of MACs do not provide non-
repudiation, i.e., after validating a message’s MAC, a server cannot be sure that any other server
in the system will also validate that message. For BFT algorithms this is problematic because
correct replicas need to make the same decision with respect to the validity of messages. Castro
describes in his thesis (Castro, 2000) that due to this limitation of vector of MAC, a faulty client
can force view-changes. For example, a faulty client sends a request with a good MAC for the
primary but a bad MAC for all other replicas. The primary authenticates and assigns a sequence
number seq to the request and sends a PRE-PREPARE message to the replicas. The replicas are
unable to authenticate the request, thus they do not send a PREPARE message. At this point, no
request with sequence number greater than seq can be executed, thus the progress stops until a
view-change operation occurs and the client can repeat its behavior in the new view.
As described in the Section 2.2.3, a faulty primary can delay processing requests in order
to affect the system performance. Besides, a faulty primary can discard some client requests,
corrupt clients’ MAC authenticators, introduce gaps in the sequence number space, etc. Even
non-primary servers can affect the system availability by flooding the network with large junk
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messages causing significant impact on the overall system throughput.
To cope with these problems Clement et al. propose Aardvark. The main idea behind
Aardvark is to provide a robust algorithm that presents a good performance during gracious
executions (when execution is synchronous and servers behave correctly) and, keep this
performance during uncivil executions (up to f servers and an arbitrary number of clients are
Byzantine and the execution is synchronous with a short bound message delay defined).
Aardvark follows the communication pattern of PBFT. The main differences are:
• Signed client requests - although message authentication codes (MACS) using
symmetric-key cryptography is three orders of magnitude faster than public-key
cryptography operations, in Aardvark clients sign their requests using digital signatures
to ensure non-repudiation and that all correct replicas make identical decisions about the
validity of client requests. In PBFT, a faulty client can sign a request with a partial valid
MAC making some correct replicas validate the request and others not.
• Resource isolation - in Aardvark each pair of replicas is connected by separate network
interface controllers (NICs) and cables. The idea is to prevent faulty servers from
interfering with timely delivery of messages from correct servers. It also allows avoiding
denial of service attacks by disabling compromised NICs.
• Regular view changes - Aardvark proposes the use of periodical view changes in order to
prevent performance degradation attacks where a faulty primary reduces the throughput of
the system by delaying the message that defines the order of requests. Replicas monitor
the performance of the current primary: if the primary fails to provide an acceptable
throughput, replicas initiate a view change.
Due to these modifications, Aardvark limits the vulnerability to disruption caused by any
client, primary or server. The performance of this algorithm was compared with a set of BFT
algorithms and shown that although it presents a good performance, Aardvark does not achieve
results as good as PBFT in the fault-free case. However, it presents the best performance for a
broad range of cases with injected faults.
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2.3 Intrusion-Tolerant SMR with fewer Replicas
Reducing the number of replicas in BFT algorithms requires modifying the system model
to a hybrid fault model. Like the algorithms of Section 2.2, the system model is composed of
hosts interconnected by a network where malicious faults can occur, therefore it does not make
assumptions on these faults. However, the basic system model is extended with a subsystem –
a wormhole – that is always correct thus trusted, i.e., which is not affected by malicious faults.
A few years ago, an algorithm that needs only 2 f +1 replicas was published (Correia et al.,
2004). This algorithm requires that the system is enhanced with a tamperproof distributed
component called Trusted Timely Computing Base (TTCB). More recently, another BFT
algorithm with only 2 f + 1 replicas was presented, A2M-PBFT-EA (Chun et al., 2007). It
is based on a local trusted component called Attested Append-Only Memory (A2M).
Yin et al. presented a BFT algorithm for an architecture that separates agreement (made by
3 f +1 servers) from service execution (made by 2 f +1 servers) (Yin et al., 2003). This was an
important contribution to the area because service execution is expected to require much more
computational resources than agreement. However, the algorithm still needs 3 f +1 machines.
Details about the trusted components mentioned above, as well as the corresponding algorithms’
operation, are described in the next sections.
2.3.1 TTCB – Tolerating Half Less One Byzantine Nodes
The Trusted Timely Computing Base (TTCB) is a distributed wormhole. It is used for
the implementation of Byzantine state machine replication services, reducing the number of
required replicas to 2 f + 1 (Correia et al., 2004). The system model is composed by a set of
servers interconnected by a network. The TTCB is distributed with local parts in some of the
servers and its own communication channel.
The TTCB provides a very simple and limited set of services, hence the implementation
can be formally verified. The first is the Local Authentication Service, which guarantees the
integrity of the communication between the server and its local TTCB. The second is the Trusted
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Multicast Ordering (TMO) service, an ordering service used to implement an atomic multicast
protocol which is the core of the replication scheme.
In order to circumvent the FLP result the original version of the TTCB was synchronous
(Correia et al., 2002), but if another solution is used with this purpose, e.g., failure detectors,
the TTCB can be implemented as a non-real-time trusted component (Correia et al., 2004). To
increase the protection of the TTCB, it can be implemented in a isolated hardware module and
the communication between TTCBs has to be completely independent of the communication
channel used by the unstrusted components (each host has two network adapters).
The state machine replication algorithm that uses the TTCB basically operates in the
following way: (1) a client sends a command to one of the servers; (2) the server sends
the command to all servers using an atomic multicast protocol; (3) each server executes the
command and sends a reply to the client; (4) the client waits for f + 1 identical replies from
different servers.
The core of the algorithm executed by the servers is the atomic multicast protocol, which
guarantees that if the sender is correct all correct servers deliver the sent message in the same
order. The TMO service assists the atomic multicast protocol assigning an order number to
the message. When a process p wants to send a message to other process, it gives the TTCB
a cryptographic hash of the message and multicasts the message through the network. When
another process q receives the message, it also gives the TTCB a hash of the message; When a
certain number of processes gave the hash of the message, the TTCB assigns an order number to
the message and gives that number to the processes. All correct processes deliver the messages
in the order defined by the TTCB.
By relying on the services provided by the TTCB, the state machine replication algorithm
exhibit good time and message complexities when compared with more traditional Byzantine
algorithms. Moreover, the algorithm only requires n = 2 f + 1 processes, instead of the usual
n = 3 f +1.
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2.3.2 A2M – Making Adversaries Stick To Their Word
The Attested Append-Only Memory (A2M) is an abstraction of a trusted log. It was
conceived to be small, easy to implement and consequently formally verifiable (Chun et al.,
2007). An A2M log offers methods to append values and to lookup values within the log. It
also provides a method to obtain the end of the log and to advance the suffix stored in memory
(used to skip ahead by multiple sequence numbers). There are no methods to replace values
that have already been assigned.
The main goal of this trusted component is to provide a log for algorithms to become
immune to equivocation. Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms have to deal with faulty hosts that
can provide false and inconsistent information in different ways to different clients or servers.
The A2M was specially designed to constrain this kind of behavior. It mitigates the effects of
Byzantine faults in the untrusted components by relying on the history of operations provided
by the A2M which cannot be tampered.
The A2M abstraction was applied in the PBFT algorithm in order to reduce the number of
replicas from 3 f + 1 to 2 f + 1, originating the A2M-PBFT-EA algorithm. Each replica was
equipped with an A2M and all messages exchanged among replicas are appended to A2M logs
before they are sent to other replicas. The A2M provides attestation to protect that message
from integrity attacks and to make it non-repudiable. Therefore, certificates for prepared and
committed requests, for view changes and checkpoints in A2M-PBFT-EA have size f + 1, as
opposed to 2 f +1 in PBFT.
The performance evaluation shows that A2M is a practical tool for improving Byzantine
fault tolerance algorithms. However, to implement the A2M-PBFT-EA it is necessary to
manage five logs, therefore the abstraction of a trusted log may require more storage space
and complexity than the authors assume.
2.3.3 Separating Agreement from Execution
Yin et al. consider that two barriers limit the widespread use of the BFT algorithms to
improve security. First, although existing BFT algorithms improve integrity and availability,
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compromising a single replica is enough to endanger confidentiality. Second, BFT algorithms
require 3 f + 1 replicas, which is a significant cost even with falling hardware costs. Yin et
al. proposed a new general BFT replication architecture to address these two problems (Yin
et al., 2003).
The key principle of this architecture is to separate agreement from execution. State
machine replication relies on first agreeing on a order of all requests and then executing these
requests on all state machine replicas. While the system still requires 3 f +1 agreement replicas
to order requests using Byzantine-resilient agreement, it only requires a simple majority of
correct execution replicas to process the ordered requests, i.e., 2 f + 1. This distinction is
crucial because service execution is expected to require much more computational resources
than agreement. Note that, this is obtained without using trusted component, i.e., the system
model is identical to PBFT’s.
Servers are divided in an agreement cluster and an execution cluster. The client sends
a request to the agreement cluster that executes the PBFT algorithm in order to obtain an
agreement certificate that defines the order of request execution. Then, the agreement cluster
forwards the client request and the agreement certificate to the execution cluster. The execution
cluster implements an application-specific state machine to process requests in the order
determined by the agreement cluster.
Separating agreement from execution leads to a privacy firewall architecture to protect con-
fidentiality through Byzantine replication. In existing state machine replication architectures,
the voting operation is executed by clients that wait for f + 1 matching replies to accept the
result. When confidentiality is a requirement, this kind of architectures allows a malicious client
to observe confidential information leaked by faulty servers. Yin et al. proposed a redundant
set of privacy firewall nodes to restrict the communication of the execution nodes filtering out
incorrect replies before they reach the agreement nodes or the clients.
The privacy firewall acts between the execution cluster and the clients passing only
information sent by correct execution servers. The system restricts communication by (1)
physically connecting firewall nodes only to the nodes directly above and below them and (2)
encrypting the bodies of requests and replies. The first restriction enforces the requirement
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that all communication between execution nodes and the outside world flow through at least
one correct firewall. The second restriction prevents nodes below the correct cut of firewall
nodes from accumulating and revealing confidential state by observing the bodies of requests
and replies.
The performance evaluation shows that the proposed architecture adds modest latencies to
unreplicated systems and that its performance is competitive with existing BFT algorithms. On
the other hand, when the privacy firewall is used, the system must pay additional cost for the
extra firewall nodes and for a relatively expensive threshold signature operation.
2.4 State Machine Replication on WANs
The state machine approach is a general solution to implement highly available services.
For local area networks this approach has presented a good performance when used to
implemented fault and intrusion-tolerant algorithms (Castro & Liskov, 1999; Kotla et al.,
2007). However, in large-scale environments – or wide-area networks (WANs) – some state
machine approach’s features prevent these algorithms from scaling and having an acceptable
performance. This section presents works that have implemented and evaluated fault and
intrusion-tolerant algorithms suitable for wide-area networks.
2.4.1 Mencius – Building Efficient Replicated State Machines
Mencius is a crash fault-tolerant state machine replication algorithm used to implement
distributed fault-tolerant services on wide-area networks (Mao et al., 2008). Existing crash
fault-tolerant algorithms such as Paxos (Lamport, 2001) and Fast Paxos (Lamport, 2006) have
some limitations to implement wide-area applications. These algorithms usually rely on a
primary replica that is in charge of defining the order of client requests. This primary replica
becomes a bottleneck that limits the system throughput. Besides, the primary processes more
messages than the other replicas. This unbalanced communication pattern limits the utilization
of available bandwidth in the network which connects the servers.
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The main goal of Mencius is to overcome these limitations providing an efficient fault-
tolerant algorithm for wide-area applications. Mencius is derived from Paxos whose replicas
play one or more of the following roles: proposers (propose values), acceptors (choose the value
to be decided) and learners (learn the chosen value).
Paxos’ communication pattern is the following: (1) Each server receives clients’ requests
and forwards them to the leader; (2) The leader proposes the order to execute the request through
a PROPOSAL message; (3) If there are no other leaders concurrently proposing requests, then
the servers acknowledge the request proposed by the leader with ACCEPT messages; (4) Once
the leader receives ACCEPT messages from a majority of the servers, it learns that the value
has been chosen and broadcasts LEARN message to inform the other servers that a majority of
servers agree on the request order.
Mencius follows this communication pattern and proposes a multi-leader state machine
approach. Servers are spread across a wide-area network, each site has one server and an
unbounded number of clients. A client only requests operations to the local server and in each
round of the algorithm execution a different server is designated to be the primary. When the
local server becomes the primary it multicast the client requests sending a PROPOSAL message
to the other servers, following the communication pattern described above.
When a server does not have clients’ requests to order, it sends a SKIP message giving the
chance to another server become the primary. A revoke mechanism is used to ensure progress
when replicas suspect that the leader is crashed. Some server will eventually arise as the new
leader and revoke the right of the primary to propose a value.
Due to the rotating primary, some messages can be piggybacked reducing the algorithm’s
latency. This basic form of operation amortizes the load of being a leader, increasing the
algorithm throughput. The performance evaluation shows that Mencius sustains a higher
throughput and presents a better scalability when compared with Paxos. Mencius also presents
a better latency, although the effect of network variance on both protocols is complex.
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2.4.2 RAM – Low Latency State Machine Replication
Mao et. al (Mao et al., 2009) describe the design principles of a BFT algorithm for wide-
area networks – RAM algorithm – based on the use of the A2M trusted service (Chun et al.,
2007) and a rotating primary as in Mencius (Mao et al., 2008).
The system model considers that the number of sites is 3 f + 1 and that each site supplies
one state machine replica, assuming that no more than f servers can exhibit Byzantine behavior.
Clients trust and communicate only with the local server since mechanisms are used to deal with
compromised servers. Servers in other sites, however, are treated as being possibly uncivil,
i.e., they can deviate arbitrarily from their algorithm, even by colluding with some malicious
purpose. This model is called mutually suspicious domains: there is trust between the server
and clients within a domain; there is no trust for inter-domain communication.
The rotating leader scheme defines that servers take turns to be the primary and all other
servers are called replicas. The leader orders clients’ requests sending a PROPOSE message or
no requests sending a SKIP message.
The trusted service (A2M) is used to avoid that Byzantine leaders send inconsistent
proposals, e.g., that a faulty leader sends a PROPOSE message to one server and a SKIP message
to another. Each server is equipped with a local A2M. Whenever the leader sends a PROPOSE
or a SKIP, it appends the message in its A2M log. The A2M record the hash of the message and
the sequence numbers that it has signed.
The algorithm works basically as follows: (1) Clients send requests only to the local servers;
(2) When a server becomes the leader, it sends a PROPOSE or a SKIP message; (3) When a
replica receives a PROPOSE message it broadcasts an ACCEPT message and relays the PROPOSE
message using a P-RELAY; (4) A correct server learns the client request when it receives 2 f +1
matching ACCEPT messages. (5) When a replica receives a SKIP message it relays the message
using S-RELAY to all other servers and learns that no operation has been chosen.
Only PROPOSE, SKIP, P-RELAY and S-RELAY messages are digitally signed by the A2M.
The last two messages are used during the revoke mechanism. When more than α replicas
suspect that the current leader is faulty, a new leader is elected to revoke the suspected leader (α
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is a system parameter). The new leader uses the P-RELAY and S-RELAY messages to compose
a progress certificate that assures that if a correct server learns a request, then all correct servers
learn that request, even if some of the servers are Byzantine.
In order to enforce liveness, RAM uses an eventually accurate failure detector that instead
of outputting a binary value (either suspected or not) for each server, it outputs three values:
correct, suspicious, or faulty. A server is believed to be correct if it sends messages in time
and no misbehavior is detected. A server is considered faulty if is detected that it proposes
inconsistent requests to the same consensus instance. Finally, a server is considered suspicious
if it does not propose, accept or skip its turns on time.
Currently, there is no implementation of RAM, consequently there is no performance
evaluation, but Mencius proved that the rotating leader algorithm can be efficient on WANs.
Besides, the mutually suspicious domains model makes clients send requests only to the local
server reducing the latency in one wide-area communication step when compared, for example,
with PBFT. Assuming this model, some operations that do not require linearizability can be
executed locally without the price of wide-area communication. On the other hand, some issues
related to the revoke mechanism and failure detector suggest that RAM may be vulnerable to
performance attacks.
2.4.3 Steward – Scaling Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Replication
Steward is a hierarchical Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication architecture for
systems whose servers are distributed in multiple wide-area sites (Amir et al., 2006). The main
goal is to define a scalable architecture for BFT systems deployed on large-scale environments.
Steward defines two levels of distributed algorithms, a Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm
based on PBFT that is executed by the servers within each site and a benign fault-tolerant
algorithm based on Paxos, that is executed by the wide-area sites. The required numbers of sites
and replicas are intrinsically related to these protocols: the numbers of sites has to be 2 f +1 and
the number of replicas in each site has to be 3 f +1, where f is the maximum number of faulty
sites/servers. Both algorithms are used to ensure the required properties: safety and liveness.
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In order to attest the content of a message originated by a given site, messages exchanged
among servers located in different sites carry a threshold signature (Desmedt & Frankel, 1989).
The idea of the threshold signature mechanism is that, each site has a public key and the
corresponding private key is shared among its servers. Considering n to be the number of
servers, it is possible to define a (t,n)-threshold signature scheme, where at least t servers are
required for creating a signature. In the Steward’s architecture, a (2 f + 1, 3 f + 1) threshold
digital signature scheme is used. One site is designated to be the leading site that is in charge of
coordinating the wide-area algorithm, assigning sequence numbers to the clients’ requests. Each
site has a representative server which is responsible for coordinating the local BFT algorithm
and the threshold signature scheme.
In Steward clients and servers operate basically as follows: (1) Clients of a given site request
operations to the representative server. (2) When a representative server receives a request, it
forwards the request to the representative of the leading site. (3) The representative server of the
leading site coordinates the BFT algorithm in order to assign a global sequence number to the
client request. The global sequence number is signed by the site using the threshold signature
scheme and it is encapsulated in a PROPOSAL message that is sent by the representative to all
other sites using the inter-site protocol. (4) When a representative server receives a PROPOSAL
from the leading site it sends an ACCEPT message to the other sites. The representative server
constructs ACCEPT messages using the threshold signature scheme. (5) When a representative
server receives ACCEPT messages from other sites, it forwards these messages to the local
servers. (6) When a correct server receives 2 f + 1 ACCEPT messages from distinct servers,
it accepts and executes a client request.
Steward also includes algorithms to elect the leading site, the local representative and the
leading site representative. The generic objective of these algorithms is to deal with failures,
in order to preserve safety and liveness in case of a representative server is faulty or the
partitioning of the leader site. In Steward, due to its hierarchical architecture, read operations
are performed only by local replicas, therefore this kind of operations presents a better latency
when compared with versions of PBFT deployed on large-scale environments. Besides, the
proposed architecture confines the actions of malicious replicas to their local site, allowing the
use of a benign fault-tolerant algorithm over the WAN, increasing system scalability. However,
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the use of a benign fault-tolerant algorithm has a price: Steward can withstand f out of 3 f +1
Byzantine failures within each site but cannot survive even a single compromised site. This
limitation is overcome in (Amir et al., 2008b) by using Byzantine-resilient communication
among sites implemented using virtual links that are reliable.
2.5 Trusted Computing
Trusted computing is a broad term, used to refer to certain technologies and proposals to
improve the security of computer systems and networks making them safer, less prone to viruses
and malware. In a more specific sense, the idea is to include in the computers a component that
is able to protect sensitive information from adversaries with physical access or that try to steal
information using malicious software.
The main branch of trusted computing work emerged in the context of software protection.
Best in 1980 proposed a secure coprocessor to execute programs that are stored encrypted in
order to prevent them from being corrupted or copied for use in a unauthorized processors
(Best, 1980). Kent extended Best’s work to protect software using a tamper resistant module.
Programs were encrypted into the tamper resistant module which decrypts and executes them
inside its private space (Kent, 1980).
White and Comerford at IBM Watson continued the work of Kent and others with ABYSS
– a Basic Yorktown Security System (White & Comerford, 1990). ABYSS is an architecture for
the trusted execution of application software. This architecture is based on a secure coprocessor
that executes a small and critical software that increases the protection of the other software
running on the unprotected host. The main difference with the Kent’s work is that rather
than trying to secure the entire execution environment of the software, White and Comerford
proposed a partitioned computation: dividing the application into a portion that run inside of
the secure coprocessor and a portion that runs inside of the unprotected host.
White and colleagues refined the ABYSS design in the Citadel project (Palmer, 1992). The
project consisted in the development of a tamperproof hardware module to provide a set of
security services to the rest of the host machine. The main services provided by the Citadel
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project were: cryptographic functions, authentication, secure storage, access control, audit and
a trusted execution environment.
The prototypes of Citadel were used by Yee and Tygar in the Dyad project (Tygar & Yee,
1993). The secure coprocessor was used to support the execution of new applications addressing
a number of security problems: protecting the integrity of publicly accessible workstations;
tamper-proof accounting/audit trails; copy protection; electronic currency without centralized
servers; and electronic contracts. In addition, the secure coprocessor was used to check the
software’s integrity during the host’s boot process.
The Citadel secure coprocessor that was used in the Dyad project was evolved to
commercial products originating the secure coprocessors IBM 4758 and IBM 4764, currently
available in some IBM servers (Dyer et al., 2001). These coprocessors are implemented on
a high-security, programmable PCI board. They provide a secure subsystem in which data
processing and cryptography can be performed. These tamper-resistant environments are
implemented by specialized cryptographic electronics, microprocessor, memory, and random
number generator.
Recognizing the importance of improving the security of computers systems and networks,
in 1999 AMD, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Infineon, Intel, Microsoft, and Sun Microsystems created
the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) 1. Today, the TCG is an organization that consists
of industrial and academic members, that aims at developing and supporting open industry
specifications for trusted computing across multiples platform types. The TCG has released
several specifications that describe the main requirements for a trusted platform. A trusted
platform behaves in expected ways and its behavior is ensured by a combination of hardware
and software components specially designed for this purpose. The specifications describe how
to make an existing computing system become trusted, and how to increase the security in
environments like network infrastructures. The core component of the TCG specification is the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that is described in the next section.
1The first name was Trusted Platform Alliance (TCPA) in 2003 but it was renamed TCG.
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2.5.1 Trusted Platform Module
The TPM is the main component of the TCG specifications, increasingly becoming
available as a chip in commodity PCs (Trusted Computing Group, 2007a). The TPM is
a secure coprocessor that contains its own processor, memory and software. The Trusted
Computing Group specifications also describe a library for applications to access the TPM
functionalities, the Trusted Software Stack (TSS). The interaction with the TPM is performed
through commands. Each command provides one TPM functionality (Kinney, 2006; Trusted
Computing Group, 2007c). Internally the TPM is composed by the following components
(Trusted Computing Group, 2007b):
Volatile memory – contains all data that is not kept when the computer is turn off. This
memory stores temporary RSA keys and information used by the TPM commands.
Non-volatile memory – used to store the Endorsement Key (EK), the Storage Root Key
(SRK), owner authorization data, persistent flags and counters, and Program Configuration
Registers (PCRs). EK is an encryption key that uniquely identifies each TPM (a RSA key
pair). It is generated as part of the TPM’s manufacturing process. SRK is also a RSA key pair,
created inside of the TPM. Its private part never leaves the TPM, and it is used to encrypt all
other keys created by the TPM. PCRs are memory slots. Platform boot processes measure each
of the components in the system (both hardware and software) and securely store the results of
the measurements in the PCRs. TPM has support for at least 4 monotonic counters and must
allow 7 years of increments every 5 seconds without causing a hardware failure.
Functional units – The TPM has a hardware random number generator (RNG), which
provides a source of high-quality random numbers for on-chip key generation and to be used
by other applications. It has a hash unit (SHA-1) and an associated message authentication
(HMAC) engine. It has also the ability to generate RSA keys of up to 2,048 bits on the
chip, based on random numbers supplied by the RNG. It has an RSA engine that can perform
signatures, encryption and decryption. The TPM does not do signature verification, as this is
not a sensitive operation. The functional units also contain the firmware for measuring platform
devices.
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TCG specification defines that a trusted platform should provide at least three mechanisms
(Trusted Computing Group, 2004):
• Integrity measurement: is the process of obtaining metrics of platform characteristics that
affect the integrity (trustworthiness) of a platform and putting digests of those metrics
inside of the TPM. The TPM has registers for storing integrity measurements (Platform
Configuration Registers), authorization information (the TPM’s owner password), and
keys.
• Sealed storage: protects private information by binding it to a specific platform configu-
ration including the software and hardware being used. This means that the sealed data
can be read only by the same combination of software and hardware.
• Integrity report: creates an unforgeable hash summary of the hardware and software
configuration in a computer allowing that modifications in this computer are detected
by authorized parties.
Some applications have explored the TPM in order to increase the security avoiding
data exposure and software attacks. Microsoft defined a new security technology, the Next
Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), for Windows (Microsoft TechNet, 2003).
NGSCB uses the TPM in order to implement integrity report and sealed storage. The Wave
Systems’ Embassy Trust Suite (ETS) delivers advanced levels of security to the client PC using
the TPM (Molsberry & Berger, 2007). ETS provides data protection, password management,
TPM management, and TPM key backup/recovery. BitLocker Drive Encryption explores the
use of the TPM to provide a full-disk encryption application, to protect the keys used in the
encryption, and also to provide authentication through a trusted boot pathway (Ferguson, 2006).
These are some examples of current applications/technologies that use the TPM in order to
reduce security risks.
The industry is making progress towards robust, standard-based trusted platforms. These
solutions should include comprehensive TPM functionalities, native operating system support,
and PKI infrastructure on the network. However, it is still unclear when all of these elements
will be in place and mature enough for end-to-end solutions to be routinely deployed.
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3
Byzantine Consensus with
2f + 1 Processes
Consensus is a classical distributed systems problem with both theoretical and practical
interest (Lynch, 1996; Guerraoui et al., 2000). First introduced in (Pease et al., 1980), the
problem can be stated informally as: how to ensure that a set of distributed processes achieve
agreement on a value despite a number of faulty processes.
From a theoretical point of view, the importance of this problem derives from several other
distributed systems problems being reducible or equivalent to it. Examples are atomic broadcast
(Hadzilacos & Toueg, 1994; Chandra & Toueg, 1996; Correia et al., 2006), non-blocking
atomic commit (Guerraoui & Schiper, 2001), group membership (Guerraoui & Schiper, 2001),
and state machine replication (Schneider, 1990). These relations between consensus and
other distributed problems are important because they imply that many results stated for
consensus apply to these other problems. Among these results, the most relevant is probably
the impossibility of solving consensus deterministically in an asynchronous system if a single
process can crash, often called the Fisher-Lynch-Paterson (FLP) result (Fischer et al., 1985).
This result has lead to a large number of works that try to circumvent it, i.e., to slightly
modify the system model in such a way that consensus becomes solvable. Examples include
randomization (Rabin, 1983; Ben-Or, 1983), failure detectors (Chandra & Toueg, 1996; Malkhi
& Reiter, 1997), partial-synchrony (Dwork et al., 1988; Dolev et al., 1987), and wormholes
(Correia et al., 2005; Neves et al., 2005).
Byzantine consensus in asynchronous message-passing systems has been shown to require
at least 3 f + 1 processes to be solvable in several system models e.g., with failure detectors,
partial synchrony or randomization. Baldoni et al. present a sophisticated algorithm that
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assumes f ≤min(b(n−1)/2c,C), where C is the maximum number of faulty processes allowed
by the certification algorithm (Baldoni et al., 2003). However, as they point out, “known
certification techniques assume n−C= d2n+13 e.” This means that in practice their algorithm also
requires n ≥ 3 f + 1. As presented in the Section 2.3 recently two works (Correia et al., 2004;
Chun et al., 2007) have shown that the reduction from 3 f +1 to 2 f +1 replicas is possible with a
hybrid system model, i.e., by extending the system model with trusted/trustworthy components
that constrain the power of faulty processes to have certain behaviors. These components have
been called wormholes, a science-fiction inspired designation that suggests that they are short-
cuts to obtain otherwise unavailable properties (Verissimo, 2002; Verissimo, 2006). Systems
with wormholes are no longer homogeneous but hybrid: most of the system is still asynchronous
Byzantine but the wormhole is trusted/trustworthy by construction.
In this chapter we present how to implement a 2 f +1 Byzantine consensus algorithm using
a 2 f + 1 reliable multicast algorithm. Like previous works, to solve asynchronous Byzantine
consensus with 2 f + 1 processes we need a trusted/trustworthy component, or wormhole, to
obtain certain properties. However, we use the abstraction provided by the wormhole to obtain
a communication primitive commonly used in distributed computing: reliable multicast. This
primitive ensures that all processes (i) deliver the same messages and (ii) deliver all messages
sent by correct (i.e., non-faulty) processes. More precisely, we present a reliable multicast
algorithm that imposes no bounds on the number of faulty processes, unlike previous existing
algorithms that require n ≥ 3 f + 1 (Bracha, 1984; Reiter, 1994). In consequence, this reliable
multicast algorithm also satisfies its properties with n≥ 2 f +1 processes.
An important aspect of the design of 2 f +1 Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms is the design
of the trusted component. This problem is not novel for it is similar to the problem of designing a
Trusted Computing Base or a reference monitor. A fundamental goal is to design the component
in such a way that it is verifiable, which requires simplicity (see for example (Gasser, 1988)).
Therefore, the second contribution of this chapter is the presentation of the Unique Sequential
Identifier Generator (USIG), that is a trusted/tamperproof service that is simpler that the two
previous in the literature and arguably minimal. The USIG service is used to implement a
Confirmable Reliable Multicast (CRM) algorithm that is the building block component used to
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implement the 2 f +1 BFT state machine replication algorithms defined in this thesis (Chapters
4 and 6).
3.1 System Model
We consider a system composed by a set of n processes Π = {p1, p2, ...pn}. A process is
said to be correct if it follows its algorithm, otherwise it is said to be faulty. Faulty processes
can deviate from the algorithm arbitrarily, i.e., we assume the existence of Byzantine faults.
However, no more than f = bn−12 c can be faulty (in the tight case n = 2 f +1).
Processes communicate by message-passing. Every pair of processes is linked by an
authenticated reliable channel. The system is asynchronous, which means that there are no
bounds on the processing times or communication delays. However, we assume the existence
of a muteness failure detector composed by failure detector modules in each of the processes.
Failure detectors give hints about faulty processes. The original failure detectors were used
to suspect that processes crashed (Chandra & Toueg, 1996). We consider muteness failure
detectors, which suspect that a process is mute, either because it crashed or is Byzantine and
stopped sending messages according to the algorithm (Doudou et al., 2005). We assume an
algorithm A that generates a set of messages. A message m is an A -message if it corresponds
to the syntax of the messages generated by A . The definition of mute process is the following:
• Mute process. A process q is mute to some correct process p, with respect to some
algorithm A , if there is a time after which p stops receiving A -messages from q.
Unlike crash failure detectors, muteness failure detectors depends on the algorithm A .
We consider a class of muteness failure detectors that is inspired in Chandra and Toueg’s
eventually perfect failure detector, which we call eventually perfect muteness FD, ♦MPA .
Failure detectors of this class satisfy the following properties:
• Mute A -completeness. Eventually every process that is mute to any correct process p is
permanently suspected by p.
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• Eventual strong A -accuracy. There is a time after which correct processes are not
suspected by any correct process.
This failure detector is stronger than others used in previous Byzantine consensus algo-
rithms that require, e.g., only eventual weak A -accuracy (Doudou et al., 2005; Baldoni et al.,
2003). However, the two properties above are reasonable in the sense that they are satisfied
whenever the network delays become stable (to put it informally). Doudou et al. provide an
implementation ID of the muteness failure detector ♦MA that they introduce (Doudou et al.,
2005). Although that failure detector satisfies only eventual weak A -accuracy, it is simple to
show that ID is also an implementation of our ♦MPA failure detector in the same partial
synchronous model (in which we assume that there is a time after which process relative speeds
and communication delays are bounded).
It is also important to note that the Mute A -completeness property is identical to the one
used in other algorithms (Doudou et al., 2005; Baldoni et al., 2003) and does not involve
agreement between correct processes on another process being faulty. More precisely, what
the property says is that if a faulty process p′ is mute to a correct process p then eventually p′
is permanently suspected by p; the property does not say that if p′ is mute to p then eventually
all correct processes will suspect of p′, which would be impossible to enforce.
3.2 2 f +1 Reliable Multicast
The reliable multicast problem consists basically in making all correct processes deliver
the same messages (Bracha, 1984). Furthermore, if the process that multicasts the message
is correct, then all correct processes deliver the message, and no two messages with the same
identifier are delivered by any correct process. Formally, a reliable multicast algorithm can be
defined in terms of the following properties (Hadzilacos & Toueg, 1994; Cachin et al., 2001):
• RM1 Validity. If a correct process multicasts a message m, then some correct process
eventually delivers m.
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• RM2 Agreement. If a correct process delivers a message m, then all correct processes
eventually deliver m.
• RM3 Integrity. For any identifier id, every correct process p delivers at most one message
m with identifier id, and if sender(m) is correct then m was previously multicast by
sender(m).
The predicate sender(m) gives the field of the message header that identifies its sender. We
consider that the sender also delivers the messages it multicasts.
Bracha presented a reliable multicast algorithm that needs n ≥ 3 f + 1 processes (Bracha,
1984). He does not provide a proof that 3 f + 1 is the minimum number of processes but it is
simple to understand that the algorithm can not work with n= 2 f +1. The idea is the following.
Consider three quorums of processes: two quorums A and B, each one with f correct processes;
and one quorum C with a single process that is the sender. Consider also that the communication
between quorums A and B experiences long delays but that the communications between A and
C, and between B and C are fast in comparison. The system is asynchronous so decisions must
be taken considering f + 1 processes. Now, suppose that the sender is faulty and sends two
different messages mA and mB with the same identifier id respectively to the quorums A and B.
The communication between A and B is slow so the sender can force the correct processes in
quorums A and B to deliver different messages with the same identifier, breaking either RM2
or RM3.
3.2.1 Trusted/trustworthy component
With a wormhole it is possible to prevent a faulty sender from doing this attack successfully.
Consider that there is a set of trusted/trustworthy wormholes ϒ = {w1,w2, ...wn} and that each
process has access exclusively to the wormhole of the same number (i.e., process p j has access
to wormhole w j). Each wormhole w j has a public-private key pair (Ku j,Kr j). The private key
Kr j is known only by w j and is used to produce digital signatures. Every correct process knows
the correct public key Ku j of every wormhole w j, so it can verify all the signatures produced
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by the wormholes using their private keys. The wormholes provide a single service that can be
abstracted as a function that is called by the processes (for wormhole w j):
σ ← signj(id,msg)
The function takes as parameters a message identifier id and a message msg. It returns
either the signature σ of (id,msg) or ⊥. The signature is returned if id > id′, where id′ is the
identifier given as parameter in the previous call to the function; otherwise ⊥ is returned.
This service is very simple but it precludes a faulty process from obtaining two different
messages with the same identifier correctly signed. Therefore, it also stops a faulty process
from doing the attack described above. Algorithm 1 uses this service to solve reliable multicast
with any number of faulty processes.
3.2.2 The algorithm
The reliable multicast algorithm is a variation of Bracha’s but it has one less communication
step due to the use of the wormhole and requires no bounds on the number of faulty processes
(although we should have n≥ f +1 for the problem not to be vacuous). The algorithm is called
to multicast a message by calling RELIABLE MULTICAST(id,msg) (first line) and a message is
delivered when RETURN(id,msg) is called by the algorithm (line 5). Basically the sender sends
the message to all processes and all processes send an ECHO message also to all processes.
The wormhole is used to prevent a faulty sender from sending two messages with the same
identifier as explained above. Function verify(id,msg,σ ,Ku j) verifies if the signature σ was
obtained with message (id,msg) and key Kr j. The next theorem proves the correctness of the
algorithm:
Theorem 1 Algorithm 1 solves the reliable multicast problem as defined by properties RM1,
RM2 and RM3.
Proof (sketch): Notice that m is equal to (id,msg) in the algorithm.
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Function RELIABLE MULTICAST(id,msg)
Task T1:
1: σ ← signi(id,msg)
2: ∀ j 6= i : SEND INITIAL(i, id,msg)σ to p j
Task T2: {execute only once per message multicasted}
3: when (message INITIAL( j, id,msg)σ or ECHO( j, id,msg,σ) is received) and (verify(id,msg,σ ,Ku j)
do
4: ∀k 6= j : SEND ECHO( j, id,msg,σ) to pk
5: RETURN(id,msg)
Algorithm 1: Reliable Multicast algorithm (code for process pi).
RM1 Validity. If a correct process pi multicasts (id,msg) then a message
INITIAL(i, id,msg)σ with a correct signature σ is received by all correct processes (line
3), and those processes deliver the message (line 5).
RM2 Agreement. If a correct process delivers a message (id,msg) then it also sends
ECHO(id,msg,σ) to all correct processes (line 4) and all correct processes eventually receive
that ECHO message (line 3) and deliver (id,msg) (line 5).
RM3 Integrity. The definition of the wormhole service and a simple inspection of the
algorithm show that the property is always satisfied. Theorem 1
Notice that the proofs do not depend on any quorum of processes so the algorithm tolerates
any number of faulty processes.
3.3 2 f +1 Byzantine Consensus
Informally, consensus is the problem of making a set of processes to agree on a value. A
process p is said to propose a value v ∈ V for an execution of the consensus algorithm when it
calls MR 2FBC CONSENSUS(v). The process is said to decide a value v when the algorithm
calls RETURN(v). There are several definitions of Byzantine consensus in the literature. In this
section we consider the following definition taken from (Doudou & Schiper, 1997; Doudou
et al., 2002; Baldoni et al., 2003), also much used for crash consensus (Hadzilacos & Toueg,
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1994; Mostefaoui & Raynal, 1999; Friedman et al., 2005)1. Byzantine asynchronous multi-
valued consensus is defined in terms of the following properties:
• MVC1 Validity. If a correct process decides v, then v was proposed by some process.
• MVC2 Agreement. No two correct processes decide differently.
• MVC3 Termination. Every correct process eventually decides.
This section presents the Byzantine consensus algorithm with 2 f + 1 processes that is
based on the Mostefaoui and Raynal’s crash fault-tolerant consensus (MR-Consensus for short)
(Mostefaoui & Raynal, 1999). The modification of Mostefaoui and Raynal algorithm into a
2 f +1 Byzantine consensus algorithms can be summarized in terms of the following sequence
of steps:
1. communication channels: communication channels are substituted by authenticated
reliable channels. These channels constrain the power of the adversary in the network
in the sense that these channels do not allow the creation, modification or dropping of
messages. In a malicious environment this involves either physically secure communi-
cation channels or the use of cryptographic mechanisms, which requires the additional
assumption of a computationally bounded adversary.
2. multicast communication: multicasts are substituted by reliable multicasts. This
mechanism constrains the power of the adversary by preventing it from delivering
different messages with the same identifiers to different processes. This requires the
2 f +1 reliable multicast algorithm presented in Section 3.2.
3. message validation: message receptions are enhanced with message validations, i.e.,
when a message is received it is only considered if it is valid as defined in Section 3.3.1.
The objective is to force the adversary to conform to the algorithm.
1Crash consensus is also often defined in terms of uniform properties, which make statements about what is
decided by faulty processes. These properties are unenforceable with the Byzantine fault model in which faulty
processes can have an arbitrary behavior.
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4. reception quorum: receptions of quorums of messages from n − f processes are
substituted by: (1) reception of messages from at least n− f processes plus the failure
detector suspicion of all other processes (line 9 in the algorithm). This requires an
eventually perfect muteness failure detector, ♦MPA .
3.3.1 Consensus algorithm
Algorithm 2 presents the MR 2FBC algorithm that is based on a rotating coordinator. Each
round (lines 3-12) one of the processes is selected to be the coordinator (line 4) and tries to
impose its estimate as the decision (line 5). Each round has two phases. In the first (lines 5-7)
the coordinator disseminates a PHASE1 message with its estimate of the value to be decided. In
the second phase (lines 8-12), each process disseminates a PHASE2 message with the estimate
of the coordinator or ⊥. If a correct process receives n− f PHASE2 messages with the same
value, it decides that value and disseminates this decision using a DECISION message (line 11).
Some of the modifications to MR-Consensus are obvious and do not need much discussion:
reliable channels are substituted by authenticated reliable channels and message disseminations
are substituted by the reliable multicast primitive (lines 5, 8). The syntax we use does not make
it clear so notice that the identifier of a message disseminated is composed by the process
identifier, the message type (e.g., PHASE1) and the round number.
Another modification is that we use the message validation mechanism to prevent some of
the attacks that might be done by faulty processes. In several places the algorithm only takes
into account messages that are valid (lines 7, 9, 10, 14). The definition of valid message is
identical to Bracha’s (Bracha, 1984). The basic idea is that a message is valid if it might have
been sent by a correct process, i.e., by a process that follows the algorithm. More precisely,
each step k of the algorithm has the following basic format: the process disseminates a message
to all other processes, waits for a set S of messages from the other processes, and obtains the
content of the next message using a protocol function F(k,S). A message that is delivered by the
reliable multicast primitive (messages PHASE1 and PHASE2) or by a reliable channel (messages
DECIDE) at step k is called a k-message. Each process pi maintains a set of messages VALIDi
such that:
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• VALID1i = { delivered 1-messages }
• for k > 1,mkj ∈ VALIDki if there exist n− f (k-1)-messages m1, ...mn− f such that
mkj = F(k,{m1, ...mn− f })
Informally, a message is said to be valid if it is justified by the messages previously received
by the process. For instance, line 14 seems to be wrong since the process should require
DECISION messages from f +1 processes, for at least one to be sent by a correct process, before
deciding in line 14. However, the validation mechanism ensures that the condition in that line
is true only if the (single) DECISION message might have been sent by a correct process, i.e., if
the process received n− f PHASE2 messages with the same estimate est (lines 9-11).
Function MR 2FBC CONSENSUS(vi)
Task T1:
1: ri← 0 {ri is pi’s round number}
2: esti← vi {esti is pi’s current estimate of the value to be decided}
3: while true do
4: ci← (ri mod n)+1; ri← ri+1 {ci is the current coordinator}
{———————— phase 1: coordinator to all ———————————-}
5: if (ci = i) then RELIABLE MULTICAST PHASE1(ri,esti) end if
6: wait until (message PHASE1(ri,−) is received from pci or pci is suspected by pi’s FD module)
7: if (valid message PHASE1(ri,v) received from pci) then auxi← v else auxi←⊥ end if
{————————– phase 2: all to all —————————————–}
8: RELIABLE MULTICAST PHASE2(ri,auxi)
9: wait until (valid messages PHASE2(ri,−) are received from at least n− f processes)
and (∀ j : valid message PHASE2(ri,−) is received from p j or p j is suspected by pi’s FD
module)
10: ∀ j : if (valid message PHASE2(ri,v) received) then Ri[ j]← v else Ri[ j]←⊥ end if
11: if (∃v : #v(Ri)≥ n− f ) then esti← v; ∀ j 6= i : SEND DECISION(ri,esti) to p j; RETURN(esti) else
12: if (∃v : #v(Ri)≥ n−2 f ) then esti← v end if end if
Task T2:
13: when valid message DECISION(r,est) is received do {no need of f +1 messages due to validation
mechanism}
14: ∀ j 6= i : SEND DECISION(r,est) to p j; RETURN(est)
Algorithm 2: MR 2FBC Byzantine consensus algorithm (code for process pi).
The main difference of MR 2FBC in relation to MR-Consensus is line 9. In MR-Consensus,
processes wait until they receive messages from n− f processes (see line 8 of Fig. 1 at
(Friedman et al., 2005)). Clearly it is not possible to wait for more messages as f processes can
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be faulty, so MR 2FBC has also to wait for n− f messages at line 9. However, there is a crucial
difference between the crash and the Byzantine fault models: while in the crash fault model
(thus in MR-Consensus) all messages in that n− f quorum are sent by processes that follow the
algorithm, in the Byzantine fault model (thus in MR 2FBC) f of those messages can be sent by
faulty processes2. In fact, in the worst case, with n= 2 f +1 and f Byzantine processes, in every
round that quorum of n− f messages contains f + 1 messages, f of which sent by Byzantine
processes. The behavior of these f faulty processes is constrained by the message validation
mechanism, but they can do a simple attack that is undistinguishable from correct behavior: to
send always ⊥ as their estimate, pretending that their failure detector modules suspect of the
coordinator (see lines 6-8).
To deal with this problem, line 9 must “know about” all processes before continuing. More
precisely, line 9 waits for messages from n− f processes, but also either for messages or to
suspect of the rest of the processes. This ensures that eventually pi receives messages from
all correct processes, as there is a time after which correct processes are not suspected by any
correct process (eventual strong A -accuracy). This is also the reason why we need a stronger
failure detector than previous Byzantine consensus algorithms that require only eventual weak
A -accuracy (Doudou et al., 2005; Baldoni et al., 2003). While those algorithms require only
that the coordinator is eventually not suspected, MR 2FBC requires that eventually no correct
process is suspected, i.e., eventual strong A -accuracy.
3.3.2 Correctness
Next, we prove the correctness of the MR-2FBC algorithm.
Lemma 1 If a correct process decides v in round r, then no correct process decides v′ 6= v in a
round r′ ≥ r.
Proof (sketch): A correct process can only decide in lines 11 or 14. Line 11: A correct process
p can only decide in line 11 after receiving n− f valid PHASE2(r,v) messages (lines 9-11).
2This is not the case with 3 f +1 Byzantine consensus algorithms as they wait for 2 f +1 messages, a majority
of which must come from correct processes.
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Consider another correct process p′. In the same round, p′ must receive at least n− f valid
PHASE2 messages (line 9), but those messages can contain (r,v) or (r,⊥). Both p and p′ receive
(at least) n− f valid PHASE2 messages but there are at most n of those messages, so n−2 f of
them are common to the two processes (2× (n− f ) = n+(n−2 f )), and so they must be valid
PHASE2(r,v) messages (i.e., they must contain v).
Now, consider round r+1. If p′ does not decide v in round r, then in round r+1, p′ either
receives a PHASE1(r+1,v) message and tries again to decide v, or receives a PHASE1(r+1,v′)
message. The latter case might be problematic but that message is not valid as every process
received at least n− 2 f valid PHASE2(r,v) messages so the protocol function imposes that it
either (i) decides (line 11) or (i) sets est to v (line 12) and disseminates PHASE1(r+ 1,v) in
round r+ 1. For rounds r′ > r+ 1 the same applies and messages with different values never
become valid.
Line 14: A correct process p decides in line 14 if it receives a valid DECISION(r,est), thus
the protocol function requires it to have received n− f PHASE2(r,v) messages. If that is the
case, all correct processes received at least n−2 f of those messages and we fall in the case of
line 11 above. Lemma 1
Lemma 2 Every correct process eventually decides.
Proof (sketch): First we have to prove that the algorithm does not block indefinitely at some
line. The only lines where a process blocks are those were it waits for messages, i.e., lines 6
and 9. The properties of the failure detector guarantee that the algorithm does not block at those
lines.
Now let us prove that one correct process eventually decides. The eventual strong A -
accuracy property of the failure detector ensures that eventually there will be a round r in
which no correct process is suspected. In that case, all correct processes receive messages from
all other correct processes in line 9 and decide in line 10.
In this latter situation all processes decide in the same round but that is not mandatory.
For instance, if failure detector modules in some correct processes suspect some of the other
processes, then it is possible that one of the correct processes p decides in a round r, but not
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the others. In that case, no correct process decides a different value (Lemma 1). Furthermore,
every other correct process p′ decides the same value when it eventually receives the DECIDE
message sent by p (lines 11 and 14-16). Notice that this message must be valid as it is valid iff
process p′ receives n− f valid PHASE2(r,v) messages, which it must have received since these
are the messages that made p to decide (lines 9-11) and the reliable multicast ensures that all
correct processes receive the same PHASE2 messages (property RM2 Agreement). Lemma 2
Theorem 2 Algorithm 2 solves the Byzantine consensus problem as defined by properties
MVC1, MVC2 and MVC3.
Proof (sketch): Property MVC1 Validity comes from inspection of the algorithm. MVC2
Agreement is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1. Property MVC3 Termination is given
by Lemma 2.
Theorem 2
3.4 Unique Sequential Identifier Generator Service
The trusted component presented in the Section 3.2.1 provides a function to sign a message
with a unique identifier. The function sign(id,msg) takes as a parameter an identifier id and
returns a signature iff id > id′, where id′ is the identifier given as parameter in the previous call
to the function. In order to proceed with this verification our trusted component needs to store
the last identifier used by the sign function. Although this function is very simple, it cannot
be implemented using current COTS trusted hardware, such as the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM). The Unique Sequential Identifier Generator (USIG) service presented in this section
takes advantage of a functionality already provided by the TPM, the monotonic counters. The
USIG is simple as our previous trusted component but can be implemented using COTS trusted
hardware.
The USIG is a service provided locally in each server by a module that has to be built
to be trusted/trustworthy. More precisely, the confidentiality of its key and the integrity of its
operation are assumed to be held even if an adversary has access to the server. There is no
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communication among the modules in different servers3, so each correct server si has exclusive
access to module wi of a set of modules W = {w0, ...,wn−1}.
The service is used to assign identifiers (numbers) to messages ensuring the following
properties:
1. uniqueness – it will never assign the same identifier to two different messages, and
2. sequentiality – it will never assign an identifier that is not the successor of the previous
one
The interface of the service has two functions:
createUI(m) returns a unique identifier UI, which is a data structure containing a counter
value and a USIG-certificate that certifies that UI was created by this module wi for message m;
verifyUI(UI,m) verifies if the UI is valid for message m, i.e., if USIG-certificate matches
the message and the rest of the data in UI.
The main components inside a module wi are a counter and cryptographic mechanisms.
The unique identifier is a read of the counter, which is incremented whenever createUI is
called. When this is called in module wi, it returns a USIG certificate containing a HMAC that
is obtained using the message m and a secret key Ki. This key is shared with all modules in W ,
which use it to validate the certificate. The service properties are based on the secretness of the
shared key. There are two basic options to implement the service, in terms of the certification
scheme used:
USIG-Hmac: the certificate contains a HMAC obtained using the message and a secret key
owned by this USIG but known by all the others, for them to be able to verify the certificates
generated.
USIG-Sign: the certificate contains a signature obtained using the message and the private
key of this USIG.
3In this Section and Section 3.5 we do not consider process but a set of servers P = {s0, ...,sn−1} to start use
this nomenclature in the rest of the thesis.
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Notice that in USIG-Hmac the properties of the service (e.g., uniqueness) are based on the
secretness of the shared keys, while in USIG-Sign the properties are based on the secretness of
the private keys. Therefore, while for USIG-Hmac both functions createUI and verifyUI
must be implemented inside the tamperproof component, for USIG-Sign the verification
requires only the public-key of the USIG that created the certificate, so this operation can be
done outside of the component.
3.4.1 Implementing the trusted component
The fundamental assumption behind an implementation of a trusted component is that it
is much harder to subvert than the applications that use it. Different implementation consider
different threat models but they share the same objective: isolate the service from the rest of the
system in order to make it trusted. Several options to make the USIG service trusted have been
discussed in papers about the TTCB (Correia et al., 2002) and A2M (Chun et al., 2007). Figure
3.1 presents different implementation scenarios.
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provider
HW
OS
USIG
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Application
(b) With a trusted 
software isolation
(c) With a trusted 
VM
HW
(d) With trusted 
hardware
OS
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USIG
HW
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OS
USIG
Application
Figura 3.1: USIG service implementation scenarios.
In Figure3.1(a) the USIG service is implemented in an isolated server offered by a trusted
provider (or a trusted third party) and can be accessed, for instance, through a RPC interface.
This approach is applied in (Maniatis & Baker, 2002; Haber & Stornetta, 1991) that explore
a trusted component external to the application. The main handicap in using this approach in
distributed systems is the high-latency caused by the interaction between the application and
the trusted component. In Figure3.1(b) the USIG service is hosted in the same server than the
main application and the isolation is assured by a trusted software layer. This approach can
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be implemented using, for instance, Singularity (Hunt & Larus, 2007). The USIG service is
a process that runs in the same space address of the main application, but due to the strong
isolation guarantees provided by Singularity is possible to trust on it. The main advantage of
this approach is that the communication between the application and the trusted component
should be faster than the other approaches once they are in the same address space.
In Figure3.1(c) the USIG service is hosted in the same server than the main application
but it is isolated through virtualization, i.e., a hypervisor that provides isolation between a
set of virtual machines with their own operating systems. The trusted component can be
accessed for instance, through a RPC interface. Examples of virtual machines include Xen
(Barham et al., 2003) and other more security-related technologies like Terra (Garfinkel et al.,
2003), Nizza (Singaravelu et al., 2006) and Proxos (Ta-Min et al., 2006). In Figure3.1(d) the
USIG service is implemented using trusted hardware. AMD’s Secure Virtual Machine (SVM)
architecture (Advanced Micro Devices, 2005) and Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)
(Intel Corporation, 2006) are recent technologies that provide a hardware-based solution to
launch software in a controlled way, allowing the enforcement of certain security properties.
Flicker explores these technologies to provide a minimal trusted execution environment, i.e.,
to run a small software component in an isolated way (McCune et al., 2008a). Flicker and
similar mechanisms can be used to implement the USIG service. The wormhole also can be
implemented inside a secure coprocessor (like IBM 4758), a smartcard or another hardware
board using more or less complex hardware appliances, running their own (small) kernel,
communicating with the servers though some well-controlled interface, like RS-232C or USB.
3.4.2 Implementing the USIG service with the TPM
The simplicity of the USIG service allows it to be implemented with the TPM. The
implementation of the service requires TPMs compliant with the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG) 1.2 specifications (Trusted Computing Group, 2007a; Trusted Computing Group,
2007c). We assume that the TPMs are tamperproof, i.e., resistant to any attacks. In reality
TPMs are not secure against physical attacks (Marchesini et al., 2003) so we assume an attacker
never has physical access to the servers and their TPMs (attacks come through the network, e.g.,
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from the Internet).
The version of the USIG service that can be implemented using the TPM is USIG-Sign,
i.e., the version that is based on public-key cryptography. TPMs have the ability to sign data
using the private key of the attestation identity key pair (AIK), which we call private AIK for
simplicity and that can never leave the TPM (there is no API that allows extracting it from the
TPM). We assume that servers know the other TPMs’ AIK public keys so they can verify the
signatures produced.
We explore mainly two features defined in the TPM 1.2 specification (Trusted
Computing Group, 2007a). The first are the monotonic counters. The TPM provides
two commands on counters: TPM ReadCounter that returns the counter value, and
TPM IncrementCounter that increments the counter and returns its new value (Trusted
Computing Group, 2007c). No command is provided to set or decrement counters. The TCG
imposes that the counters have 32 bits and can not be increased arbitrarily often to prevent
that they burn out in 7 years (Trusted Computing Group, 2007a). In the TPMs we used in the
experiments, counters could not be increased more than once every 3.5 seconds approximately
and the same is verified in other TPMs (Sarmenta et al., 2006). This feature seriously constrains
the performance of algorithms that use this implementation of the USIG service.
The second feature is the transport command suite (Trusted Computing Group, 2007a).
This set of commands protects the communication with the TPM as a process that wants
to use the TPM services may not trust software that may interpose between the two. More
precisely, using the commands TPM EstablishTransport, TPM ExecuteTransport
and TPM ReleaseTransportSigned, it is possible to create a session that is used to do
a sequence of TPM commands, to log all executed commands, and to obtain a hash of this
log along with a digital signature of this same hash obtained with the private AIK (Trusted
Computing Group, 2007c; Kinney, 2006). The communication between the process and the
TPM is protected using common mechanisms like message authentication codes (MACs)
produced with hash functions and nonces. From the point of view of our algorithms, the
important is that the TPM ReleaseTransportSigned command returns a proof that a set
of commands was executed by the TPM. This proof can be verified by holders of the public
AIK.
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The interface of the USIG service (functions createUI and verifyUI) does not change
in the TPM-based implementation. However, the service is not completely implemented inside
the TPM, which can not be modified, but by the TPM plus a thin software layer on top of it.
This layer does not have to be trusted.
The implementation of the USIG service on top of the TPM is straightforward. The function
createUI(m) is implemented the following way:
1. calculate a hash of m;
2. start a session in the TPM by calling TPM Establish Transport and
TPM ExecuteTransport;
3. ask the TPM to increment the counter by calling TPM IncrementCounter, assuring
that all messages are assigned a sequential number (concurrency is not an issue as no two
sessions can be open simultaneously in the same TPM);
4. end the session by calling TPM ReleaseTransport Signed, which takes as param-
eter the hash of the message (antiReplay parameter), and produces a signature of a data
structure that includes the monotonic counter value, the hash of m and the hash of the
transport session log;
5. return a data structure with all those items plus the signature that is what we call the
unique identifier UI.
Notice that the USIG certificate we mentioned when first describing the createUI is now
composed by the signature and the hash of the transport session log. The latter is used to prove
that the TPM increased the counter. Therefore, we do not have a tamperproof service that always
increment the counter, but a non-tamperproof layer of software that requests the tamperproof
hardware to increment the counter and give a proof that it did it.
The function verifyUI(PK,UI,m) is implemented entirely in software, i.e., outside the
TPM. It is implemented the following way:
1. calculate the hash of m and check if this hash is equal to the hash in UI;
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2. use the TPM’s public AIK (PK) to check if the signature was produced from the hash of
m together with the hash of the transport log and the hash of the monotonic counter (both
part of UI);
3. check if the log contains the call to the TPM IncrementCounter command;
4. if some of the checks fail, return false, otherwise return true.
3.5 Confirmable Reliable Multicast
As mentioned before, one of the problems that any BFT algorithm has to solve is the
problem of forcing all the processes to deliver the same messages. This is known as the
reliable multicast problem and has been shown to require 3 f + 1 processes to be solvable in
asynchronous systems with an homogenous Byzantine fault model (Bracha, 1984).
In this section we present the Confirmable Reliable Multicast (CRM) algorithm, which
solves a similar problem to reliable multicast with only 2 f + 1 processes. When compared
with the reliable multicast algorithm presented in the Section 3.2, the CRM has the following
differences: (i) it uses the USIG service in order to constrain the behavior of malicious servers;
(ii) CRM allows a replica that accepts a message m to prove that it did accept m following the
algorithm.
CRM is the core algorithm executed by the servers in the 2 f +1 BFT algorithms used in this
thesis. Normally reliable multicast is defined considering that the algorithm is executed by a set
of processes, but here we use instead the word servers to emphasize that the CRM algorithm is
executed by servers of the BFT algorithms.
CRM is defined in terms of the following properties (for a data message m that is
multicasted):
• CRM1 Validity: If a correct server multicasts a message m, then some correct server
eventually accepts m.
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• CRM2 Agreement: if a correct server accepts a message m, then all correct servers
eventually accept m.
• CRM3 Integrity: For any unique identifier UI, every correct server accepts at most one
message m with UI, and if sender(m) is correct then m was previously multicast by
sender(m).4
• CRM4 Confirmability: If a correct server accepts a message m, then it can prove that it
accepted m following the CRM algorithm.
This last property is not satisfied by the reliable multicast of Section 3.2.
3.5.1 The algorithm
CRM is presented in Algorithm 3. The messages are called PREPARE and COMMIT as this
is the role they play in the MinBFT and EBAWA algorithms (Chapters 4 and 6). They also
include a view number v that is used in the BFT algorithms but has no purpose in the reliable
multicast algorithm.
1: when si wants to multicast a data message m do
2: UIi = createUI(m)
3: send 〈PREPARE,v,si,m,UIi〉 to all servers
4: when s j receives a 〈PREPARE,v,si,m,UIi〉 from si do
5: if verifyUI(PKi,UIi,m) then
6: UIj = createUI(m)
7: send 〈COMMIT,v,s j,si,m,UIi,UIj〉 to all servers
8: when sk receives 〈COMMIT,v,s j,si,m,UIi,UIj〉 do
9: if sk did not receive the PREPARE message and verifyUI(PKi,UIi,m) and verifyUI(PK j,UIj,m) then
10: UIk = createUI(m)
11: send 〈COMMIT,v,sk,si,m,UIi,UIk〉 to all servers
12: when sl receives 〈COMMIT,v,s j,si,m,UIi,UIj〉 messages from f + 1 different servers for which
verifyUI(PK j,UIj,m) do
13: accept m
Algorithm 3: Confirmable Reliable Multicast.
The basic idea is that a data message m is sent in a PREPARE message to all servers (line 3),
4sender(m) returns the sender field in the PREPARE message that is used to disseminate m.
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and each server resends it to all others in a COMMIT message (line 7) 5. Each message sent has
a unique identifier UI generated by the createUI function (lines 2, 6,10), so no two messages
can have the same identifier. Servers check if the identifiers of the messages that they receive
are valid for the messages using the verifyUI function (lines 5).
If a server did not receive a PREPARE message but it received a COMMIT message with a
valid identifier generated by the sender (lines 8-11) then it sends its COMMIT message. This
can happen if the sender is faulty and does not send the PREPARE message to server sk (but
sends it to other servers), or if the PREPARE message is simply late and is received after the
COMMIT messages. A data message m is accepted by a server following the algorithm if the
server receives f +1 valid COMMIT messages from different servers for m (lines 12, 13). CRM
produces a certificate that a message has been accepted. This CRM certificate is composed by
the message m and the f +1 UI identifiers used in line 12.
The following section provides a proof that the algorithm satisfies the four properties stated
above, but the rationale is the following:
There are 2 f + 1 servers so at least f + 1 are correct (at most f are faulty). If a correct
server multicasts a message m, then at least f other correct servers receive it and reply with
COMMIT messages, thus all correct servers receive f + 1 COMMIT messages and accept m
(Validity). No different message can be accepted due to the unique identifier mechanism
(Agreement/Integrity). A correct server can prove that it accepted message m by providing
the CRM certificate (Confirmability).
3.5.2 Correctness
CRM is correct if it satisfies the four properties stated in Section 3.5:
Lemma 3 If a correct server multicasts a message m, then some correct server eventually
accepts m.
5For simplicity in the algorithms some messages are said to be sent to “all servers”, which includes the sender.
However, in practice this can be implemented in a more economic way, starting by not really sending messages to
oneself.
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Proof (sketch): If si is correct, then it multicasts m in a PREPARE message with a valid UI (lines
1-3). At least f +1 servers are correct, verify that UI is valid for message m and send COMMIT
messages with a valid UI to all the other servers (lines 4-7 and 8-11). This allows some correct
server to accept m (lines 12-13). Lemma 3
Lemma 4 if a correct server accepts a message m, then all correct servers eventually accept
m.
Proof (sketch): For a correct server to accept a message m, it must have received f +1 COMMIT
messages (lines 12-13), at least one of which must have been sent by a correct server. Before
a correct server accepts m, it multicasts a COMMIT message to all servers in lines 7 or 11.
Therefore, all correct servers receive m either from the sender (i.e., the server that executed
lines 1-3) or from another correct server and send a COMMIT message to all others. All correct
servers accept m when they get COMMIT messages from f + 1 correct servers, which is the
minimum number of servers that are correct (lines 12-13). Lemma 4
Lemma 5 For any unique identifier UI, every correct servers accepts at most one message m
with UI, and if sender(m) is correct then m was previously multicast by sender(m).
Proof (sketch): This property derives trivially from the properties of the unique identifiers UI
generated by the USIG service. Lemma 5
Lemma 6 If a correct server accepts a message m, then it can prove that it accepted m.
Proof (sketch): A correct server accepts a message m in line 13 after receiving f +1 COMMIT
messages with a valid UI (line 8). It can prove that it accepted m simply by presenting a CRM-
certificate composed by these f +1 UI identifiers. Lemma 6
Theorem 3 Algorithm 3 solves the reliable multicast as defined by properties CRM1, CRM2,
CRM3 and CRM4.
Proof (sketch): The proof comes from the previous lemmas. Property CRM1 is an immediate
consequence of Lemma 3. Property CRM2 is given by Lemma 4. Properties CRM3 and CRM4
come respectively from Lemmas 5 and 6. Theorem 3
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3.6 Conclusion
The chapter has showed that it is possible to implement a 2 f + 1 asynchronous Byzantine
consensus algorithm using a 2 f +1 reliable multicast algorithm that requires wormholes. This
is an important contribution once consensus is a distributed computing problem of known
theoretical and practical importance.
Using a 2 f +1 reliable multicast to solve 2 f +1 Byzantine consensus is interesting for two
reasons. First, it tackles the difficulty of understanding how a wormhole assists in solving a
distributed computing problem, by using it to solve a well-known and simpler problem, reliable
multicast. Second, it is important to understand that it is possible to solve 2 f + 1 Byzantine
consensus by relying only on a 2 f + 1 reliable multicast and no other “unusual” component
(e.g., no other component that needs a wormhole to be implemented). This service provided
by the wormhole is very simple but it precludes a faulty process from obtaining two different
messages with the same identifier correctly signed.
Based on the idea of using a wormhole to constraint the behavior of malicious processes
in the consensus algorithms, we proposed the USIG service. This minimal trusted service
composed by a monotonic counter plus a cryptographic mechanism provides an interface with
operations to increment a counter and to verify if a given counter value is correct. A side effect
of the simplicity of our trusted component is that it can be implemented even on COTS trusted
hardware, such as the TPM. This secure co-processor is currently available in the mainboard of
many commodity PCs.
Consensus is an important component of many replication algorithms. In the state machine
approach, the main agreement problem is to make all correct replicas execute the same sequence
of operations. Therefore, we applied the USIG service in order to design a Confirmable Reliable
Multicast that is the core component used in the 2 f + 1 Byzantine-resilient state machine
replication algorithms presented in the next chapters. The fundamental ideal is that our minimal
trusted service has to provide something that gives to replicas the notion of a sequence of
operations, in such a way that a malicious replica would not be able to make different correct
replicas execute different operations as their i-th operation.
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Note
The content of this chapter was partially reported in (Veronese et al., 2009c; Correia et al.,
2010).
4
Minimal Byzantine Fault
Tolerance
This chapter presents two asynchronous BFT algorithms that are minimal in several senses.
First, they require only 2 f +1 replicas, instead of the usual 3 f +1. Second, the trusted service
in which this reduction of replicas is based is arguably minimal, so it is simple to verify
and implement (which is possible even using commercial trusted hardware). Third, in nice
executions the two algorithms run in the minimum number of communication steps for non-
speculative and speculative algorithms, respectively 4 and 3 steps. Besides the obvious benefits
in terms of cost, resilience and management complexity of having less replicas to tolerate a
certain number of faults, our algorithms are simpler than previous ones (being closer to crash
fault-tolerant replication algorithms). The performance evaluation shows that, even with the
trusted component access overhead, they can have better throughput than Castro and Liskov’s
PBFT, and better latency in networks with non-negligible communication delays.
Minimal number of replicas. BFT algorithms typically require 3 f + 1 servers to tolerate f
Byzantine (or faulty) servers (Castro & Liskov, 2002; Cowling et al., 2006; Kotla et al., 2007;
Reiter, 1995). Clearly a majority of the servers must be non-faulty because the idea is to do
voting on the output of the servers and faulty servers can not be reliably identified, but these
algorithms require f additional servers.
Reducing the number of replicas has an important impact in the cost of intrusion-tolerant
systems as one replica is far more costly than its hardware. For tolerating attacks and intrusions,
the replicas can not be identical and share the same vulnerabilities; otherwise causing intrusions
in all the replicas would be almost the same as in a single one. Therefore, there has to be
diversity among the replicas, i.e., replicas shall have different operating systems, different
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application software, etc. (Littlewood & Strigini, 2004; Obelheiro et al., 2006). This involves
additional considerable costs per-replica, in terms not only of hardware but especially of
software development, acquisition and management.
The two novel BFT algorithms presented in this chapter require only 2 f +1 replicas, which
is clearly the minimum for BFT algorithms, since a majority of the replicas must be non-faulty.
It was previously shown that a Byzantine fault-tolerant service can be executed in only 2 f +1
replicas, while the agreement part of BFT algorithms requires 3 f +1 replicas (Yin et al., 2003).
However, the algorithms presented require only 2 f +1 replicas both for execution of the service
and agreement.
Minimal trusted service. In order to reduce the number of replicas from 3 f + 1 to 2 f + 1
the replicas have to be extended with tamperproof components. While 3 f +1 BFT algorithms
tolerate any failure in up to f replicas, 2 f + 1 BFT algorithms also tolerate up to f faulty
replicas, but these special components can not be compromised. Therefore, an important aspect
of the design of 2 f + 1 BFT algorithms is the design of these components so that they can be
trusted to be tamperproof.
Correia et. al. proposed a tamperproof distributed component called Trusted Timely
Computing Base (TTCB) that is used to implement a 2 f + 1 BFT algorithm (Correia et al.,
2004). A2M-PBFT-EA is another BFT algorithm with only 2 f + 1 replicas based on a local
trusted component called Attested Append-Only Memory (A2M). The second sense in which
the algorithms presented in this chapter are said to be minimal is that the trusted/tamperproof
service in which they are based is simpler that the two previous in the literature and arguably
minimal.
The TTCB is a distributed component that provides several services and A2M provides a
log that can grow considerably and an interface with functions to append, lookup and truncate
messages in the log. The trusted component used by the algorithms in this chapter is the Unique
Sequential Identifier Generator (USIG) previously presented in the Chapter 3.
Looking to the proof of why it is not possible to design a BFT agreement algorithm with less
than 3 f +1 servers (Lamport et al., 1982; Bracha, 1984), it can be seen that the problem is that
the malicious server can lie to the correct ones. In case of state machine replication, the main
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agreement problem is to make all correct replicas execute the same sequence of operations. It
is not difficult to see that nothing is simpler than a trusted monotonic counter, used to associate
sequence numbers to each operation. On the other hand, the values generated by this counter
should be unforgeable, so some kind of authentication must be employed. The USIG service
provides an interface with operations to increment a counter and to verify if other counter values
(incremented by other replicas) are correctly authenticated.
Due to the simplicity of our trusted component, it can be implemented even on COTS
trusted hardware, such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) (Trusted Computing Group,
2007a). Using COTS trusted hardware is an obvious benefit in relation to previous algorithms,
but also a challenge: we can not define the tamperproof abstraction that better suites our
needs, but are restricted to those provided by the TPM. Our performance evaluation shows
that the versions of our algorithms that use the TPM have very poor performance (unlike
versions that use other implementations of the service). We discuss how the TPM design and
implementations can evolve to become usable for practical BFT algorithms.
Minimal number of steps. The number of communication steps is an important metric for
distributed algorithms, for the delay of the communication tends to have a major impact in the
latency of the algorithm. This is specially important in WANs, where the communication delay
can be as much as a thousand times higher than in LANs and, in fact to tolerate disasters and
large-scale attacks like DDoS replicas have to be deployed in different sites, which increases
the message communication delays.
The first algorithm we propose – MinBFT – has a message exchange pattern similar to
PBFT’s (Castro & Liskov, 2002). The replicas move through a succession of configurations
called views. Each view has a primary replica and the others are backups. When a quorum
of replicas suspects that the primary replica is faulty, a new primary is chosen, allowing the
system to make progress. The fundamental idea of MinBFT is that the primary uses the USIG’s
trusted counter to assign sequence numbers to client requests. However, more than assigning a
number, the tamperproof component produces a signed certificate that proves unequivocally that
the number is assigned to that message (and not other) and that the counter was incremented (so
the same number can not be used twice). This is used to guarantee that all non-faulty replicas
66 CAPI´TULO 4. MINIMAL BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE
take into account the same messages and, ultimately, agree on the same order for the execution
of the requests.
The second algorithm we propose – MinZyzzyva– is based on speculation, i.e., on the
tentative execution of the clients’ requests without previous agreement on the order of their
execution. MinZyzzyva is a modified version of Zyzzyva, the first speculative BFT algorithm
(Kotla et al., 2007).
For BFT algorithms, the metric considered for latency is usually the number of communi-
cation steps in nice executions, i.e., when there are no failures and the system is synchronous
enough for the primary not to be changed. MinBFT and MinZyzzyva are minimal in terms
of this metric for in nice executions the two algorithms run in the minimum known number
of communication steps of non-speculative and speculative algorithms, respectively 4 and 3
steps (Martin & Alvisi, 2006; Kotla et al., 2007). Notice that the gain of one step in speculative
algorithms comes at a price: in certain situations Zyzzyva and MinZyzzyva may have to rollback
some executions, which makes the programming model more complicated.
At this stage it is important to comment that there are no free lunches and that these
improvements have their drawbacks also. In relation to BFT algorithms that do not use a trusted
component, our algorithms (and the other two in the literature (Chun et al., 2007; Correia et al.,
2004)) have the disadvantage of having one additional point of failure: the tamperproofness of
the component. In practice, this prevents these algorithms from being used in settings in which
the potential attacker has physical access to a replica, as protecting even hardware components
from physical attacks is complicated.
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the characteristics of the algorithms presented in this
chapter and the state-of-the-art algorithms in the literature with which they are compared. This
table was derived from Table 1 in (Kotla et al., 2007). The throughput and latency metrics
are for each request. f is the maximum number of faulty servers and b the size of the batch
of requests used. The line “cost” considers the result by Yin et al. that the execution of the
application can be done in only 2 f + 1 servers (Yin et al., 2003). In the algorithms that use a
tamperproof component, some MACs are done inside this component.
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PBFT Zyzzyva A2M-PBFT-EA MinBFT MinZyzzyva
(Castro & Liskov, 1999) (Kotla et al., 2007) (Chun et al., 2007) this chapter this chapter
(Castro & Liskov, 2002)
(+(Yin et al., 2003))
Model Trusted component no no A2M USIG USIG
Speculative no yes no no yes
Cost Total replicas 3 f +1 3 f +1 2 f +1 2 f +1 2 f +1
Replicas with 2 f +1 (Yin et al., 2003) 2 f +1 2 f +1 2 f +1 2 f +1
application state
Throughput MAC ops at 2+(8 f +1)/b 2+3 f/b 2+(2 f +4)/b 2+( f +3)/b 2+Sign/b (*)
bottleneck server
Latency Communication 5 / 4 3 5 4 3
steps
Tabela 4.1: Comparison of BFT algorithms. (*) MinZyzzyva does 2 batches and one signature.
4.1 System Model
The system is composed by a set of n servers P = {s0, ...,sn−1} that provide a Byzantine
fault-tolerant service to a set of clients C = {c0,c1, ...}. Clients and servers are interconnected
by a network and communicate only by message passing. We assume that the communication
is done using reliable authenticated point-to-point channels, but that these channels may
be disconnected and reconnected later, causing sequences of messages to be lost1. This
communication model is equivalent to PBFT’s (Castro & Liskov, 2002) and other BFT systems.
All servers are equipped with a local clock used to compute message timeouts. These clocks
are not synchronized so their values can drift.
We assume a partial synchrony system model (Dwork et al., 1988): in all executions of
the system, there is a bound ∆ and an instant GST (Global Stabilization Time), so that every
message sent by a correct server to another correct server at instant u > GST is received before
u+∆, with ∆ and GST unknown. The intuition behind this model is that the system can work
asynchronously (with no bounds on delays) most of the time but there are stable periods in
which the communication and processing delays are bounded2. This assumption is required
to ensure the liveness of BFT algorithms (e.g., (Castro & Liskov, 2002; Cowling et al., 2006;
Kotla et al., 2007)).
Servers and clients are said to be either correct or faulty. Correct servers/clients always
1These channels can easily be implemented in practice assuming fair links and using retransmissions, or in a
more practical view, using TCP over IPsec or SSL/TLS.
2In practice this stable period has to be long enough for the algorithm to terminate, but does not need to be
forever.
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follow their algorithm. On the contrary, faulty servers/clients can deviate arbitrarily from their
algorithm, even by colluding with some malicious purpose. This class of unconstrained faults
is usually called Byzantine or arbitrary. We assume that at most f out of n servers can be faulty
for n= 2 f +1. In practice this requires that the servers are diverse (Littlewood & Strigini, 2004;
Obelheiro et al., 2006). Notice that we are not considering the generic case (n≥ 2 f +1) but the
tight case in which the number of servers n is the minimum for a value of f , i.e., n = 2 f + 1.
This restriction is well-known to greatly simplify the presentation of the algorithms, which are
simple to modify to the generic case.
Each server contains a local trusted/tamperproof component that provides the USIG service
(Chapter 3, Section 3.4). Therefore, the fault model we consider is hybrid (Verissimo, 2006).
The Byzantine model states that any number of clients and any f servers can be faulty. However,
the USIG service is tamperproof, i.e., always satisfies its specification, even if it is in a faulty
server. For instance, a faulty server may decide not to send a message or send it corrupted, but
it can not send two different messages with the same value of the USIG’s counter and a correct
certificate.
The authenticity of the messages exchanged by the algorithm is protected with signatures
based on public-key cryptography or message authentication codes (MACs) produced with
collision-resistant hash functions. Each server and client has a public/private key pair. Each
server knows the public keys of all servers and clients, and each client knows the public keys
of all servers. The servers use their key pairs to establish shared keys among themselves and
use the latter to create and verify MACs. A signature σc is said to be valid iff it was created
with its sender’s (c) private key and corresponds to the message. A message digest is said to
be valid iff it was created with the key shared between its sender and its recipient. We also use
hash functions to obtain digests of requests and other data. We make the standard assumptions
about cryptography, i.e., that hash functions are collision-resistant and that signatures can not be
forged. We assume all public and private keys are distributed before the algorithm is executed.
4.2. MINBFT 69
4.2 MinBFT
The MinBFT algorithm follows a Paxos-like pattern (Lamport, 2001) similar to PBFT
(Castro & Liskov, 1999; Castro & Liskov, 2002) and A2M-PBFT-EA. The service is modeled as
a state machine that is replicated across different replicas in a distributed system. Each replica
maintains the service state and implements the service operations.
The replicas move through a succession of configurations called views. Each view has a
primary replica and the rest are backups. The primary is the server sp , v mod n, where v is the
current view number. Clients issue requests with operations.
The fundamental idea of MinBFT is that the primary uses the USIG service, (Chapter 3,
Section 3.4), to assign sequence numbers to client requests. More than assigning a number,
the USIG service produces a signed certificate that proves unequivocally that the number is
assigned to that message (and not other) and that the counter was incremented (so the same
number cannot be used twice). The certificate is signed using signatures or MACs, so it can be
verified by the other replicas using the corresponding public or shared key.
MinBFT uses the Confirmable Reliable Multicast (CRM) primitive (Chapter 3, Section 3.5)
which requires only 2 f +1 servers, instead of the 3 f +1 of reliable multicast in homogeneous
systems, i.e., in systems with no “special” (secure/tamperproof) component (Bracha, 1984).
This primitive delivers the same messages to all replicas and allows the replicas to prove that
they delivered a message. As seen in Section 2.1.4 the properties that the algorithm has to
enforce are:
• safety – all correct servers execute the same requests in the same order;
• liveness – all correct clients’ requests are eventually executed.
In normal case operation the sequence of events is the following: (1) a client sends a
request to all servers; (2) the primary assigns a sequence number (execution order number)
to the request and sends it to all servers in a PREPARE message; (3) each server multicasts a
COMMIT message to other services when it receives a valid PREPARE from the primary; (4)
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(a) PBFT
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(b) MinBFT
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req-view-
change view-change new-view
X
(c) MinBFT view change
Figura 4.1: Normal case operation of PBFT (a) and MinBFT (b). View change operation of MinBFT
(c).
when a server accepts a request, it executes the corresponding operation and returns a reply
to the client; (5) the client waits for f + 1 matching replies for the request and completes the
operation.
When f +1 backups suspect that the primary is faulty, a view change operation is executed,
and a new server s′p , v′ mod n becomes the primary (v′ > v is the new view number). This
mechanism provides liveness by allowing the system to make progress when the primary is
faulty.
4.2.1 Clients
A client c requests the execution of an operation op by sending a message
〈REQUEST,c,seq,op〉σc to all servers. seq is the request identifier that is used to ensure
exactly-once semantics: (1) the servers store in a vector Vreq the seq of the last request they
executed for each client; (2) the servers discard requests with seq lower than the last executed
(to avoid executing the same request twice), and any requests received while the previous one
is being processed. Requests are signed with the private key of the client. Requests with an
invalid signature σc are simply discarded. After sending a request, the client waits for f + 1
replies 〈REPLY,s,seq,res〉 from different servers s with matching results res, which ensures
that at least one reply comes from a correct server. If the client does not receive enough replies
during a time interval read in its local clock, it resends the request. In case the request has
already been processed, the servers resend the cached reply.
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4.2.2 Servers: normal case operation
The core of the algorithm executed by the servers is the PREPARE and COMMIT message
processing (see Figure 4.1). MinBFT has only two steps, not three like PBFT (Castro & Liskov,
2002) or A2M-PBFT-EA (Chun et al., 2007). When the primary receives a client request, it
uses a PREPARE message to multicast the request to all servers. The main role of the primary is
to assign a sequence number to each request. This number is the counter value returned by the
USIG service in the unique identifier UI. These numbers are sequential while the primary does
not change, but not when there is a view change, an issue that we discuss later.
The basic idea is that a request m is sent by the primary si to all servers in a
message 〈PREPARE,v,si,m,UIi〉, and each server s j resends it to all others in a message
〈COMMIT,v,s j,si,m,UIi,UIj〉, where UIj is obtained by calling createUI. Each message sent,
either a PREPARE or a COMMIT, has a unique identifier UI obtained by calling the createUI
function, so no two messages can have the same identifier. Servers check if the identifiers of
the messages that they receive are valid using the verifyUI function.
If a server sk did not receive a PREPARE message but received a COMMIT message with a
valid identifier generated by the sender, then it sends its COMMIT message. This can happen if
the sender is faulty and does not send the PREPARE message to server sk (but sends it to other
servers), or if the PREPARE message is simply late and is received after the COMMIT messages.
A request m is accepted by a server following the algorithm if the server receives f + 1 valid
COMMIT messages from different servers for m.
This core algorithm has to be enhanced to deal with certain cases. A correct server s j
multicasts a COMMIT message in response to a message 〈PREPARE,v,si,m,UIi〉 only if three
additional conditions are satisfied: (1) v is the current view number on s j and the sender of
the PREPARE message is the primary of v (only the primary can send PREPARE messages); (2)
the request m contains a valid signature produced by that client (to prevent a faulty primary
from forging requests); and (3) s j already accepted request m′ with counter value cv′ = cv−1,
where cv is the counter value in UIi (to prevent a faulty primary from creating “holes” in the
sequence of messages). This last condition ensures that not only the requests are executed in
the order defined by the counter of the primary, but also that they are accepted in that same
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order. Therefore, when a request is accepted it can be executed immediately (there is never the
necessity of waiting for requests with lower numbers). The only exception is that if the server is
faulty it can “order” the same request twice. So, when a server accepts a request, it first checks
in Vreq if the request was already executed and executes it only if not.
This message ordering mechanism imposes a FIFO order that is also enforced to other
messages (in the view change operation) that also take a unique identifier UI: no correct server
processes a message 〈...,si, ...,UIi, ...〉 sent by any server si with counter value cv in UIi before
it has processed message 〈...,si, ...UIi′, ...〉 sent by si with counter value cv−1. To enforce this
property, each server keeps a vector Vacc with the highest counter value cv it received from each
of the other servers in PREPARE, COMMIT, CHECKPOINT or VIEW-CHANGE messages. The
FIFO order does not impose that the algorithm works in lockstep, i.e, the primary can send
many PREPARE messages but all servers will accept the corresponding requests following the
sequence order assigned by the primary.
4.2.3 Servers: garbage collection and checkpoints
Messages sent by a server are kept in a message log in case they have to be resent. To discard
messages from this log, MinBFT uses a garbage collection mechanism based on checkpoints,
very similar to PBFT’s.
Replicas generate checkpoints periodically when a request sequence number (the counter
value of the UI assigned by the primary) is divisible by the constant cp (checkpoint period).
After the replica j produces the checkpoint it multicasts 〈CHECKPOINT, j,UIlast ,d,UI j〉 where
UIlast is the unique identifier of the last executed request, d is the hash of the replica’s state
and UIj is obtained by calling createUI for the checkpoint message itself. A replica considers
that a checkpoint is stable when it receives f + 1 CHECKPOINT messages signed by different
replicas with the same UIlast and d. We call this set of messages a checkpoint certificate, which
proves that the replica’s state was correct until that request execution. Therefore, the replica can
discard all entries in its log with sequence number less than the counter value of UIlast .
The checkpoint is used to limit what messages are added to the log. We use two limiters: the
low water mark (h) and the high water mark (H). The low water mark is the sequence number
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of the last stable checkpoint. Replicas discard received messages with the counter value less
than h. The high water mark is H = h+L where L is the maximum size of the log. Replicas
discard received messages with the counter value greater than H.
4.2.4 Servers: view change operation
In normal case operation, the primary assigns sequence numbers to the requests it receives
and multicasts these numbers to the backups using PREPARE messages. This algorithm strongly
constrains what a faulty primary can do: it can not repeat or assign arbitrarily higher sequence
numbers. However, a faulty primary can still prevent progress by not assigning sequence
numbers to some requests (or even to any requests at all).
When the primary is faulty a view change has to be executed and a new primary chosen.
View changes are triggered by timeout. When a backup receives a request from a client, it starts
a timer that expires after Texec. When the request is accepted, the timer is stopped. If the timer
expires, the backup suspects that the primary is faulty and starts a view change.
The view change operation is represented in Figure 4.1. When a timer in backup si times-
out, si sends a message 〈REQ-VIEW-CHANGE,si,v,v′〉 to all servers, where v is the current view
number and v′ = v+1 the new view number3.
When a server si receives f + 1 REQ-VIEW-CHANGE messages, it moves to view v+ 1
and multicasts 〈VIEW-CHANGE,si,v′,Clast ,O,UIi〉, where Clast is the latest stable checkpoint
certificate and O is a set of COMMIT messages sent by the replica since the last checkpoint was
generated. At this point, a replica stops accepting messages for v.
The VIEW-CHANGE message takes a unique identifier UIi obtained by calling createUI.
The objective is to prevent faulty servers from sending different VIEW-CHANGE messages with
different Clast and O to different subsets of the servers, leading to different decisions on which
was the last request of the previous view. Faulty servers still can do it, but they have to assign
different UI identifiers to these different messages, which will be processed in order by the
correct servers, so all will take the same decision on the last request of the previous view.
3It seems superfluous to send v and v′ = v+1 but in some cases the next view can be for instance v′ = v+2.
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Correct servers only consider 〈VIEW-CHANGE,si,v′,Clast ,O,UIi〉 messages that are consistent
with the system state: (1) the checkpoint certificate Clast contains f +1 valid UI identifiers; (2)
the counter value (cvi) in UIi is cvi = cv+ 1, where cv is the highest counter value of the UIs
signed by the replica in O; if O is empty the highest counter value will be the UI in Clast signed
by the replica when it generated the checkpoint; and (3) there are no holes in the sequence
number of COMMIT messages in O.
When the new primary for view v′ receives f +1 VIEW-CHANGE messages from different
servers, it stores them in a set Vvc, which is the new-view certificate. Vvc must contain all requests
accepted since the previous checkpoint, and can also include requests that were only prepared.
The primary of v′ uses the information in the Clast and O fields in the VIEW-CHANGE messages
to define S, which is the set of requests that were prepared/accepted since the checkpoint, in
order to define the initial state for v′. To compute S, the primary starts by selecting the most
recent (valid) checkpoint certificate received in VIEW-CHANGE messages. Next, it picks in
VIEW-CHANGE messages the requests in O sets with UI counter values greater than the UI
counter value in the checkpoint certificate.
After this computation, the primary multicasts a message 〈NEW-VIEW,si,v′,Vvc,S,UIi〉.
When a replica receives a NEW-VIEW message it verifies if the new-view certificate is valid.
All replicas also verify if S was computed properly doing the same computation as the primary.
A replica begins the new view v′ after all requests in S that have not been executed before are
executed. If a replica detects that there is a hole in the sequence number of the last request
that it executed and the first request in S, it requests to other replicas the commit certificates of
the missing requests to update its state. If due to the garbage collection the other replicas have
deleted these messages, there is a state transfer (using the same protocol of PBFT (Castro &
Liskov, 2002)).
In previous BFT algorithms, requests are assigned with sequential execution order numbers
even when there are view changes. This is not the case in MinBFT as the sequence numbers
are provided by a different tamperproof component for each view (by the USIG service of the
primary). Therefore, when there is a view change the first sequence number for the new view
has to be defined. This value is the counter value in the unique identifier UIi in the NEW-VIEW
message plus one. The next PREPARE message sent by the new primary must follow the UIi in
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the NEW-VIEW message.
When a server sends a VIEW-CHANGE message, it starts a timer that expires after Tvc units
of time. If the timer expires before the server receives a valid NEW-VIEW message, it starts
another view change for view v+ 2 4. If additional view changes are needed, the timer is
multiplied by two each time, increasing exponentially until a new primary server responds. The
objective is to avoid timer expirations forever due to long communication delays.
Consider two quorums (i.e., subsets) of servers, one that accepted the last executed request,
and another that is executing the view change operation (the rest of the servers are slow). PBFT
reasons in terms of quorums of 2 f + 1 servers, while MinBFT uses quorums of f + 1 servers.
In contrast with PBFT, that requires at least one correct server in the intersection of the two
quorums, in MinBFT we do not have this requirement. The reason is that the Confirmability
property of the CRM algorithms and the FIFO order prevent faulty servers in the intersection of
lying about the last request accepted. The complete proof of correctness of the algorithm can
be found in Appendix A.1.
4.3 MinZyzzyva
This section presents the second BFT algorithm of this chapter, MinZyzzyva. This
algorithm has characteristics similar to the previous one, but needs one communication step
less in nice executions because it is speculative. MinZyzzyva is a modified version of Zyzzyva,
the first speculative BFT algorithm (Kotla et al., 2007).
2f+1
Client
Server 0
(primary)
Server 1
Server 2
(a) Gracious execution
X
f+1 f+1
commit
(b) Faulty replica case
Figura 4.2: MinZyzzyva basic operation.
4But the previous view is still v. Recall the previous footnote about REQ-VIEW-CHANGE messages.
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The idea of speculation is that servers respond to clients’ requests without first agreeing on
the order in which the requests are executed. They optimistically adopt the order proposed by
the primary server, execute the request, and respond immediately to the client. This execution
is speculative because that may not be the real order in which the request should be executed. If
some servers become inconsistent with the others, clients detect these inconsistencies and help
(correct) servers converge on a single total order of requests, possibly having to rollback some
of the executions. Clients only rely on responses that are consistent with this total order.
MinZyzzyva uses the USIG service to constrain the behavior of the primary, allowing a
reduction of the number of replicas of Zyzzyva from 3 f + 1 to 2 f + 1, preserving the same
safety and liveness properties.
We divide the presentation of MinZyzzyva in four parts: gracious execution, non-
gracious execution, checkpoints and view change. Figure 4.2 illustrates the basic operation
of MinZyzzyva.
4.3.1 Gracious execution
This is the optimistic mode of the algorithm. It works essentially as follows: (1) A client
sends a request in a REQUEST message to the primary sp. (2) The primary receives the request,
calls createUI to assign it a unique identifier UIp containing the sequence number (just like in
MinBFT), and forwards the request and UIp to the other servers. (3) Servers receive the request,
verify if UIp is valid and if it comes in FIFO order, assign another unique identifier UIs to the
request, speculatively execute it, and send the response in a RESPONSE message to the client
(with the two UI identifiers). (4) The client gathers the replies and only accepts messages with
valid UIp and UIs. (5) If the client receives 2 f +1 matching responses, the request completes
and the client delivers the response to the application.
Notice that 2 f +1 are all the servers. This is a requirement for MinZyzzyva to do gracious
execution, just like it was for Zyzzyva. Clients and servers use request identifiers (seq) to ensure
exactly-once semantics, just like in MinBFT (seq of the last request executed of each client is
stored in vector Vreq). The client only accepts replies that satisfy the following conditions: (1)
contain UIp and UIs that were generated for the client request; and (2) contain a UIp that is valid
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and that is the same in all replies. Clients do not need to keep information about the servers’
counter values. Notice also that the COMMIT messages do not contain the message history (as
in Zyzzyva), since the UIp defines the sequence of operations.
A replica may only accept and speculatively execute requests following the primary
sequence number order (FIFO order), but a faulty primary can introduce holes in the sequence
number space. A replica detects a hole when it receives a request with the counter value cv
in the primary’s UI, where cv > maxcv + 1 and maxcv is the counter value of the last request
received. In this situation, it sends to the primary a 〈FILL-HOLE,si,v′,maxcv + 1,cv〉 message
and starts a timer. Upon receiving a FILL-HOLE message the primary sends all requests in the
interval reported by the replica. The primary ignores FILL-HOLE messages of previous views.
If the replica’s timer expires without it having received a reply from the primary, it multicasts
the FILL-HOLE message to the other replicas and also requests a view change by sending REQ-
VIEW-CHANGE message (just like Zyzzyva).
4.3.2 Non-gracious execution
If the network is slow or one or more servers are faulty, the client may never receive
matching responses from all 2 f + 1 servers. When a client sends a request it sets a timer.
If this timer expires and it has received between f + 1 and 2 f matching responses, then it
sends a COMMIT message containing a commit certificate with these responses (with the UIp
and UIs identifiers) to all servers. When a correct server receives a valid commit certificate
from a client, it acknowledges with a LOCAL-COMMIT message. Servers store in a vector Vacc
the highest received counter value of the other servers (that come in the UI identifiers). With
the UIp and UIs in the COMMIT message, the servers update their vector values. The client
resends the COMMIT message until it receives the corresponding LOCAL-COMMIT messages
from f +1 servers. After that, the client considers the request completed and delivers the reply
to the application. The system guarantees that even if there is a view change, all correct servers
execute the request at this point.
If the client receives less than f + 1 matching responses then it sets a second timer and
resends the request to all servers. If a correct server receives a request that it has executed, it
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resends the cached response to the client. Otherwise, it sends the request to the primary and
starts a timer. If the primary replies before the timeout, the server executes the request. If the
timer expires before the primary sends a reply, the server initiates a view change.
Using the USIG service, it is not possible to generate the same identifier for two different
messages. A faulty primary can try to cause the re-execution of some requests by assigning it
two different UI identifiers. However the servers detect this misbehavior using the clients’ seq
identifier in the request and do not do the second execution, just like in MinBFT5.
4.3.3 Garbage collection and checkpoints
Like in Zyzzyva, the properties ensured by MinZyzzyva are defined in terms of histories.
Each server in MinZyzzyva maintains an ordered history of the requests it has executed. Part
of that history, up to some request, is said to be committed, while the rest is speculative. A
prefix of the history is committed if the server has a commit certificate to prove that a certain
request was executed with a certain sequence number. A commit certificate is composed by
f + 1 matching responses from f + 1 different servers. These certificates can be (1) sent by a
client in the non-gracious execution detailed above, (2) obtained when a view change occurs or
(3) obtained from a set of f +1 matching checkpoints.
Like in MinBFT, replicas generate checkpoints periodically, when the counter value in a
UI generated by the primary is divisible by the constant cp. After the replica j produces the
checkpoint, it multicasts 〈CHECKPOINT,s j,UIi,d,UI j〉 where UIi is the unique identifier of the
last executed request, d is the digest of the current replica’s state and UIj is obtained by calling
createUI for the checkpoint message itself. A replica considers that a checkpoint is stable
when it receives f +1 CHECKPOINT messages with valid UI identifiers from different replicas
with the same UIi and d. Then all messages executed before UIi are removed from the log.
5Therefore Zyzzyva’s proof of misbehavior (Kotla et al., 2007) is not needed in MinZyzzyva.
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4.3.4 View change
The view change operation works essentially as MinBFT’s but MinZyzzyva weakens the
condition under which a request appears in the new view message. When a server si suspects
that the primary is faulty it sends a 〈REQ-VIEW-CHANGE,si,v,v′〉 message. When a server re-
ceives f +1 REQ-VIEW-CHANGE messages, it multicasts a 〈VIEW-CHANGE,si,v′,Clast ,O,UIi〉,
where Clast is the latest commit certificate collected by the replica and O is a set of requests that
were executed by the replica since Clast . Each ordered request has UIp signed by the primary
and UIi signed by the replica during the request execution. At this point, the replica stops
accepting messages other than CHECKPOINT, VIEW-CHANGE and NEW-VIEW.
Like in MinBFT, correct servers only consider 〈VIEW-CHANGE,si,v′,Clast ,O,UIi〉 mes-
sages that are consistent with the system state: (1) the checkpoint certificate Clast contains f +1
valid UI identifiers; (2) the counter value cvi in UIi is cvi = cv+ 1, where cv is the highest
counter value of the UIs signed by the replica in O; if O is empty the highest counter value will
be the UI in Clast signed by the replica when it generated the checkpoint; and (3) there are no
holes in the sequence number of COMMIT messages in O.
When the new primary receives f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages it multicasts a 〈NEW-
VIEW,si,v′,Vvc,S,UIi〉 message to define the initial state to v′. When a replica receives a NEW-
VIEW message it verifies if the new-view certificate is valid and if S was computed properly. A
replica begins in the new view v′ when all requests in S that have not been executed before, are
executed. Replicas consider a valid NEW-VIEW message equivalent to a commit certificate.
Correct servers evaluate VIEW-CHANGE messages and the new primary builds NEW-VIEW
messages exactly as in MinBFT. When a replica receives a NEW-VIEW message it verifies if
the new-view certificate is valid. Replicas consider a valid NEW-VIEW message equivalent to a
commit certificate.
This algorithm strongly constrains what a faulty primary can do since it can not repeat
or assign arbitrarily high sequence numbers. However, due to the speculative nature of
MinZyzzyva, in some cases servers may have to rollback some executions. This can happen
after a view change when the new primary does not include in the NEW-VIEW message some
operations that were executed by less than f servers. This can only happen for operations that do
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not have a commit certificate, therefore the client also did not receive neither 2 f +1 RESPONSE
messages, nor f +1 LOCAL-COMMIT messages, thus the operations did not complete. Rollback
is a internal server operation and does not involve the USIG service (there is no rollback of the
counter). As mentioned before the NEW-VIEW message is equivalent to a commit certificate, so
operations that were rollback by a replica will not appear in the next view changes or checkpoint
messages.
The complete proof of correctness of the algorithm can be found in Appendix A.2.
4.4 Implementation
We implemented the prototypes for both MinBFT and MinZyzzyva in Java. We chose Java
for three reasons. First, we expect that avoiding bugs and vulnerabilities will be more important
than performance in most BFT deployments, and Java offers features like memory protection,
strong typing and access control that can make a BFT implementation more dependable (Oaks,
2000). The second reason is to improve the system portability making it easier to deploy in
different environments. Finally, we want to show that an optimized BFT Java prototype can
have performance that is competitive with C implementations such as PBFT.
The prototypes were implemented for scalability, i.e., for delivering a throughput as high
as possible when receiving requests from a large number of clients. To achieve this goal, we
built a scalable event-driven I/O architecture (which can be seen as a simpler version of SEDA
architecture (Welsh et al., 2001)) and implemented an adaptive batching algorithm and window
congestion control similar to the one used in PBFT (the algorithm can run a pre-configured
maximum number of parallel agreements; messages received when there are no slots for running
agreements are batched in the next agreement possible). Other common BFT optimizations
such as making agreements over the request hashes instead of the entire requests, and using
authenticators were also employed in our prototypes (Castro & Liskov, 2002). Additionally,
we used recent Java features such as non-blocking I/O and the concurrent API (from packages
java.nio and java.util.concurrent). Finally, we used TCP sockets.
Our algorithm implementations access the USIG service through a small abstract Java
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class that was extended to implement the several versions of USIG. In all these versions the
fundamental idea was to isolate the service from the rest of the system but the levels of isolation
obtained are different, as presented in Figure 4.3.
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BFT
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USIG lib
USIG
Figura 4.3: Different versions of the USIG service: Non-Secure - the service is inside the process;
VM-based - the service is in an isolated virtual machine; TPM - the service is supported by a trusted
hardware.
• Non-secure USIG: The non-secure version of USIG is a simple class that provides
methods to increment a counter and return its value together with a signature. This
version of the USIG service is not isolated and thus can be tampered by a malicious
adversary that controls the machine. The practical interest of this version is to allow us to
understand what would be the performance of our algorithms if the time of accessing the
USIG service was 0.
• VM-based USIG: This version runs the USIG service as a process in a virtual machine
(VM) different from the one in which the normal system (operating system, algorithm
code) runs. In each system replica we use the Xen hypervisor (Barham et al., 2003) to
isolate the replica process and the USIG service. The replica with the algorithm code
runs on domain1, which is connected to the network and contains all untrusted software.
The USIG service (one hundred lines of Java code plus the crypto lib) runs on domain0,
which is not connected to the network and contains as little services as possible. The
communication between the replica process and the USIG service is done using sockets.
To ensure that the counter value is kept when a replica reboots, its value should be
stored in a flash memory or other high speed secondary storage (but this feature was
not implemented in our prototype).
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• TPM USIG: The TPM-based version of USIG is the most secure version of the service
we have deployed so far since the service is implemented by trusted hardware, providing
stronger isolation. In this version the USIG service is implemented by a thin layer
of software (a function in a library) and by the TPM itself (see Section 3.4). The
identifier generated by the service is signed using the TPM’s private AIK, a RSA key
with 2048-bits. We used TPM/J, an object-oriented API written in Java, to access the
TPM (Sarmenta et al., 2006).
To explore the costs associated with the authentication operations, versions Non-Secure
(NS) and VM-based (VM) of the USIG service were implemented using several methods of
authenticating an UI: NTT ESIGN with 2048-bit keys (Crypto++ lib accessed through the Java
Native Interface), RSA with 1024-bit keys and SHA1 to produce HMACs (both from the Java 6
JCA default provider). Using HMAC, the servers have a shared key therefore the UI signature
verification has to be carried out inside of the trusted service. For this reason, only MinBFT
can use the USIG service implemented with HMAC (USIG-Hmac). In MinZyzzyva the client
verifies if the UI is the same in all server replies, which turns impossible the use of HMACs in
this algorithm in our system model (only the servers have a trusted module).
Considering the possible implementations of the USIG service (Section 3.4) and the kinds
of isolation that can be seen in Figure 4.3, we have implemented seven version of the USIG
service: NS-Hmac, NS-Sign(ESIGN), NS-Sign(RSA), VM-Hmac, VM-Sign(ESIGN), VM-
Sign(RSA) and TPM.
The counter used in the NS and VM versions of the USIG has 64 bits (a Java long variable),
which is enough to prevent it from burning out in less than 233 years if it is incremented twice
per millisecond.
We assume that it is not possible to tamper with the service, e.g., decrementing the counter,
but privileged software like the operating system might call the function createUI. This is a
case of faulty replica as the replica deviates from the expected behavior (does not use sequential
values for UI) but the service remains correct. A simple authentication mechanism is used to
prevent processes other than the replica processes from accessing the service. Both, the TPM
and VM-based version are able to continue to work correctly even under attacks coming from
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the network against the server software. However, only the version with the TPM is tolerant to a
malicious administrator that manipulates the services hosted by f servers, and even this version
is not tolerant against physical attacks.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
This section presents performance results of our algorithms using micro-benchmarks. We
measured the latency and throughput of the MinBFT and MinZyzzyva implementations using
null operations.
We also present performance results for a macro-benchmark that was used to understand the
impact of using our algorithms in a real application: we integrated MinBFT and MinZyzzyva
with the Java Network File System (JNFS) (Radwin, 2002).
PBFT (Castro & Liskov, 2002) is often considered to be the baseline for BFT algorithms, so
we were interested in comparing our algorithms with the implementation available on the web6.
To compare this implementation with our MinBFT and MinZyzzyva algorithms, we made our
own implementation of PBFT’s normal case operation in Java (JPBFT). We did not compare
with the TTCB-based algorithm and A2M-PBFT-EA because their code was not available.
Unless where noted, we considered a setup that can tolerate one faulty server ( f = 1),
requiring n = 4 servers for PBFT and JPBFT and n = 3 servers for MinBFT and MinZyzzyva.
We executed from 0 to 120 logical clients distributed through 6 machines. The servers and
clients machines were 2.8 GHz Pentium-4 PCs with 2 GBs RAM running Sun JDK 1.6 on top
of Linux 2.6.18 connected through a Dell gigabit switch. The PCs had a Atmel TPM 1.2 chip.
In all experiments in which Java implementations were used, we enabled the Just-In-Time (JIT)
compiler and run a warm-up phase to load and verify all classes, transforming the bytecodes into
native code. All experiments run only in normal case operation, without faults or asynchrony,
which is usually considered to be the normal case.
6http://www.pmg.lcs.mit.edu/bft/.
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4.5.1 Micro-Benchmarks
For the first part of the performance evaluation we chose the versions of MinBFT
and MinZyzzyva that presented best performance and we compare them with PBFT. We
evaluated the performance of four algorithms PBFT, JPBFT, MinBFT-Hmac and MinZyzzyva-
Sig(ESIGN) on a LAN. We measured the latency of the algorithms using a simple service with
no state that executes null operations, with arguments and results varying between 0 and 4K
bytes. The latency was measured at the client by reading the local clock immediately before the
request was sent, then immediately after a response was consolidated (i.e., the same response
was received for a quorum of servers), and subtracting the former from the latter. Each request
was done synchronously, i.e., the client waited for a reply before invoking a new operation. The
results were obtained by timing 100,000 requests in two executions. The obtained latencies are
averages of these two executions. The results are show in Table 4.2.
Req/Res PBFT JPBFT MinBFT-Hmac MinZyzzyva-Sig
0/0 0.4 1.8 2.3 2.9
4K/0 0.6 2.2 2.9 3.1
0/4K 0.8 2.5 3.0 3.2
Tabela 4.2: Latency results varying request and response size for the best versions of MinBFT and
MinZyzzyva, together with PBFT and a similar Java implementation.
In this experiment, PBFT has shown the best performance of all algo-
rithms/implementations, followed by JPBFT, MinBFT-Hmac and MinZyzzyva-Sig, which was
the worse. This experiment shows clearly that our Java implementation runs an agreement
much slower than PBFT. One of the possible reasons for this can be the overhead of our
event-driven socket management layer that maintains several queues and event listeners to deal
smoothly with a high number of connections. When compared with JPBFT, MinBFT-Hmac
has a small extra cost because of the overhead to access the USIG service to create and to
verify the UI. Zyzzyva is known to be faster than PBFT in most cases (Kotla et al., 2007; Singh
et al., 2008), but Zyzzyva (like PBFT) uses only MACs, while MinZyzzyva uses signatures, so
MinZyzzyva ends up being slower than PBFT, JPBFT and MinBFT-Hmac.
The second part of the micro-benchmark had the objective of measuring the peak
throughput of the algorithms with different loads. We ran experiments using requests and
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responses with 0 bytes. We varied the number of logical clients between 1 and 120 in each
experiment, where each client sent operations periodically (without waiting for replies), in order
to obtain the maximum possible throughput. Each experiment ran for 100,000 client operations
to allow performance to stabilize, before recording data for the following 100,000 operations.
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Figura 4.4: Peak throughput for 0/0 operations for the best versions of MinBFT and MinZyzzyva,
together with PBFT and a similar Java implementation.
Figure 4.4 shows that the fewer communication steps and fewer number of replicas in
MinZyzzyva are reflected in higher throughput by achieving around 30,000 operations per
second. For the same reason, the MinBFT-Hmac throughput is 10% higher than the one
observed for PBFT. It is interesting to notice that the minimal number of communication steps
and replicas (which reduces the quorum sizes used by the algorithms) makes the replicas process
less messages (less I/O, less MAC verification, etc.), which increases the throughput. Due
to the optimizations for scalability discussed in Section 4.4, JPBFT presented only 5% lower
throughput when compared with the original PBFT implementation.
The throughput values in the figure together with the latency values of Table 4.2 show the
effect of adaptive batching. The similarity on the peak throughput values is explained by the
fact that, in our experiments under heavy load (e.g., 120 clients accessing the system), PBFT
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runs more agreements with batches of up to 70 messages while our algorithms use batches of
up to 200 messages.
4.5.2 Effects of Communication Latency
In the third experiment we emulated WAN network delays on all links and run latency
experiments to better understand how these algorithms would behave if the replicas and clients
were deployed on different sites. Despite the fact that this scenario is not what is expected
when one considers the data centers used today (in which all replicas are inside a data center),
it is important if one considers the deployment of a fault independent replicated system: it can
tolerate malicious attacks (such as DDoS), link failures, site misconfigurations, natural disasters
and many other problems that can affect whole sites. We used netem7 to inject delays in the
communication among replicas by varying the delays between 1 and 50 ms and use a standard
deviation of 10% of the injected delay. The latency was measured in the same way as in previous
section. Figure 4.5 presents the results.
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Figura 4.5: Latency for 0/0 operations with several link latency values.
7http://www.linuxfoundation.org/en/Net:Netem.
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As expected, the measurements show that the latency becomes higher with larger delays.
Due to the tentative execution optimization (described in Section 6.1 of (Castro & Liskov,
2002)), PBFT reduces the number of communication steps from 5 to 4 communication steps,
and this is reflected in the results obtained. We did not implement this optimization in JPBFT,
therefore it presents the worse latency in our experiments. MinBFT and MinZyzzyva presented
the best latency results when the latency is greater than 2 ms, due to their smaller number of
communication steps.
The case of the missing communication step. Surprisingly, MinBFT executes requests
with almost the same latency as MinZyzzyva, which contradicts the theoretical number of
communication steps of these algorithms: 4 and 3 respectively. The explanation for this fact
highlights one interesting advantage of MinBFT when tolerating a single fault. In a setup
with f = 1 in which the network latency is stable, replicas receive the PREPARE and COMMIT
messages from the primary almost together (the primary “sends” the PREPARE to itself and
sends its COMMIT immediately). Since, the MinBFT algorithm needs only f + 1 COMMIT
messages to accept a request, with f = 1 only two COMMITs are required. These two COMMITs
are received just after the PREPARE: one from the leader and another from the server itself.
Therefore, the client request is executed soon after the PREPARE message from the primary
server arrives, making MinBFT reach the latency of MinZyzzyva.
In setups with f > 1 this nice feature will not appear since the quorum for COMMIT
acceptance should contains at least 3 replicas. However, the use of smaller quorums can
make our algorithms more efficient in real networks due to their large variance in link latency
(Junqueira et al., 2007).
4.5.3 Comparing Different USIG Versions
To explore the different implementations of the USIG service and the computational over-
head added by different cryptographic mechanisms we measured the latency and throughput of
MinBFT and MinZyzzyva with all our different USIG implementations in a LAN, excluding
the TPM-based USIG that will be discussed in the next section.
Figure 4.6 shows the results for our latency experiments. The signature-based versions
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of the algorithms add significant computational overheads when compared with MAC-based
authenticators.
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Figura 4.6: Latency of 0/0 operations for MinBFT and MinZyzzyva using several USIG
implementations.
Algorithm createUI verifyUI
Hmac (SHA1) 0.008 0.007
ESIGN (2048 bits) 1.035 0.548
RSA (1024 bits) 10.683 0.580
Tabela 4.3: Overhead (in milliseconds) of UI creation and verification for messages with 20 bytes (the
size of request hash).
Since the algorithms require two createUI calls and one (in MinZyzzyva) or f + 1 (in
MinBFT) verifyUI calls in their critical path, the algorithms latencies are very dependent
of the USIG implementation. To better understand the nature of that relation, it is worth
understanding the costs of the cryptography employed in these versions. Table 4.3 presents
the latency of createUI and verifyUI on several implementations of NS-USIG (with has no
access cost). The data in this table explains the results observed in Figure 4.6: roughly, the use
of ESIGN adds 2.5 ms to the latency of MinBFT when compared with Hmac, while RSA adds
17.5 ms when compared with ESIGN.
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As a side note, the same RSA implementation when run on a 64-bit 2.3GHz quadcore
Xeon machine, with a 64-bit JVM, execute createUI and verifyUI in 2.496 and 0.128 ms,
respectively, a gain of 80% when compared with the results of the table. This allow us to
conclude that asymmetric cryptography can be used successfully in high-end servers, specially
if one can make separate threads run the tasks of signature generation.
Figure 4.7 shows the throughput of the algorithms with the different USIG implementations.
The VM-based versions have throughput lower than the non-secure versions due to the overhead
to access the trusted service. This difference is especially relevant when comparing the values
for the VM-based MinBFT using Hmac and its corresponding Non-Secure version because the
UI verification is executed inside of the trusted component.
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Figura 4.7: Peak throughput for 0/0 operations for MinBFT and MinZyzzyva using several USIG
implementations.
This graph shows that the cost of accessing the VM-based USIG lowers the peak throughput
by a factor from 6% (MinZyzzyva-Sign(ESIGN)) to 16% (MinBFT-Hmac). It shows that the
VM-based isolation is a cost-effective solution in the sense that a moderate level of isolation
can be obtained without losing too much performance.
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4.5.4 Hardware-based USIG Performance
Table 4.4 presents the latency and peak throughput of the USIG service implemented on a
Atmel TPM 1.2 chip integrated to the mainboard of machines.
Algorithm Latency Peak Throughput
MinBFT 1617 23404
MinZyzzyva 1552 24179
Tabela 4.4: Latency and peak throughput of MinBFT and MinZyzzyva using the TPM USIG.
The time taken by the TPM-based USIG service to run createUI is 797 ms, almost all of
which is taken by the TPM to increment the counter and produce an RSA signature. In this
sense, the latency values can be explained by the execution of two createUI executed in the
critical path of the algorithm. The verification of a UI takes approximately 0.07 ms, since it is
executed outside of the TPM, so, its effect in the latency is minimal.
The peak throughput shows that the values are not so bad if compared with the values
presented in Figure 4.7. However, to obtain these values with TPM USIG we needed to batch a
large number of requests in the PREPARE messages because the restriction of one increment
by 3.5 seconds. The throughput is strictly dependent of the number of messages batched
during this time, in our experiments we found that the peak throughput was achieved with
batches with more than 20000 messages. So, the behavior of the execution of our system is:
3.5 seconds without accepting any message followed by one second accepting with more than
20000 messages, which may be unacceptable in many practical services.
There are at least two important reasons for the poor performance of the TPM USIG.
The first is the maximum increment rate of the TPM monotonic counter, which makes the
system able to execute one agreement (to order a batch of messages) every 3.5 seconds. The
TPM specification version 1.2 defines that the monotonic counter “must allow for 7 years of
increments every 5 seconds” and “must support an increment rate of once every 5 seconds”
(Trusted Computing Group, 2007a). The text is not particularly clear so the implementers of
the TPM seem to have concluded that the counter must not be implemented faster than once
every 5 seconds approximately, while the objective was to prevent the counter from burning out
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in less than 7 years. The counter value has 32 bits, so it might be incremented once every 52 ms
still attaining this 7-year target.
Furthermore, if in a future TPM version the counter size is increased to 64 bits (as it is in
our VM-based USIG), it becomes possible to increment a counter every 12 picoseconds, which
will make this limitation disappear. The second reason for the poor performance we observed
is the time the TPM takes to do a signature (approximately 700 ms). A first comment is that
normally cryptographic algorithms are implemented in hardware to be faster, not slower, but
our experiments have shown that with the TPM the opposite is true. This suggests that the
performance of the TPM signatures might be much improved. We believe that it will be indeed
improved with the development of new applications for the TPM. Moreover, at least Intel is
much interested in developing the TPM hardware. For instance, it recently announced that it
will integrate the TPM directly into its next generation chipset (Branscombe, 2008). Others
have also been pushing for faster TPM cryptography (McCune et al., 2008b).
4.5.5 Macro-Benchmark
To explore the costs of the algorithms in a real application, we integrated them with JNFS,
an open source implementation of NFS that runs on top of a native file system (Radwin, 2002).
We compare the latencies obtained with a single server running plain JNFS and with three
different replication scenarios integrating JNFS with JPBFT, MinBFT-Hmac and MinZyzzyva-
Sig.
The macro-benchmark workload consists of five phases: (1) create/delete 6 subdirectories
recursively; (2) copy/remove a source tree containing 7 files with up 4Kb; (3) examine the status
of all files in the tree without examining their data (returning information as owner, size, date
of creation); (4) examine every byte of data in a file with 4Kb size; (5) create a 4Kb file.
Table 4.5 shows the results of the macro-benchmark execution. The values are the mean
of the latencies of 200 runs for each phase of the workload in two independent executions.
The standard deviations for the total time to run the benchmark with MinBFT and MinZyzzyva
were always below 0.4% of the value reported. Note that the overhead caused by the replication
algorithms is uniform across the benchmark phases in all algorithms. The total time of an
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operation in a replication scenario is defined by the operation time observed in JNFS in a single
server plus the algorithm latency. The main conclusion of the macro-benchmark was that the
overhead introduced by the replication is not too high (no more than 3%).
Phase JNFS JPBFT MinBFT-Hmac MinZyzzyva-Sig
1 26 28 29 29
2 681 685 687 688
3 20 22 23 23
4 5 7 8 8
5 108 111 113 114
Total 840 852 860 862
Tabela 4.5: Macro-benchmark: latencies of JNFS alone and replicated with BFT algorithms
(milliseconds)
4.6 Related Work
The idea of exploring a hybrid fault model in the context of intrusion tolerance or Byzantine
fault tolerance, was first explored in the TTCB work (Correia et al., 2002). The idea was to
extend the “normal” replicas that might be faulty with a tamperproof subsystem. This concept
was later generalized with the notion of wormholes (Verissimo, 2006). It was in this context that
the first 2 f + 1 state machine replication solution appeared (Correia et al., 2004). The TTCB
had the job of ordering the clients’ requests. The atomic multicast algorithm did not follow
a Paxos-like message pattern, but made destination agreement, i.e., consensus on the order of
execution (De´fago et al., 2004). Recently Chun et al. presented another 2 f +1 BFT algorithm
based on similar ideas, A2M-PBFT-EA (Chun et al., 2007). This algorithm requires only
local tamperproof components (to implement the A2M abstraction). MinBFT and MinZyzzyva
are also 2 f + 1 BFT algorithms but that, on the contrary the previous two, are minimal in
the several senses discussed above. Furthermore, A2M-PBFT-EA is a modification of PBFT,
while MinBFT is a novel algorithm that is simpler and more efficient in terms of number of
communication steps and MACs at the bottleneck server.
The quest for reducing the number of replicas of BFT algorithms had other interesting
developments. Yin et al. presented a BFT algorithm for an architecture that separates agreement
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(made by 3 f + 1 servers) from service execution (made by 2 f + 1 servers) (Yin et al., 2003).
This was an important contribution to the area because service execution is expected to require
much more computational resources than agreement. However agreement still needs 3 f + 1
machines, while in the present work we need only 2 f + 1 replicas also for agreement. Li and
Mazieres proposed an algorithm, BFT2F, that needs 3 f + 1 replicas but if more than f but at
most 2 f replicas are faulty, the system still behaves correctly, albeit sacrificing either liveness
or providing only weaker consistency guarantees (Li & Mazieres, 2007).
Quorum systems are a way to reason about subsets of servers (quorums) from a group.
Quorums can be used to implement data storage in which data can be written and read. These
systems are less powerful than state machine replication that is a generic solution to implement
(Byzantine) fault-tolerant systems. Martin et al. have shown that it is possible to implement
quorum-based data storage with only 2 f +1 replicas (Martin et al., 2002).
The main quest in BFT algorithms has been for speed. PBFT has shown that these
algorithms “can be fast” (Castro & Liskov, 2002) but others appeared that tried to do even
better. HQ combined quorum algorithms with PBFT with very good performance when the
operations being done do not “interfere” (Cowling et al., 2006). Another similar algorithm,
Q/U, uses lighter, quorum-based algorithms, but does not ensure the termination of the
requests in case there is contention (Abd-El-Malek et al., 2005). Very recently Zyzzyva
exploits speculative execution to reduce the number of communication steps and cryptographic
operations establishing a new watermark for the performance of these algorithms (Kotla et al.,
2007). An instructive comparison of these algorithms based on simulations was recently
published (Singh et al., 2008).
Monotonic counters are a service of the TPM that appeared only in version 1.2 (Trusted
Computing Group, 2007a; Trusted Computing Group, 2007c). Two papers have shown the use
of these counters in very different ways than we way we use them. Dijk et al. addressed the
problem of using an untrusted server with a TPM to provide trusted storage to a large number of
clients (van Dijk et al., 2007). Each client may own and use several different devices that may
be offline at different times and may not be able to communicate with each other except through
the untrusted server. The challenge of this work is not to guarantee the privacy or integrity of
the clients’ data, but in guaranteeing the data freshness. It introduces freshness schemes based
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on a monotonic counter, and shows that they can be used to implement tamper-evident trusted
storage for a large number of users.
The TCG specifications mandate the implementation of four monotonic counters in the
TPM, but also that only one of them can be used between reboots (Trusted Computing Group,
2007a). Sarmenta et al. override this limitation by implementing virtual monotonic counters
on an untrusted machine with a TPM (Sarmenta et al., 2006). These counters are based on a
hash-tree-based scheme and the single usable TPM monotonic counter. These virtual counters
are shown to allow the implementation of count-limited objects, e.g., encrypted keys, arbitrary
data, and other objects that can only be used when the associated counter is within a certain
range.
4.7 Conclusion
BFT algorithms typically require 3 f + 1 servers to tolerate f Byzantine servers, which
involves considerable costs in hardware, software and administration. Therefore reducing the
number of replicas has a very important impact in the cost of the system. We show that using
a minimal trusted service (only a counter plus a signing function) it is possible to reduce the
number of replicas to 2 f +1 preserving the same properties of safety and liveness of traditional
BFT algorithms. Furthermore, we present two BFT algorithms that are minimal, not only in
terms of number of replicas and trusted service used, but also of communication steps in nice
executions: 4 and 3 steps, respectively without and with speculation. This is an important
aspect in terms of latency, especially in networks with non-negligible communication delays.
In contrast with the two previous 2 f + 1 BFT algorithms, we were able to use the TPM as
the trusted component due to the simplicity of our USIG service. The contributions can be
summarized as follows:
• the chapter presents two BFT algorithms that are minimal in terms of number of replicas
(only 2 f +1), complexity of the trusted service used, and number of communication steps
(4 and 3 respectively without/with speculation); it also shows that, even with the trusted
component access overhead, these algorithms can have better throughput than Castro
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and Liskov’s PBFT, and better latency in networks with non-negligible communication
delays;
• it presents the first implementations with some level of isolation for a trusted component
used to improve BFT algorithms. We implemented several versions of the USIG
service with different cryptography mechanisms that are isolated both in separate virtual
machines and trusted hardware.
The minimality of the presented BFT algorithms in terms of number of replicas, trusted
service and number of steps, leads to a simplicity that we believe makes them practical to a
level only comparable with crash fault-tolerant algorithms.
Note
The content of this chapter was partially reported in (Veronese et al., 2009b).
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5
Byzantine Fault Tolerance
with a Rotating Primary
Since Castro Liskov’s work (Castro & Liskov, 2002) demonstrating that is possible to
build replicated services tolerant to malicious faults with acceptable overhead, Byzantine fault
tolerance became an active area of research in the systems and dependability communities.
Several leader-based Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication algorithms have been
presented (Aiyer et al., 2005; Amir et al., 2008a; Clement et al., 2009; Cowling et al., 2006;
Kotla et al., 2007) (algorithms that are not leader-based have also been presented (Correia et al.,
2004)).
In leader-based BFT algorithms, the servers (or replicas) move through a succession of
configurations called views. Each view has a primary server (or leader) that is in charge of
defining the order in which the requests are executed by all replicas. In all previous BFT
algorithms, including PBFT, the primary remains the same as long as no faults are detected.
When a subset of the servers suspect that the primary is faulty, they choose another replica to
be the primary.
This basic scheme has been shown to be vulnerable to performance attacks by Amir et
al. (Amir et al., 2008a). More precisely, these authors have shown two attacks that can degrade
the performance of PBFT to let it so slow that it is barely usable. In the first attack, pre-
prepare delay, a faulty server delays the ordering of requests from some of the clients, causing
a considerable increase of the latency of those requests and a great reduction of the throughput.
PBFT imposes a maximum delay on the execution of requests, but only on the first request of
a queue of pending requests, so a faulty primary can process one request at a time, strongly
delaying most requests. In the second attack, timeout manipulation, faulty servers manage to
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increase the timeouts used in PBFT, seriously degrading the performance of the system. These
attacks also apply to some of the algorithms that derive from PBFT (e.g., (Kotla et al., 2007)).
Avoiding these attacks is especially important in large-scale environments where detecting a
faulty primary takes much longer than in LANs, due to the long communication delays and large
conservative timeouts. Amir et al. presented an algorithm, Prime that tolerates these attacks by
adding a pre-ordering phase of 3 communication steps to PBFT. Clement et al. also presented a
system, Aardvark, that tolerates these attacks by monitoring the performance of the primary and
changing the view in case it seems to be performing slowly (Clement et al., 2009). Aardvark is
also based on a version of PBFT.
This chapter presents Spinning, an algorithm that modifies the usual form of operation of
BFT algorithms: instead of changing the primary when it is suspected of being faulty, it changes
the primary whenever it defines the order of a single batch of requests. Putting it more simply:
in each view the primary orders only one batch. The name of the algorithm comes precisely
from the fact that the primary is always changing, i.e., spinning.
Spinning was also designed as a modification of PBFT, just like Prime and Aardvark. Its
normal operation is similar to PBFT’s, with its three communication steps. It has no view
change operation, since views are always changing anyway, but it has a merge operation, which
is in charge of putting together the information from different servers to decide if requests in
views that “went wrong” are to be executed or not. A view can go wrong essentially for the
same reasons as a view change is needed in PBFT: the primary is faulty and does not send (some
of) the messages it should, or the network becomes very slow and timeouts expire.
This basic operation of Spinning has an obvious problem: the primary is always changing
so faulty servers go on being the primary, becoming able to impair the average performance of
the service. To avoid this problem, we use a mechanism that punishes misbehavior, basically
by putting in a blacklist the servers that were the primaries when something went wrong. When
a server is in the blacklist, it does not become the primary.
Spinning has two main benefits. The first is that it avoids the above-mentioned performance
attacks made by faulty primaries in a very simple and efficient way: by always changing the
primary. View changes in Spinning do not incur in the cost of running a distributed algorithm
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with several communication steps; the view is changed automatically after the 3 communication
steps executed by the servers, which are essentially the same as in PBFT. Theoretically, rotating
the primary after each request can make the system lose at most 13 of its throughput when under
attack. This leads to better performance than Prime and Aardvark.
The second benefit is that Spinning manages to improve the throughput of PBFT when there
are no faulty servers by balancing the load of ordering requests among all (correct) servers.
Although ordering requests requires that all servers exchange messages, thus causes load in
all of them, most load is in the primary so changing the primary improves the throughput of
the algorithm by a factor of 20%. Something similar was recently explored by Mao et al. in
the Mencius algorithm, but they consider only crash faults, so manage to avoid communication
between the servers other than the primary, thus obtaining a much higher improvement of the
throughput (Mao et al., 2008).
5.1 System Model
The system model considered in this chapter is, in several aspects, similar to that presented
in the Section 4.1. Therefore in this section we evidence the differences and summarize the
common aspects of both system models.
The system is composed by a set of n servers or replicas P = {s0, ...,sn−1} that provide
a Byzantine fault-tolerant service to a set of clients C = {c0,c1, ...}. Clients and servers are
interconnected by a network and communicate only by message passing. We assume that the
communication is done using reliable authenticated point-to-point channels. We also assume a
partial synchrony system model.
The fault model considered in this chapter is homogeneous. Servers and clients can be
correct or faulty. Correct servers and clients follow the algorithm that they are supposed to
execute. We assume that any number of clients can be faulty, but the number of servers that can
be faulty is limited to f = b(n−1)/3c, which implies that n≥ 3 f +1. For simplicity we present
the algorithm for the tight case, i.e., with n= 3 f +1. The failures can be Byzantine or arbitrary,
meaning that the processes can deviate arbitrarily from their algorithm, even by colluding with
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some malicious purpose.
The authenticity of the messages exchanged by the algorithm is protected with signatures
based on public-key cryptography or message digests produced with collision-resistant hash
functions. Each server and client has a public/private key pair. Each server knows the public
keys of all servers and clients, and each client knows the public keys of all servers.
5.2 Spinning
Each server in P is modeled as a functionally identical state machine (Schneider, 1990).
Each server maintains a set of state variables that are modified by a set of operations. Clients of
the service issue requests with operations through a replication algorithm which ensures that,
despite concurrency and failures, servers (or replicas) perform requests in the same order. As
seen in Section 2.1.4, the properties that the algorithm has to enforce are: (1) all correct servers
execute the same requests in the same order; (2) all correct clients’ requests are eventually
executed. This section presents the Spinning algorithm.
5.2.1 Algorithm overview
In the initial presentation of the algorithm we do several simplifications that we remove
later in Section 5.2.6, e.g., that requests are not processed in batches but one at a time. We also
do not consider the blacklist mechanism, which is described later in Section 5.2.4.
The servers/replicas move through successive configurations called views. Each view has a
primary replica that changes in a round-robin fashion. The primary is the server sp , v mod n,
where v is the current view number. The purpose of the algorithm is to force all correct servers
to execute the requests in the same order, but only one request is executed per view. Notice that
there are no sequence numbers in the algorithm. The number of sequence for each request is
simply the number of the view in which it is accepted for execution. The primary has the task
of defining which request is the one to be executed in the current view.
The normal operation of the algorithm follows essentially the communication pattern of
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PBFT’s normal operation. The primary sends a PRE-PREPARE message with a pending request
to all servers. When a correct server receives this PRE-PREPARE message, it validates the
and sends all servers a PREPARE message. When a correct server receives 2 f + 1 PREPARE
messages, it sends a COMMIT message. Each correct server that receives 2 f + 1 COMMIT
messages accepts and executes the request, then increments its view number. Notice that the 3
steps have the same names as the messages sent in each of them: pre-prepare, prepare, commit.
A faulty primary may not send the PRE-PREPARE message, or not send it to some of the
servers. Therefore, if a server has client requests in its buffer to be ordered, it waits a maximum
time interval Tacc to accept the request of that view. If a server does not receive enough COMMIT
messages to accept the request during Tacc, then it sends a MERGE message to all servers.
The merge operation plays a role somewhat similar –but different– to the view change
in PBFT. The generic objective is the same: to ensure liveness if the primary is faulty. The
specific objective is different, though: it is not to change of view, but to agree on which requests
of the previous views were accepted and have to be executed by all (correct) servers. The main
problem is when some of the messages are lost or not sent, and some of the correct servers
accept the requests, but other correct servers do not. In that case, the algorithm has to merge the
information from the different servers to agree on the requests that were accepted and go on to
the next view.
When a server si receives at least f +1 MERGE messages, it also sends its MERGE message
and its state is changed to merge. When the server that will be primary in the next view receives
2 f + 1 MERGE messages, it sends a PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message that carries information
enough to make all servers agree about the order of requests in the previous views. When
another correct server receives and validates the PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message, it sends a
PREPARE message and follows the normal operation of the algorithm.
Details about how a server processes each message of the algorithm are given in the next
section and the algorithm is formalized in Appendix A.3 that also gives a proof of correctness.
Figure 5.1 shows the algorithm communication pattern.
102 CAPI´TULO 5. BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE WITH A ROTATING PRIMARY
1
2
3
4
primary
v
primary
primary
primary
v+1
v+2
v+3
s
s
s
s
MERGE
MERGE
PREPARE−
PRE−
primary
v
primary
primary
primary
v+1
v+2
v+3
PREPARE
PRE− PREPARE COMMITPREPARE
PRE− PREPARE COMMIT
s
s
s
1
2
3
4s
c c
REPLYREPLYREQUEST REQUEST
(b)(a)
Figura 5.1: (a)Normal operation, communication pattern between the servers, with the communication
with a client for one request superimposed. (b) Merge operation.
5.2.2 Algorithm
This section provides a more in depth description of the algorithm. It presents the algorithm
in terms of the sequence of operations executed in a view, first in normal operation and later in
the merge operation. Each server is always in one of two states that correspond to these two
operations: normal and merge.
Table 5.1 serves as a reference to the fields of the messages exchanged.
Label Meaning
Server messages
s server identifier
v view number
op request
dm digest of request
P set of prepared certificates (each one contains 2 f + 1 valid PREPARE
messages)
VP vector with digests of requests ordered by view number (the digests are
taken from the P field of MERGE messages)
M set of 2 f +1 MERGE messages (merge certificate)
Client messages
c client identifier
seq request identifier
op operation requested to be executed
Tabela 5.1: Labels given to fields in messages.
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5.2.2.1 Normal Operation
In normal operation a request is processed the following way:
1. Client sends a request to all servers. A client c issues a request for the execution of an
operation op by sending a message 〈REQUEST,c,seq,op〉σc to all servers. The seq field is the
request identifier that is used to ensure exactly-once semantics: the servers neither execute a
request for this client with a seq lower than the last executed of that client to avoid executing
the same request twice.
2. Upon server si becoming the primary of view v. When the view change and a replica si
becomes the primary of view v it verifies if: (i) it accepted the request from view v−1; (ii) it is
in the normal state; and (iii) if it has at least one client request pending to be ordered. If these
conditions are satisfied the primary sends a 〈PRE-PREPARE,si,v,dm〉σsi message to all servers,
where si is the server identifier, v is the view number and dm is a digest of the request sent by a
client.
3. Upon server s j receiving a PRE-PREPARE message. When a replica s j receives a
〈PRE-PREPARE,v,si,dm〉σsi message from si, it evaluates if: (i) the signature is valid; (ii) the
view number v is equal to the current view number on s j and the sender is the primary of v; and
(iii) it is in the normal state. If these conditions are satisfied the message is said to be valid
and s j replies with a 〈PREPARE,v,s j,dm〉σs j message to all the other servers. After s j sends its
PREPARE message, any subsequent PRE-PREPARE messages for view v are discarded.
A server can also receive a PRE-PREPARE message with view v′ > v. In this case it buffers
the message and waits to accept all messages with view less than v′. After that, if the message
with view v′ is valid, the server sends the PREPARE message of that view. This assures that even
that the network mixes the order of messages the server always accepts messages following the
order defined by the view number.
4. Upon server s j receiving PREPARE messages from at least 2 f + 1 servers. When a
replica receives 2 f + 1 PREPARE messages from different servers (including itself), with valid
signatures, the same view number v and the same dm, it sends a 〈COMMIT,v,s j〉σs j message to
all servers.
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5. Upon server s j receiving COMMIT messages from at least 2 f + 1 servers. When a replica
receives 2 f +1 COMMIT messages from different servers (including itself), with valid signatures
and the same view number v, it accepts and executes the request. After executing the request,
the server sends 〈REPLY,s,seq,res〉σs j to the client that issued the request, where res is the
result of the operation. The server increments its view number and if it is the primary sends a
PRE-PREPARE message. Otherwise it sets a timer waiting for the request of the new view to be
executed.
6. Upon a client receiving matching replies from f +1 servers. When the client receives f +1
replies 〈REPLY,s,seq,res〉σs from different servers s with matching results res, it accepts the
result.
5.2.2.2 Merge Operation
Servers can not wait indefinitely for messages from the primary because it may be faulty.
Therefore, whenever a new view begins and the servers have requests pending to be ordered,
every correct server starts a timer, in order to wait at most Tacc for the request of that view to
be accepted. If that timer expires, the merge operation starts. More precisely, when the timer
expires at a server or it receives f +1 MERGE messages from f +1 other servers (at least one of
which correct), it changes its state from normal to merge. When it receives a PRE-PREPARE-
MERGE from the new primary, it sets the state back to normal. The objective is to change of
primary until one that is not suspected of being faulty is selected.
The main difficulty of this operation is that in a view v the timer may expire in some correct
servers but not in others. This may lead some correct servers to accept and execute the request
of that view, while others do not. To prevent this situation from breaking the safety property,
the messages exchanged in the merge operation take information about the requests accepted in
the last views.
If the network is slow, timers can go on expiring successively and merge operations can
be executed one after another. However, the partial synchrony model (Section 5.1) together
with the timeout configuration (Section 5.2.5) ensure that eventually the system becomes stable
enough for the algorithm to change to normal operation.
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1. Upon the timer expiring on server si. When the timer expires, the server sends a
〈MERGE,si,v,P〉σsi message to all servers. If the server has at least f + 1 PREPARE messages
from different servers with the current view number, then it sets the v field in the message to
this view number. Otherwise, the field is set to vlast that is the last view for which si accepted a
request. This mechanism assures that if the timer expires on other servers at least f +1 servers
initiate the merge with the same view number. The field P contains information about requests
from the current and previous views for which si received a valid PRE-PREPARE message and
at least 2 f + 1 valid PREPARE messages. More precisely, P takes one prepared certificate for
each of these requests. Such a certificate is composed by 2 f + 1 valid PREPARE messages
corresponding to a certain PRE-PREPARE message.
Each correct server always keeps the last n requests accepted and their prepare certificates.
P contains all certificates that si has for any views greater or equal to vlast−n, where vlast is the
last view for which si accepted the request. Note that it is necessary to include only the last n
accepted requests because a correct server only accepts a request in a view v if si has accepted
the request ordered in the view v− 1. After sending a MERGE message, the server changes its
state to merge and increments the view number.
2. Upon server s j receiving f +1 MERGE messages from different servers. When s j receives at
least f + 1 MERGE messages for a view v, if v is higher or equal to its current view and it has
not sent a MERGE message for this view, it sends 〈MERGE,s j,v,P〉σs j to all servers. It changes
the state to merge and increments the view number. The verification that v is higher or equal to
its current view is needed to prevent faulty servers from doing a merge operation of a past view.
3. Upon server si becoming the primary of view v. When si receives 2 f + 1
MERGE messages and it is the primary of the new view (i.e., si = v mod n), it sends
〈PRE-PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M〉σsi to all servers. VP is a vector of digests of requests taken
from the P field of the MERGE messages, ordered by view number. Only digests from views
vmin to vmax are included: vmax is the highest view number in the prepared certificates in the P
fields received in the MERGE messages; vmin = vmax−n. M is a merge certificate composed by
the 2 f +1 MERGE messages received. This certificate is used by the recipients of the message
to verify if the primary computed VP correctly, i.e., if it is valid.
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4. Upon server s j receiving a PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message. When a server s j receives a
valid message 〈PRE-PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M〉σsi from si it evaluates if: (i) the signature of
the message is valid; (ii) the sender is the primary of v; and (iii) VP is valid (using the merge
certificate M to do the same computation as the primary).
Consider that the last request accepted by s j has the view number vlast and that the lowest
view number in VP is vmin. If vlast + 1 ≥ vmin, the server state is changed to normal and s j
sends a 〈PREPARE,v,s j,dm〉σs j message to all servers, where dm is the digest of VP. Otherwise,
the server must have missed some messages before the view vmin and it must obtain missing
information from another replica. The mechanism to bring a replica up to date is discussed in
below.
5. Upon server s j receiving PREPARE messages from at least 2 f + 1 servers. This step is the
same as step 4 of normal operation. When a replica receives 2 f + 1 PREPARE message with
valid signatures, the same view number v and the same dm, it sends 〈COMMIT,v,s j〉σs j to all
servers.
6. Upon server s j receiving COMMIT messages from at least 2 f + 1 servers. This step
corresponds to the step 5 of normal operation. When a replica receives 2 f + 1 COMMIT
messages with valid signatures, it accepts all requests in the field VP of the PRE-PREPARE-
MERGE message, following the order of view numbers. Servers use the information about
previously executed requests to avoid re-executing clients’ requests.
The server increments the view number and verifies if it has received a new PRE-PREPARE
message from the new primary and proceeds as in the step 3 of normal operation.
5.2.3 Garbage collection
If a server becomes unable to communicate with the rest for some time because its channels
are disconnected, it may miss some of the messages exchanged. Therefore, each server has to
store messages in a buffer and retransmit them when necessary.
Each correct server keeps the messages for the last l requests accepted in its buffer. The
algorithm does not allow accepting requests out of order, therefore we can use the view number
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to limit the value of l. l is a system parameter that can be set to n, which represents a full
cycle of the algorithm (each server is primary once). Even when there are subsequent merge
operations at least 2 f +1 servers keep in their buffer the l last requests accepted (and all related
algorithm messages). These messages are only discarded when 2 f +1 servers accept the next l
messages.
If a server si missed some messages but all replicas discarded them already, the correct
servers send to si the most recent prepared certificate proving that the system made progress
and that it is no longer possible to recover the messages. The solution to this situation is to do
a state transfer from the correct servers to si.
Messages received for a view higher than the current one (v) are buffered. In order to
avoid buffer exhaustion when malicious servers send messages with high view numbers, correct
replicas discard messages with view higher than v+ n when the buffer free space drops below
some low water mark L (a system parameter).
The garbage collection does not need PBFT’s checkpoint mechanism to advance the low and
high water marks of the buffer. Servers do not exchange checkpoint messages. State transfers
may be needed, though, as already mentioned. Therefore, servers compute checkpoints to
be used for this purpose, like in (Castro & Liskov, 2002). The checkpoints are generated
periodically, when a view number is divisible by some constant (e.g. 10). After a replica
generates a checkpoint it discards all PRE-PREPARE, PREPARE and COMMIT messages with
view number less than v from its buffer. It also discards all earlier checkpoints so every correct
server has to store a single checkpoint.
When a replica that missed some messages needs a state transfer, it requests the checkpoint
from other servers. The replica accepts a checkpoint state when it receives the same checkpoint
reply from at least f +1 different servers.
5.2.4 Punishing misbehavior
In the basic version of the algorithm described, every server becomes the primary
periodically. This is an opportunity for faulty servers to periodically impair the performance
108 CAPI´TULO 5. BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE WITH A ROTATING PRIMARY
of the algorithm, although only during the window of time in which they are the primary.
Therefore, in order to punish the misbehavior of faulty primaries we defined the blacklist
mechanism that is presented in this section.
Normally the algorithm works in cycles of n primaries. Each server keeps a blacklist of
servers. When a server is included in the blacklist it does not become the primary. When a
correct server s accepts a request and increments the view number, it verifies if the primary of
the next view is not in its blacklist. If it is, the server increments the view number again until
it finds a new primary that is not in the list. The blacklist does not contain servers known to be
faulty, but suspected of being faulty. A server can be wrongly suspected of being faulty due to
long network delays. Therefore, servers in the blacklist are not excluded from the algorithm in
any other way than not being the primary.
The blacklist has to follow the same sequence of steps in all correct servers, so all servers
have to apply the same criteria in the same order to insert and remove servers from the list.
The basic mechanism is the following. When a server receives a valid PRE-PREPARE-
MERGE message in view v, this means that 2 f + 1 servers agreed that some problem occurred
in view v− 1. All correct servers that receive the PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message include the
primary of v−1 in the blacklist. The size of the blacklist is f , since it is the maximum number
of faulty servers. If the list is full and a server has to be inserted, the oldest one in the list is
removed (i.e., in a FIFO fashion).
The basic scheme has to be modified in the following way. If there is a merge operation
and the new primary is faulty, it may not send valid PRE-PREPARE-MERGE messages to all
correct servers, leading to different blacklists. However, if the new primary does this attack,
a new merge operation must be done. Therefore, the servers only keep in the blacklist the
primary’s identifier that caused the last merge operation. When a server understands that a
merge operation started after another one, it replaces –not adds– the last server inserted in
the blacklist by the server that caused the new merge operation. The idea is that all merge
operations that occurred before the last one are ignored, simply because it is not possible to
know if all correct servers received all PRE-PREPARE-MERGE messages. Notice that there is no
risk of confusion about which is the next primary because the server that is removed from the
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blacklist is always the one before the last one, which can never be the next primary (n≥ 4).
5.2.5 Timeout configuration
Tacc is the maximum time interval for a message to be accepted in a view. This value is not
constant. It starts with a initial value defined by the system parameter Tstart and is multiplied
by two whenever there is a merge operation. Just like in PBFT, the objective is to ensure the
liveness of the system when there are long communication delays, i.e., to ensure that eventually
Tstart > ∆ .
To avoid that a malicious primary forces this timeout to be high and the progress of the
system slow, each server divides by two the value of Tacc whenever it detects that the system is
stable (only if Tacc > Tstart). In order to detect if the system is stable, all correct servers calculate
the time Tavg that a request takes to be accepted. If after r cycles a server verifies that Tavg is
lower than Tacc/2, the server resets the value of Tacc to Tacc/2 (r is a system parameter). After r
cycles if all requests have been accepted it is possible to infer that the system is stable. Due to
delays in the network some servers can reduce their timeouts while others do not. However, this
is not a problem because the partial synchrony assumption guarantees that the system stabilizes
and all correct servers eventually reset Tacc.
5.2.6 Optimizations
This section presents several optimizations to the basic Spinning algorithm presented above.
Batches of requests
The basic algorithm only “orders” one request per view or, more precisely, only agrees on
the execution of one request per view. The algorithm can be trivially modified to agree on the
execution of a batch (i.e., a set) of requests per view. The difference is that the primary has
to send in the PRE-PREPARE message the digests of the pending requests, instead of only one.
After being accepted, the requests are executed in some deterministic order.
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Piggybacking PRE-PREPARE messages
The PRE-PREPARE messages can be sent together with COMMIT messages, reducing the
cycle of the communication among the servers from 3 communication steps to 2. When a
server sends a COMMIT message in view v, if it is the primary of the next view (v+ 1), it
appends a PRE-PREPARE message to the COMMIT messages. Therefore, the next primary
sends a 〈〈COMMIT,v,s j〉,〈PRE-PREPARE,v+ 1,s j,dm′〉〉σs j message where dm′ is the digest
of a client’s request that has not yet been accepted. When a correct server receives such a
message, it stores the PRE-PREPARE and only sends the corresponding PREPARE message when
the view changes, i.e., when the request from view v is accepted.
Using MAC vectors
Signatures based on public-key cryptography are known to be much slower to obtain and
verify than message digests based on hash functions (MACs). PBFT uses vectors of message
digests instead of signatures to improve the performance of BFT algorithms (Castro & Liskov,
2002). The idea is to authenticate a message with a vector of MACs, called an authenticator,
each one obtained with a secret key shared between the sender and each of the recipients.
However, authenticators are less powerful than signatures because a faulty sender can falsify
a subset of the MACs, while signatures are all or nothing: either valid or invalid.
In order to improve the performance of the Spinning algorithm, the messages sent by the
clients/servers can be authenticated using authenticators instead of signatures, like in PBFT. In
order to prevent a request with a partially valid MAC vector to be accepted only by some of the
correct servers, we use a mechanism similar to the one described in (Castro & Liskov, 2002):
a server si authenticates a message if either the MAC for si is correct or si has 2 f PREPARE
messages with the same request’s digest.
Parallel executions
The basic Spinning algorithm accepts and executes a single batch of requests per view.
However, this basic functioning can be generalized to run a pre-configured maximum number
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of parallel agreements, which we call the window size (w). When a request is received during a
view, if the primary still did not start w agreements in the current view (i.e., sent PRE-PREPARE
messages), it starts a new one. Otherwise, the request is kept for the next view. The messages
exchanged between the servers take an order number local to the view (goes from 1 to w). This
mechanism works similarly to the way PBFT does batching of requests.
5.3 Evaluation
In this section we assess the advantages of Spinning comparing it with related protocols
both experimentally and analytically. Our evaluation makes three points. First, we show
experimentally that rotating the primary does not impair the performance of the system, but
instead brings some throughput gains in fault-free executions (Section 5.3.1.1). Second, we
show that rotating the primary is a simple and effective strategy to make a BFT replication
algorithm tolerate performance attacks from malicious servers (Section 5.3.1.2). Finally, we
show analytically that Spinning presents important advantages when compared with other BFT
solutions that deal with performance attacks (Section 5.3.1.3).
5.3.1 Experimental Evaluation
Protocol Implementations. As the previous algorithms presented in this thesis, we
implemented our prototype of Spinning in Java. We compared Spinning with PBFT’s C++
publicly available version and our own Java version of this protocol, JPBFT. Finally, we used
TCP sockets for communication and message authentication is done using HMACs based on
SHA1.
Experimental setup and methodology. Unless where noted, we consider a setup that
can tolerate one faulty server ( f = 1), requiring n = 4 servers. We executed from 0 to 120
logical clients distributed through 6 machines. The servers and clients machines were 2.8 GHz
Pentium-4 PCs with 2 GBs RAM running Sun JDK 1.6 on top of Linux 2.6.18 connected
by a Dell gigabit switch. In all experiments in which Java implementations were used, we
112 CAPI´TULO 5. BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE WITH A ROTATING PRIMARY
enabled the Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler and run a warm-up phase to load and verify all classes,
transforming the bytecodes into native code.
We measured the latency of the algorithms using a simple service with no state, that
executes null operations, by varying the requests size between 0 and 4Kbytes. The latency
was measured at the client by reading the local clock immediately before the request was
sent, then immediately after the response was accepted and subtracting the former from the
latter. Throughput results were obtained calling also the null operation using requests and
responses with 0 bytes. These invocations were sent by a varied number of logical clients in
each experiment (1-120). Each client sent operations periodically (without waiting for replies),
in order to obtain the maximum possible throughput. Each experiment ran for 100,000 client
operations to allow performance to stabilize, before recording data for the following 100,000
operations.
5.3.1.1 Fault-free Executions
The first part of our experiments aims to compare the performance of Spinning with PBFT
when there are no faults and asynchrony on the system. Table 5.2 present the results for latency.
Req/Res PBFT JPBFT Spinning
0/0 0.4 1.8 1.3
4K/0 0.6 2.2 1.7
0/4K 0.8 2.5 2.1
Tabela 5.2: Latency results (in ms) varying request and response size for PBFT, JPBFT and Spinning.
In this experiment, PBFT has shown the best performance of all algo-
rithms/implementations, followed by Spinning and JPBFT. Spinning is faster than JPBFT since
it implements the tentative execution optimization originally proposed and implemented in
PBFT (Castro & Liskov, 2002), which executes an operation after receiving 2 f + 1 PREPARE
messages, i.e., one step earlier.
The second part of the our experiments had the objective of measuring the peak throughput
of the algorithms with different loads. The results are presented in Figure 5.2. For our
experiments, we defined the window size of PBFT as 1, which is the optimal value for fast
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Figura 5.2: Peak throughput for 0/0 operations for PBFT, JPBFT, Spinning lock-step and Spinning with
window size equals 10.
networks, and the window size of JPBFT as 10. These values are the optimal ones found on
our network. We also executed two versions of Spinning, one in which at most one consensus
is initiated by each leader (Lock Step - LS) and another in which each server initiates at most
10 consensuses (possibly in parallel), which is equivalent to PBFT/JPBFT with window size of
10. The figure shows that PBFT, JPBFT and Spinning (LS) have approximately the same peak
throughput (22000 to 23000 op/sec). Spinning (10), on the other hand, has a throughput 14%
better than PBFT and 20% better than JPBFT.
This improvement can be explained by the better load balancing between the servers
provided by the Spinning algorithm. In PBFT, the throughput of the system is constrained by the
amount of messages per batch processed by the leader, which is 5n. Other servers process only
4n+ 1 messages per batch. If we consider this asymmetry as 5n4n+1 ≈ 1.2, this means that the
leader executes 20% more work than other replicas. This value corresponds to the throughput
improvement we observed from JPBFT to Spinning (10).
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5.3.1.2 BFT Under Attack
To assess the benefits of Spinning under performance attacks when compared with PBFT,
we run some experiments in which we designated one of the servers as the faulty one (the
primary for (J)PBFT) and this server waits an attack delay dattack before sending PRE-PREPARE
messages. We evaluated the latency and throughput of the algorithms with dattack ranging from
0 to 100 ms.
Table 5.3 reports the latency values for the algorithms with one faulty process executing the
performance attack.
dattack PBFT JPBFT Spinning (LS) Spinning (10)
0 0.4 1.8 1.3 1.3
1 1.1 3 3.4 4.2
10 16 13 4.2 5.8
100 103 103 19 22
Tabela 5.3: Latency of 0/0 operations (in ms) for PBFT, JPBFT, Spinning (LS) and Spinning (10) under
different levels of attacks (dattack of 1, 10 and 100 ms).
In this table it can be seen that the operation latencies of both PBFT and JPBFT are directly
proportional to the attack delay injected by the malicious leader. However, this is not the case
for Spinning. Assuming that the delay of a BFT algorithm execution with dattack = 0 is c,
the average delay of PBFT/JPBFT under attack would be approximately dattack + c, while for
Spinning it is the mean between the latency of the operation for all n processes, which would be
approximately f dattack+(3 f+1)c3 f+1 =
f
3 f+1dattack+c. This means that the attack delay will always be
diluted by a factor of f3 f+1 , which is
1
4 for f = 1 (our setup). This corresponds approximately
to the ratio we observed between the latency of Spinning and JPBFT.
Our final experiment evaluates the peak throughput of the algorithms with different dattack
values. Figure 5.3 reports the observed values.
Based on the results of this figure we can make three observations regarding the behavior
of the algorithms in face of performance attacks: (1.) PBFT suffers more than JPBFT; (2.)
Spinning (LS) is more resilient than Spinning (10); (3.) Spinning is much more resilient than
PBFT.
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under different levels of attacks (dattack of 1, 10 and 100 ms).
Observations (1.) and (2.) show that algorithms that execute more consensus instances
are more affected by these attacks when compared with algorithms that execute less instances,
which take more time to execute and order more messages in their batches. This is not a surprise
since the attack affects each consensus initiated by faulty servers, so more consensuses lead to
more attacks. The conclusion here is that, while Spinning (10) provides better throughput when
there are no attacks in the system, Spinning (LS) is more resilient to performance attacks, and
thus there is a tradeoff here relating the window size of the algorithms and their performance
under this type of attack.
Observation (3.) shows that our main motivation for developing Spinning actually holds
in practice: changing the leader periodically makes a BFT algorithm much more resilient to
performance attacks. Theoretically, the ratio between the throughput of PBFT and Spinning
when under attack should be approximately f3 f+1 , which would be
1
4 for f = 1. In practice, as
seen in Figure 5.3, this does not happen since the adaptive batching algorithm employed in the
algorithms dilutes the throughput loss when the attack is not so severe. Take for example, JPBFT
and Spinning (LS), when dattack = 1 and dattack = 10, the throughput of JPBFT is 40% and 50%
worse than Spinning, respectively, instead of the expected 75%. However, when dattack = 100
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ms, JPBFT is 83% worse than Spinning (instead of 75%), which means that after some point,
batching does not help.
5.3.1.3 Spinning vs. Related Solutions
In this section we compare Spinning with two very recent algorithms designed to be resilient
in face of performance attacks: Prime (Amir et al., 2008a) and Aardvark (Clement et al., 2009).
Since the implementations of these algorithms are not available, we do an analytical comparison
based on their theoretical properties.
The Prime replication algorithm introduces a pre-order phase with three communication
steps before the global-order (which is based on PBFT) that, together with the constant
monitoring of the performance of the primary, make the system able to detect several
performance attacks and change the leader when it degrades the performance of the system.
One important advantage of Spinning when compared with Prime is that in our algorithm the
primary of a view always processes less messages than Prime, which means less network I/O
and, more important, less cryptographic operations.
Considering b as the number of messages in a batch, in Spinning the primary processes
2+ 8 fb messages per client request while in Prime it processes 2+9 f +
14 f
b . Figure 5.4 illustrates
these costs for different values of f and b. The figure shows that even with batching, the
processing costs of Prime are much higher than the costs of Spinning, and thus, the expected
throughput of the former should be much lower than the later. Notice also that this evaluation
does not consider that Prime uses public-key signatures while Spinning does not.
Aardvark is a BFT library developed concurrently with this work in which a set of
engineering principles are applied to PBFT to make it more resilient against several kinds of
attacks from clients and servers. One of the attacks addressed by Aardvark is the pre-prepare
delay injected by a malicious primary. This attack is mitigated through constant monitoring
of the throughput sustained during a view plus the periodic change of primary through the
execution of PBFT’s view change sub-protocol.
Theorem 3 of the Aardvark paper (Clement et al., 2009) states that under certain conditions
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(e.g., timely network, correct clients), the ratio between the throughput of the system with
a malicious primary and the fault-free throughput is bounded by tgrace2 f timeout+tgrace
2 f+1
3 f+1 , being
tgrace the amount of time that a correct replica stays as a primary and timeout the timeout
used to trigger view changes (e.g., in case of a malicious primary). For Spinning, this ratio
is approximately 2 f+13 f+1 .
It is easy to see that Aardvark always loses more than Spinning when the primary attacks
the system, since tgrace2 f timeout+tgrace < 1. We illustrate this loss for several values of f and tgrace in
Figure 5.5.
The figure shows that, for f = 1, Spinning can potentially provide 34 of its fault-free
throughput when under attack, and this ratio tends to 23 when f increases. For Aardvark, we
consider timeout = 40 ms and tgrace as 125, 250 and 500 ms. As can be seen in the figure, the
ratio depends of the factor tgrace2 f timeout+tgrace , which depends of the strategy employed to monitor
and trigger view changes on the system. The results presented on the Aardvark paper (Figure
7 and Table 2 of (Clement et al., 2009)) make it possible to infer a tgrace value of 125 ms. The
figure shows also that increasing tgrace makes Aardvark more resilient, but always under the
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ratio ensured by Spinning.
The analysis presented in this section shows some evidence that systematically rotating the
primary after each request makes Spinning much more efficient and resilient than other recent
BFT systems that use complex mechanisms to ensure acceptable throughput when the primary
is faulty.
5.4 Related Work
Many Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms rely on a primary/leader server that tries to
impose a decision; when this primary fails a new one substitutes it. Some examples of leader-
based Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms can be found in (Reiter, 1995; Castro & Liskov, 2002;
Cowling et al., 2006; Kotla et al., 2007; Amir et al., 2008a; Mao et al., 2008). Atomic multicast
algorithms that can be used as the main building block of leader-based BFT algorithms have also
been proposed (Ramasamy & Cachin, 2006; Martin & Alvisi, 2006).
These current leader-based BFT algorithms share the same vulnerability: a faulty primary
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can slow the system down undetected, until its performance is a fraction of what the conditions
allow. Amir et al. (Amir et al., 2008a) brought to light this vulnerability and proposed a bounded
delay property to complement the liveness property, requiring the primary to impose a timely
decision in order not to be replaced. They also proposed the Prime algorithm to solve the
problem, but as shown in Section 5.3.1.3 Spinning solves it in a much more efficient way.
Even more recently, Clement et al. proposed the Aardvark algorithm that modifies PBFT in
order to protect it from attacks against performance (Clement et al., 2009). Aardvark includes
a set of mechanisms that also solve other problems, but the solution to prevent faulty servers
from delaying the service is less efficient than Spinning, as shown in Section 5.3.1.3. Aardvark
also changes of primary whenever the primary seems to be performing slowly, but it does this
change by running a view change algorithm, while Spinning is constantly changing the primary
without the need of executing a distributed algorithm to do it.
There are several consensus algorithms that are based on a rotating coordinator, i.e., that
change of process that imposes the decision until the algorithm manages to reach a final decision
(e.g., (Dwork et al., 1988)). However, these algorithms do one consensus, while Spinning does
a sequence of consensuses. Furthermore, these algorithms rotate the coordinator with the single
purpose of skipping faulty coordinators, while Spinning rotates the primary with the purpose of
tolerating subtle attacks made by faulty primaries and for load balancing.
For crash faults, Urba`n et al. presented a comparison of the performance of a rotating
coordinator consensus algorithm and a Paxos consensus algorithm (Urba´n et al., 2004). The
former is closer to Spinning, while the latter is closer to PBFT. The algorithms have shown
comparable performance in scenarios with and without crashes. However, when the failure
detectors make many mistakes (many timeouts violated in our case), Paxos seems to perform
better. It is not clear how to extrapolate these results to systems with Byzantine faults.
To the best of our knowledge the only Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm that rotates the
leader without a timeout expiring or the primary misbehaving is BAR-B (Aiyer et al., 2005).
However, BAR-B does it differently and with other purposes. BAR-B is an algorithm to
implement cooperative systems that considers three kinds of nodes: Byzantine (what we call
faulty), altruistic (what we call correct) and rational (new). Rational nodes participate in the
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system to gain some benefit and can depart from the algorithm to increase their benefits. BAR-
B rotates the leader to guarantee that every node has the opportunity to submit proposals to
the system. Each primary starts a sequence of 6 communication steps. The nodes follow a
pattern of communication similar to PBFT but have additional steps because the primary does
terminating reliable broadcast instead of consensus. Besides needing more steps, no steps are
run in parallel, unlike Spinning.
Very recently, Mao et al. presented Mencius, an algorithm for efficient state machine
replication in WANs (Mao et al., 2008). Mencius also changes the primary for each consensus
instance, just like Spinning, but has several important differences. The main one is that Mencius
only tolerates crash faults, not Byzantine faults, so it has a completely different purpose, as it
simply assumes that the primary can not be faulty. It balances the load among the servers and
reduces the communication delays by making each client communicate only with the server
that is closest to it. Mencius achieves great performance benefits because with crash faults the
servers other than the primary do not have to communicate directly among them, something
that is not true with Byzantine faults.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented Spinning, a novel Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication
algorithm that tolerates performance attacks by changing the primary whenever a batch of
pending requests is accepted for execution. This way of tolerating these attacks is much
simpler and more efficient that other solutions in the literature (Prime, Aardvark). This novel
mode of operation also does some load balancing among the servers, allowing an improvement
of PBFT’s throughput in the fault-free case. The main contributions of this chapter are the
following:
• it presents a novel style of leader-based Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication
algorithm that changes the primary whenever the current primary defines the order of a
batch of requests, instead of only when it is suspected of being faulty;
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• it presents Spinning, a BFT algorithm that is less vulnerable to performance degradation
attacks caused by a faulty primary, attaining a throughput similar to the baseline algorithm
in the area (better in the fault-free case) and better than other algorithms that tolerate these
attacks.
Note
The content of this chapter was partially published in (Veronese et al., 2009c).
122 CAPI´TULO 5. BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE WITH A ROTATING PRIMARY
6
Efficient Byzantine
Agreement on WANs
Several practical algorithms to implement efficient Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) state
machine replication have been proposed. PBFT (Castro & Liskov, 2002) was the first of them
shown to be efficient in practice and many others derive from it (Amir et al., 2008a; Clement
et al., 2009; Cowling et al., 2006; Kotla et al., 2007). For this reason, PBFT is often considered
to be a baseline for performance of BFT algorithms in local area networks (LANs), which other
algorithms improve under certain conditions.
Unfortunately, when the replicas are distributed geographically the performance of current
BFT algorithms is affected by the lower bandwidth, and the higher and more heterogeneous
network latencies. Furthermore, these algorithms usually rely on a primary replica for defining
the order in which requests are executed, and in a WAN it is difficult to detect that the primary
is faulty or that the latency and/or bandwidth of its communication with the other replicas has
become a bottleneck for the service performance.
This chapter takes a final step towards the definition of an efficient BFT algorithm for
wide-area networks by presenting EBAWA (Efficient Byzantine Agreement for Wide-Area
networks). EBAWA has a reduced number of communication steps, requires only 2 f + 1
replicas, and introduces a set of mechanisms focused in providing a better performance in large-
scale environments. The communication pattern of EBAWA is based on a Spinning (Section
6.2). Like Spinning, EBAWA constantly rotates the primary, i.e., it changes the primary after
every batch of pending requests is accepted for execution. The rotation of the primary makes
EBAWA mostly unaffected by performance degradation attacks (Amir et al., 2008a) and enables
the use of some interesting mechanisms for a WAN algorithm.
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Spinning executes agreements on client requests in sequence, one agreement per view. In
WANs, this can lead to undesirable delays due to the high latency and low bandwidth of the
communication links. In this chapter we introduce a new mechanism called asynchronous
views, one of the key features that make EBAWA efficient in WANs. The asynchronous views
mechanism consists in parallelizing several agreements, i.e., several views. This mechanism
allows not only to reduce the delay of a server waiting for its turn of being the primary, but also
allows servers to batch messages of different agreements/views in a single message, reducing
the number of messages sent and the overhead of cryptographic operations. This mechanism
reduces the latency of the algorithm, as seen by clients, and improves the throughput because
there are less messages being processed.
The use of a rotating primary and asynchronous views allow another interesting feature:
clients can send requests only to the nearest server. In WANs this tends to reduce the end-to-
end latency experienced by the client. However, in Spinning it would have the opposite effect,
because each server would have to wait for becoming the primary to start an agreement for the
execution of the requests sent by the clients. EBAWA uses the skip mechanism borrowed from
Mencius to avoid executing an agreement when a server has no pending requests (Mao et al.,
2008).
Finally, EBAWA uses a trusted component on the servers to reduce the number of replicas
and the number of communication steps required for agreement. This component implements
the USIG service (Section 3.4), which comprises a counter plus a cryptographic authentication
algorithm, being thus simple to implement in a trustworthy way. The service provided by
this trusted component makes EBAWA match lower bounds only comparable with crash fault-
tolerant algorithms (2 f + 1 to tolerate f faults and 2 communication steps for agreement)
(Lamport, 2006). Moreover, as discussed previously minimizing the number of communication
steps is fundamental to improve the performance of a distributed algorithm for WANs, since link
latencies tend to dominate the end-to-end latency experienced by clients accessing a replicated
service.
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6.1 System Model
We model the system as a set of n servers (or replicas) P = {s0, ...,sn−1} that provide a
Byzantine fault-tolerant service to a set of clients C = {c0,c1, ...}. The system model assumed
in this chapter is almost the same to that presented in the Section 4.1. Therefore, in this section
we present the differences and summarize the more important aspects of our system model.
The difference between these system models is: here, we consider that clients and servers
are interconnected by a LAN or a WAN. To tolerate natural disasters, servers have to be in
different sites, while clients can be in the same sites of servers or somewhere else. The
bandwidth between pairs of servers can be asymmetric and variable. The other assumptions
about the network are the same that the previous system model: the network can drop, reorder
and duplicate messages, but these faults are masked using common techniques like packet
retransmissions.
We also assume a partial synchronous system model (Dwork et al., 1988). An attacker may
have access to the network and be able to modify messages, so messages take digital signatures
or message authentication codes (HMACs). Servers and clients know the keys they need to
verify these signatures/HMACs. We make the standard assumptions about cryptography, i.e.,
that hash functions are collision-resistant and that signatures and HMACs cannot be forged.
Correct servers/clients always follow their algorithm. Faulty servers/clients can deviate
arbitrarily from their algorithm, even by colluding with some malicious purpose. We assume
that at most f out of n servers can be faulty with n = 2 f + 1. The fault model considered
is hybrid (Verissimo, 2006): although any number of clients and up to f servers can be
subject to Byzantine faults, the modules that implement the USIG service on servers are
trusted/trustworthy, i.e., they always satisfy the specification of the USIG service (Section 3.4).
6.2 EBAWA mechanisms
This section presents the required mechanisms to build BFT algorithms suitable for WANs.
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(a) PBFT (b) EBAWA
Primary of view { 1, 4, 7 …}
Primary of view { 2, 5, 8 …}
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Figura 6.1: Communication patterns of a single agreement (a) in PBFT and Spinning and (b) in EBAWA.
Trusted/trustworthy component. EBAWA explores the use of a trusted component that
provides the USIG service to constrain the power of faulty processes to have certain behaviors.
This allows the reduction of the number of communication steps (from the previous minimum1
of 5 (Castro & Liskov, 2002; Clement et al., 2009) to 4) and of the number of replicas (from
3 f + 1 (Castro & Liskov, 2002; Amir et al., 2008a; Clement et al., 2009; Cowling et al.,
2006; Kotla et al., 2007) to 2 f + 1). Figure 6.1 illustrates these improvements by showing
the communication patterns of PBFT and EBAWA. The number of communication steps is an
important metric for distributed algorithms, as discussed before. Besides, the already mentioned
need of avoiding common mode failures requires diversity of the replicas (Littlewood & Strigini,
2004), which involves additional considerable costs per replica, in terms not only of hardware
but especially of software development and management. Then, reducing the number of replicas
has a significant impact in the system cost.
Rotating Primary. EBAWA follows the idea of Spinning of changing the primary whenever
a batch of requests is accepted for execution. An individual agreement in Spinning follows
essentially the communication pattern of PBFT (Figure 6.1(a)). The main difference between
Spinning and PBFT is that the primary changes automatically in a round-robin fashion whenever
it defines the order of a single batch of requests. Spinning has no view change operation, since
views are always changing, but it has a merge operation, which is in charge of putting together
the information from different servers to decide if requests in views that went wrong are to be
executed or not.
1There is an optimization called tentative execution that allow these algorithms to run in 4 steps, but it only
works in synchronous and fault-free environments (Castro & Liskov, 2002).
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The use of rotating primary has two main benefits. The first is that it avoids the performance
attacks found by Amir et al. (Amir et al., 2008a), made by faulty primaries, in a very simple
and efficient way: by always changing the primary. The second benefit is that it manages to
improve the throughput of PBFT when there are no faulty servers by balancing the load of
ordering requests among all (correct) servers.
Clients scattered geographically. In order to tolerate natural disasters, power outages and
physical attacks, servers have to be in different locations. Previous works on wide-area BFT
replication consider that clients are in the same site than servers (e.g., in the same data center)
(Amir et al., 2006; Mao et al., 2009), and their fate is shared with the site’ server. The main
problem with this “fate sharing” model is that clients of a site are unable to access the service
if their local server is compromised. Moreover, this model makes it unclear how to deal with
clients that are not located on any of the replica’ sites.
In EBAWA, clients can be placed anywhere because we use the notion of proximity to
assign clients to servers: a client is nearer to certain servers than others. This proximity is not
necessarily physical but in terms of communication round-trip time. A client typically sends
requests only to the server that replies faster, and it can change its preferred server when another
one starts replying faster. In order to reduce the cost of communication, the nearest server is
also in charge of sending the complete result of the requested operation to the client. This
optimization is important when the average size of the replies is large. When a server (the
nearest) receives a request, it becomes responsible for sending the entire result to the client.
All other servers send to the client replies containing only a digest (hash) of the result. Clients
verify if the reply is valid by matching f digests with the result sent by its primary.
Asynchronous views. In Spinning, a server s only becomes the primary of view v when the
batch of requests of view v− 1 is accepted, so only upon that happening it can send a PRE-
PREPARE message defining the batch of requests to be executed in view v. In other words,
agreements about batches of messages (pairs of steps prepare-commit) are done sequentially,
following the sequence of views.
In EBAWA, the order of the requests is defined in PREPARE messages. Differently of
Spinning, in EBAWA a server starts an agreement as soon as it receives a client request by
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sending a PREPARE message, allowing servers to deal with many agreements (in some sense,
with many views) in parallel, or asynchronously. Therefore, when a server receives a sequence
of PREPARE messages it can batch the COMMIT messages in a single one, reducing the number
of communication steps among servers and the overhead of cryptographic operations (one
unique identifier per message).
As mentioned before, reducing the number of steps among servers has a significant impact
in the latency of wide-area algorithms. Reducing the number of cryptographic operations
increases the system throughput. Therefore, this new feature impacts both the latency and the
throughput of the algorithm.
Skip messages. In order to reduce the communication steps and computation overhead, we
borrow from Mencius (Mao et al., 2008) the idea of SKIP messages. Servers without pending
client requests can skip their turn, i.e., their view, by sending a SKIP message. A SKIP message
is equivalent to an empty PREPARE message but avoids that each server sends its COMMIT
message, reducing the number of communication steps of the agreement. To prevent that a
faulty primary sends in the same view a SKIP message and a PREPARE message to different
subsets of replicas, the SKIP message is always signed with a unique identifier, just like a
PREPARE message. The performance evaluation shows that this modification is especially
important when the load of client requests shifts from one server to another.
6.3 The EBAWA Replication Algorithm
This section provides a more detailed description of the EBAWA algorithm. The proof of
correctness is left for Appendix A.4.
Each server is always in one of two operational states: normal or merge. In normal
operation, each server orders only one batch of requests or skips its turn. Servers agree on
requests and execute their operations. When a server is faulty a merge operation is executed to
put together the information from different servers and decide which requests in the previous
views were executed. We use two mechanisms to avoid that a faulty replica periodically impairs
the performance of the system: blacklisting and timeout resetting as used by Spinning, presented
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in Sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 respectively. The Table 6.1 serves as a reference to the fields of the
messages exchanged by the algorithm.
Client Messages - Request
c client identifier
seq request identifier
op operation requested to be executed
Server Messages - Normal operation
s server identifier
v view number
m request
UI unique identifier of the message signed by the USIG of the server that
sent it
Server Messages - Checkpoint
vlast the view number of the last request accepted by s
UIlast is the unique identifier of the last executed request
d digest of the replica state
Server Messages - Merge operation
Clast latest stable checkpoint certificate
P a set of valid PREPARE messages received by a server since Clast
O a set of all messages signed by the local USIG service since Clast
VP vector with requests taken from the P field of MERGE messages (ordered
by view number)
M set of f +1 MERGE messages (merge certificate)
Tabela 6.1: Labels given to fields in messages.
Normal Case Operation. The sequence of events is: (1) a client sends a request to the nearest
server; (2) the server assigns an execution order number to the request (the unique identifier)
and sends it to all servers in a PREPARE message; (3) each server multicasts a COMMIT message
to other replicas when it receives a valid PREPARE from the primary; (4) when a server receives
f + 1 valid COMMIT messages it accepts a request, executes the corresponding operation, and
returns a reply to the client (5) the client waits for f + 1 matching replies for the request and
completes the operation. Next we describe these events in more detail.
Clients have a list with the f + 1 nearest servers, ordered from the nearest to the farthest.
A client c issues a request for the execution of an operation op by sending a message m =
〈REQUEST,c,seq,op〉σc to the first server of the list (see the meaning of fields in Table 6.1).
The seq field is used to ensure at-most-once semantics: the servers do not execute a request of
the client with a seq lower or equal than the last executed in order to avoid executing the same
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request twice. If the client does not receive enough replies during a time interval, it resends the
client request to the next in the server list. In case the request has already been processed, the
server resends the reply.
A request m is sent by the primary si in a message 〈PREPARE,si,v,UIi,m〉 where UIi is
obtained by calling USIG’s function createUI. When a server s j receives a PREPARE message
from si, it evaluates if: (i) the unique identifier (UI) of the message is valid (calling USIG’s
verifyUI); (ii) the client signature is valid; (iii) the view number v is equal to the current view
number on s j and the sender is the primary of v; and (iv) it is in the normal state. If these
conditions are satisfied the message is said to be valid and s j sends a 〈COMMIT,s j,v,UIi,UI j〉
message to all others.
Each PREPARE or COMMIT has a unique identifier UI obtained by calling the createUI
function, so no two messages can have the same identifier from the same server. Servers check
if the identifier of the messages that they receive are valid calling the verifyUI function. A
request m is accepted by a server if the server receives f + 1 valid COMMIT messages from
different servers for m, i.e., f + 1 COMMIT messages that contain valid UIs with the same
primary’ UI.
Servers process messages following the primary’ UI and the view number. Each server
keeps a vector Vacc[n] with the highest counter value cv that it received from each of the other
servers in all signed messages of the algorithm. Using Vacc a replica easily detects holes in the
sequence numbers of messages of potentially faulty servers. This message ordering mechanism
imposes a FIFO order: no correct server processes a message 〈...,si, ...,UIi, ...〉 sent by a server
si with counter value cv in UIi before it has processed message 〈...,si, ...UIi′, ...〉 sent by si with
counter value cv−1.
In order to reduce the protocol overhead, servers assign a single UI to a batch of
requests thus starting a single instance of the protocol. Before a server sends the PREPARE
message, it verifies if the number of unfinished agreements that it started is lower than W (a
system parameter). This mechanism bounds the number of pending agreements created by
each server. When a server receives a request, it sends the PREPARE message immediately
unless vn ≥ v×W , where vn is the next view in which the server will be the primary
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and v is the current view number. This mechanism allows each server to deal with n×W
agreements in parallel or asynchronously, where n is the number of replicas. Therefore,
COMMITs from a sequence of PREPARE messages can be batched in a single message, e.g.,
〈〈COMMIT,s j,v,UIi〉,〈COMMIT,s j,v′,UIx〉,UI j〉.
With the asynchronous views mechanism, servers usually receive PREPARE messages for
views greater than the current one, say v′ > v. In this case if the message with view v′ is valid it
buffers the message and waits to accept all messages with view number less than v′. After that,
the server sends the COMMIT message of view v′. In order to cause buffer exhaustion malicious
servers can send messages with high view numbers. To prevent this, correct servers discard
messages with view number higher than v+ n×W , when the buffer free space drops below
some low water mark L (a system parameter).
Servers without pending client requests can skip their turns by sending a message
〈SKIP,si,v,UIi〉. In order to reduce the computation overhead, SKIP messages can be also
piggybacked with COMMIT messages.
Checkpointing. As in PBFT, replicas generate checkpoints periodically and multicast
〈CHECKPOINT,s,vlast ,UIlast ,d,UI〉 messages. UI is obtained by calling createUI for the
checkpoint message itself. A replica considers that a checkpoint is stable when it receives f +1
CHECKPOINT messages signed by different replicas with the same vlast , d and UIlast (including
its own CHECKPOINT message). We call this set of messages a checkpoint certificate, which
proves that the replica’s state was correct until that request execution. Therefore, the replica can
discard all entries in its log with the view number less than the vlast .
Merge operation. The USIG service strongly constrains what a faulty primary can do: it
cannot repeat or assign arbitrarily high sequence numbers. However, a faulty primary can still
prevent progress by sending a PREPARE or a SKIP message to less than f + 1 replicas. When
f +1 replicas suspect that the primary is faulty, they execute a merge operation in order to make
correct servers agree on the requests that were accepted and go to the next view. When a server
accepts a batch of request it increments the view number and starts a timer that expires after
Tacc. If in the view v a server does not receive enough COMMIT messages to accept a request,
and neither a SKIP message during Tacc, then it changes its state to merge and sends a MERGE
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message for view v to all servers.
A MERGE message has the following format: 〈MERGE,s j,v,Clast ,P,O,UI j〉. Correct servers
only consider MERGE messages that satisfy the following requirements: (1) the checkpoint
certificate Clast contains f +1 valid UI identifiers; (2) the counter value in UI j is cv j = cv+1,
where cv is the highest counter value of the UIs signed by the replica in O (if O is empty the
highest counter value will be the UI in Clast); and (3) there are no holes in the sequence number
of messages in O. The field O in the merge message prevents that a faulty server that committed
one request in a view does not include that request in its merge message during the merge
operation.
When a server si receives f +1 MERGE messages from view v−1 and it is the primary of the
view v, it sends 〈PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M,UIi〉 to all servers. M is used by the recipients
of the message to verify if the primary computed VP correctly. When a server s j receives a valid
〈PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M,UIi〉 from si, it changes its state to normal and sends a COMMIT
message. The server increments the view v′ after receiving f +1 valid COMMIT messages for all
prepared requests VP that have not been executed before and execute them. If a replica detects
that there is a gap between the sequence number of its last executed request and the first request
to be executed in VP, it fetches other replicas for commit certificates of the missing requests.
If, due to garbage collection, the other replicas have deleted these messages, there is a state
transfer, the same protocol of PBFT (Castro & Liskov, 2002).
6.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section we assess the advantages of EBAWA and the proposed mechanisms by
comparing this algorithm with previous ones in several environments and conditions. Our
evaluation tries to answer the following questions: (1) Does the introduction of mechanisms
to make EBAWA efficient on a WAN, make it worse than other BFT algorithms on a LAN?
(2) What are the benefits of the EBAWA mechanisms on WANs when clients and servers are
dispersed geographically, when they are located in the same data center, and when the number
of tolerated faults increases? (3) How does EBAWA compare with other BFT algorithms when
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they are deployed on a real wide-area network?
First, we provide experimental results of the performance of EBAWA in a LAN to compare
it with known BFT algorithms in their own terms. In this environment, we show experimentally
that EBAWA brings some throughput gains in fault-free executions due to the rotating primary
and the reduced number of communication steps. Second, we present some experiments in a
emulated WAN (Emulab) that show the performance of EBAWA considering different locations
of clients. These experiments show that the reduced number of replicas and communication
steps make EBAWA an effective BFT algorithm for wide-area replication. Finally, we present
experimental results in a real WAN (PlanetLab) that show that EBAWA achieves the best latency
with servers dispersed geographically.
6.4.1 Algorithm Implementation
We implemented our prototypes in Java. We compare EBAWA with three previous BFT
replication algorithms: PBFT, Spinning and MinBFT. We also used our version of PBFT’s
normal case operation in Java (JPBFT) to be able to run it in a WAN, since PBFT uses IP
Multicast, which is usually not available on these environments. MinBFT has the same number
of communication steps and replicas as EBAWA, but that neither rotates the primary nor uses
any of the mechanisms explained in Section 6.2, except the USIG service. Spinning is similar to
PBFT but it rotates the primary whenever agreement about the execution of a batch of messages
is done. We were interested in comparing EBAWA with MinBFT and Spinning once they
can be considered to be improvements of PBFT, thus showing that just reducing the number
of communication steps (MinBFT) or having a rotating primary (Spinning) is not enough to
provide an efficient BFT algorithm for WANs. We do not compare with RAM because it
is neither completely specified nor implemented yet. We also do not compare with Steward
because its hierarchical architecture with two levels of protocols is completely different and has
a higher overhead than our simpler client/servers architecture.
The prototypes JPBFT, Spinning, MinBFT and EBAWA were implemented within the
same codebase and optimized to have high-throughput under heavy load. To achieve this we
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implemented an adaptive batching algorithm and window congestion control similar to the one
used in PBFT (Castro & Liskov, 2002). In all our implementations, we used TCP sockets for
communication and NTT ESIGN with 2048-bit for public-key signatures, as provided by the
Crypto++ library accessed through the Java Native Interface (JNI). In the LAN’s machines, it
takes 1.035 ms to sign and 0.548 ms to verify a message with 20 bytes (the size of a request’s
hash).
On the LAN experiments, we used the Xen hypervisor (Barham et al., 2003) to isolate the
USIG service from the replica process (as described in VM-based USIG version in Section 4.4).
We run the USIG service as a daemon in a virtual machine (VM) isolated from the one in which
the normal system runs. The USIG service is not connected to the network and contains as little
code as possible. The counter used by the USIG service has 64 bits, which is enough to prevent
it from burning out before 233 years if incremented twice per millisecond. To sign messages,
the USIG service uses HMACs based on SHA1 resulting in 0.008 ms to execute the createUI
function and 0.007 ms to execute verifyUI function.
On WANs, the USIG service was implemented as a class that provides methods that
implement the two functions of the service (as described in Non-secure USIG in Section 4.4).
We use this streamlined version to avoid deployment difficulties on Emulab and PlanetLab.
However, in terms of performance, the time to access the trusted component (≈ 1 ms in Xen) is
negligible when compared with the communication delays of a WAN.
6.4.2 Methodology
In all experiments with Java code we enabled the Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler and run a
warm-up phase to load and verify all classes, transforming the bytecodes into native code. We
measured the latency of the algorithms using a simple service with no state that executes null
operations. The latency was measured at the client by reading the local clock immediately
before the request was sent, then immediately after the response was accepted and subtracting
the former from the latter. Throughput results were obtained by calling also null operations
using requests and responses with 0 bytes. These requests were sent by a variable number of
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logical clients in each experiment. Each client sent operations periodically (without waiting
for replies), in order to obtain the maximum possible throughput. Unless where noted, in
experiments with EBAWA, clients evenly distributed their requests among servers and each
server was able to start 10 agreements asynchronously (the W parameter).
6.4.3 Local Area Network
Setup. In order to compare the performance of EBAWA with PBFT, we conducted experiments
in a LAN without faults or instability in the network. To measure the throughput, we executed
from 0 to 120 logical clients distributed over 6 machines. The servers and clients machines
were 2.8 GHz Pentium-4 PCs with 2 GBs RAM running Sun JDK 1.6 on top of Linux
2.6.18 connected by a gigabit switch. To measure latency and throughput we implemented
two versions of EBAWA. In EBAWA-S, the clients send requests signed using public-key
cryptography. In EBAWA-V, clients sign requests with authenticators (vectors of MACs), as
done in other algorithms (Castro & Liskov, 2002). We consider a setup that can tolerate one
faulty server ( f = 1), with n = 4 servers for PBFT, Spinning and JPBFT and n = 3 servers for
MinBFT and EBAWA, unless where noted. Each experiment ran for 100000 client requests to
allow performance to stabilize, before recording data for the following 100000 operations.
Latency. Figure 6.2 shows the latency of the algorithms for requests and responses of size 0
and 4K. PBFT has shown the best performance of all algorithms/implementations (0.4 ms with
0/0), followed by Spinning (1.3 ms with 0/0) and JPBFT (1.8 ms with 0/0). Spinning is faster
than JPBFT since it implements the tentative execution optimization, which allows the replicas
to send a reply before executing the commit step, as originally proposed in (Castro & Liskov,
2002).
Even with fewer communication steps, the latencies of MinBFT and EBAWA in a LAN are
higher than those of the other algorithms due to the overhead to access the trusted component in
an isolated VM. EBAWA-V presented the best latency of the three (2.1 ms with 0/0), followed
by MinBFT (2.3 ms with 0/0) and EBAWA-S (2.5 ms with 0/0). The worst latency of EBAWA-S
is justified by the fact that the client signs requests and each server needs to verify if the client’s
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signature is valid.
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Throughput. The throughput results in a LAN are presented in Figure 6.3. The main
conclusion is that EBAWA-V presents the best throughput in fault-free environments, followed
by Spinning, MinBFT, PBFT, JPBFT and EBAWA-S. The peak throughput of EBAWA-V is
22% better than PBFT’s peak throughput. These results can be explained by two factors: (1)
the introduction of asynchronous views as explained in the Section 6.2, allowing piggybacking
of PREPARE and SKIP messages on COMMIT messages, reducing the number of communication
steps and the cryptographic operations executed by servers (only one unique identifier per
message); (2) the rotation of the primary providing a better load balancing among the servers.
In PBFT, the throughput of the system is constrained by the amount of messages per batch
processed by the primary, which is 5n, while other servers process only 4n+ 1 messages per
batch. If we consider this asymmetry as 5n4n+1 ≈ 1.2, this means that the primary executes 20%
more work than other servers.
Figure 6.3 shows also that the verification of the clients’ signatures limits the peak
throughput of EBAWA-S to about 2000 operations per second, which is exactly what the
machine processor is capable of, since it takes approximately 0.5 ms to verify a signature
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(1/(0.5× 10−3) = 2000). However, the use of public-key signatures instead of authenticators
provides non-repudiation, ensuring that all correct replicas take the same decisions about the
validity of clients’ requests (Clement et al., 2009). The use of message authenticators can
be faster than signatures but lets the algorithm vulnerable to malicious clients that can force
primary changes in PBFT or merge operations in Spinning and EBAWA.
As a side note, this same signature verification takes 0.128 ms on a 64-bit 2.3GHz quadcore
Xeon machine, which allows the execution of 7812×4 = 31248 verifications per second. This
shows that algorithms based on public-key cryptography can be used successfully in high-end
servers, especially if the power of multi-core architectures is exploited to verify signatures in
parallel. This possibility and the greater robustness of EBAWA-S lead us to use this version of
EBAWA in the WAN experiments (next sections).
 0
 5000
 10000
 15000
 20000
 25000
 30000
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (o
pe
rat
ion
s/s
ec
)
Number of Clients
PBFT
JPBFT
Spinning
MinBFT
EBAWA−V
EBAWA−S
Figura 6.3: Throughput of algorithms on a fault-free LAN.
6.4.4 Emulated WAN – Emulab
Setup. We conducted experiments on an emulated WAN to measure the latency of the
algorithms when the replicas are scattered through different data centers connected by dedicated
links. From now on, our focus is on the algorithms’ latency, because low latency is intrinsically
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difficult to achieve in a WAN, while throughput can be increased with faster hardware and by
using channels with higher bandwidth. The experiments were conducted on Emulab (White
et al., 2002), using 20 Intel Pentium III machines with 600 Mhz processors, 256 Mb of RAM
and Red-Hat Linux 9. The JVM was Sun JDK1.5.11. Each link was configured with 20Mbps
of bandwidth and the server-to-server latency was configured to 40 ms. The latency between
clients and servers is different on each experiment. Each experiment was executed during 30
minutes and we consider setups with different numbers of replicas (f=1, 2 and 3).
Clients located in the same site as servers. The first case we consider is when each site has
a set of clients and one replica of the service. This setup mimics a common deployment in real
data centers, which is considered by previous BFT algorithms for WANs (Amir et al., 2006;
Mao et al., 2009). In EBAWA, clients send their requests to the local replica. In MinBFT and
JPBFT we consider that the client and the primary server are in the same site (which is the
best possible case). In Spinning, due to the rotation of the primary, the replica near the client
becomes the primary periodically. Clients are in the same network than servers therefore their
latency to access a server is about 0.2 ms.
Figure 6.4(a) presents the latency of the algorithms. The figure shows similar results for
EBAWA and MinBFT, and these results are about 30% better than the latency presented by
Spinning and JPBFT due to the lower number of communication steps of the former. With
clients in the same data center, JPBFT presents a latency better than expected (REQUEST and
PREPARE messages are received almost at the same time by replicas). Spinning presents the
same average latency of JPBFT, because, in Spinning clients send requests to all servers and
each server is constantly becoming the primary, so the fact that the client is placed with a
replica has no impact.
Clients scattered geographically. Our second WAN experiment considers a client-replicas
link latency of 40 ms to represent clients accessing replicas on different countries. Figure 6.4(b)
shows the results of this experiment.
Under such homogeneous setting, the latency observed directly reflects the amount of
communication steps required by each algorithm: EBAWA presents almost the same latency
of MinBFT, which is better than Spinning’s and JPBFT’s. Spinning presents better latency than
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Figura 6.4: Latency on an emulated fault-free WAN. (a) Clients in the same sites of the servers. (b)
Clients and servers distributed on a WAN. (c) Heterogeneous latency among clients and servers.
JPBFT due to the aforementioned tentative execution optimization.
The case of the missing communication step. When we conducted experiments with f = 1
we observed that, MinBFT and EBAWA showed a latency corresponding to 3 communication
steps, which contradicts the theoretical 4 communication steps of these algorithms (their latency
should be at least 40×4 = 160 ms). The explanation for this discrepancy was presented in the
Section 4.5.2. In this experiment MinBFT and EBAWA have latencies 18% and 35% better than
Spinning and JPBFT, respectively. In setups with f > 1 MinBFT and EBAWA present latencies
11% and 27% better than Spinning and JPBFT, respectively. The case of missing step explains
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the significant latency increase on setups of f = 1 to f = 2 (+23%), which is not observed from
f = 2 to f = 3 (+3%).
Primary location. In the previous experiments we observed that EBAWA and MinBFT
present almost the same latency when the client is near to the primary and the environment is
homogeneous. In this experiment we try to answer the following question: can this equivalence
hold in environments where the client-replica latency is heterogeneous?
In these experiments we observed that the location of the primary replica affects signifi-
cantly the service latency in WANs (when the primary is fixed). For MinBFT, we defined that
the primary server can be located in three different sites (site1,site3 and site5) and between each
site and client we defined different latencies as presented in Table 6.2. Figure 6.4(c) presents
the results of the experiment. In EBAWA clients always send the request to the nearest server
located in site1. When the primary is located near the client (site1), MinBFT presents the same
latency as EBAWA, as we have seen in previous experiments. Otherwise, when we vary the
location of the primary we have a significantly increase on MinBFT’s latency. In MinBFT for
f = 1, due to the case of the missing step, we have the same latency when the primary is in the
site3 or site5 that is 30% greater than EBAWA’s latency. For f = 2, MinBFT presents a latency
20% and 35% greater than EBAWA when the primary is located in site3 and site5, respectively.
This difference in the algorithms’ latencies is kept with f = 3. This experiment shows the
benefit of implementing a BFT algorithm with a rotating primary and making clients choose the
nearest server as their primary.
site1 site2 site3 site4 site5 site6 site7
latency 25 ms 40 ms 55 ms 75 ms 95 ms 75 ms 75 ms
Tabela 6.2: Latency among clients and replicas on different sites used on the experiment with results
presented on Figure 6.4(c). Values based on Table 6.3.
Load Balancing. When servers are replicated on a WAN, the load of requests generated by
clients can change following an unpredictable pattern. We conducted an experiment with two
client-server pairs, each pair located at a different site. Each client generates requests during
20 minutes and measures the latency. The client at data center A generates requests during
the first 10 minutes obtaining an average latency of 86 ms. Then, the client of data center B
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generates requests in parallel with A’s client. Both sites registered an average latency of 89
ms. Finally, the experiment finish with B’s client generating requests during the last 10 minutes
and registering an average latency of 84 ms. The latencies per request are presented in Figure
6.5. This experiment shows that when the load of client requests increases (duplicates in this
case), EBAWA promptly adjusts to the new load assuring a minimum impact in the service
latency. This happens because a replica sends skip messages (see Section 6.2) to give its turn
to other replicas when it has no client requests to order; and because of the asynchronous views
(see Section 6.2) that allow a replica to send a set of COMMIT messages for different pending
PREPAREs in a single one, reducing communication overhead on the system.
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Figura 6.5: Service latency when the load changes from site A to B.
6.4.5 Real WAN – PlanetLab
Setup. In order to assess EBAWA’s latency on real WANs, where both processing and network
resources are unpredictable, we conducted a set of experiments on PlanetLab2. We used
two setups called WAN-Europe and WAN-America, representing configurations with replicas
scattered through different locations in Europe and America, respectively. Together with the
protocols latency we also registered the communication latency between each pair of servers.
The observed average latency varied between 27 ms to 94 ms as presented in Table 6.3. We
consider a setup with f = 1 with three (EBAWA and MinBFT) and four (JPBFT) servers
and a client. In WAN-Europe, the client was located in Portugal and the servers in France,
2http://www.planet-lab.org/.
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Italy, Germany and Spain (for JPBFT). The primary replicas were at Germany for JPBFT and
MinBFT. In WAN-America, the client was located at Pennsylvania and the servers at Vancouver,
California, Michigan and New York (for JPBFT). The primary replica was located in Michigan
for JPBFT and MinBFT. We measured the latency of these algorithms during 10 days, 3 times
per day, and the reported values are the average of the latency measurements made each day. In
each experiment the client submitted 10000 requests.
WAN-Europe WAN-America
Portugal - France 41.03 Vancouver - Pennsylvania 94.57
France - Italy 27.3 Michigan - Pennsylvania 48.14
France - Germany 30.43 California - Pennsylvania 91.57
Italy - Germany 29.3 Vancouver - Michigan 74.48
Portugal - Italy 53.96 Michigan - California 80.76
Portugal - Germany 48.5 Vancouver - California 55.52
Spain - Portugal 46.87 New York - Pennsylvania 39.14
Spain - Germany 47.62 New York - Vancouver 72.57
Spain - Italy 45.75 New York - Michigan 48.57
Spain - France 28.87 New York - California 88.71
Total Average 39.96 69.40
Tabela 6.3: Network Latency on a real WAN in America and Europe.
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Figura 6.6: Comparison of the algorithms’ latencies in WAN-Europe (a) and WAN-America (b).
Results. Figure 6.6(a) and (b) shows the latency of EBAWA, MinBFT and JPBFT in WAN-
Europe and WAN-America. The figure shows that EBAWA consistently outperforms MinBFT
and JPBFT on real networks with heterogeneous latency among servers. Not surprisingly,
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EBAWA and MinBFT present a better latency than JPBFT due to the reduced number of
communication steps. In WAN-Europe, when the network presented an average latency of
30 ms, EBAWA presented an average latency 20% lower than MinBFT and 35% lower than the
latency presented by JPBFT. When the average network latency was 50 ms, EBAWA presented
an average latency 31% lower than MinBFT and 48% lower than JPBFT. In the WAN-America
experiments, when the average network latency was 60 ms, EBAWA presented an average
latency 10% lower than MinBFT and 43% lower than JPBFT. When the average network latency
was 80 ms, EBAWA presented an average latency 7% lower than MinBFT and 20% lower than
the latency presented by JPBFT. The closer results of MinBFT and EBAWA in WAN-America
can be explained because in this scenario we located the primary replica of MinBFT in Michigan
that is the site with the best average latency to the client, hosted in Pennsylvania.
The better latency of EBAWA in these experiments can be explained mainly by two factors:
(1) the client in EBAWA always sends the requests to the nearest server (the server that presents
the best latency to that client). In JPBFT and MinBFT, the client sends requests to all servers
and the primary may not have the best latency to that client. Therefore this delays the ordering
of the client requests and affects the end-to-end latency. We expect that the advantage of
EBAWA would be even greater if we used larger request/responses. (2) The PREPARE message
of EBAWA carries the REQUEST message, consequently, when a server accepts a request
it can execute the request immediately (and return a reply to the client). In MinBFT and
JPBFT, the PREPARE and PRE-PREPARE messages, respectively, sent by the primary server
of these algorithms, contain only a hash of the original request. We observed that with the link
heterogeneity of a real WAN, it is common that a server receives a PREPARE message from the
primary before it has received the request from the client. Then, it cannot execute the request
until it receives the message from the client or from another server, affecting the algorithm
latency. Thus, our observation is that in a WAN, it is important to send requests in the PREPARE
message.
Performance attacks. Recently Amir et al. (Amir et al., 2008a) described two attacks against
the performance of BFT primary-based algorithms that can degrade their performance to let
them barely usable. A primary replica does a performance attack by sending correct messages
slowly but without triggering protocol timeouts. Avoiding these attacks is especially important
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in large-scale environments where detecting a faulty primary takes much longer than in LANs,
due to the long communication delays and large conservative timeouts.
The second part of the PlanetLab experiments aims to compare the performance of EBAWA,
MinBFT and JPBFT when there is a malicious primary server degrading the performance of
the algorithm. We run some experiments in which we designated one of the servers as the
faulty one (the primary for JPBFT and MinBFT) and this server waits attack delay dattack units
of time before sending PRE-PREPARE/PREPARE messages. We evaluated the latency of the
algorithms with dattack set to 1, 5 and 10 seconds. Table 6.4 reports the algorithms’ latency
with one faulty process executing the performance attack, without expiring any timeout. In
this table it can be seen that the operation latencies of both JPBFT and MinBFT are directly
proportional to the attack delay injected by the malicious primary. However, this is not the case
for EBAWA. Assuming that the latency of a BFT algorithm execution with dattack = 0 is c, the
average latency of MinBFT/JPBFT under attack would be approximately dattack + c, while for
EBAWA the attack delay will always be diluted by a factor of f2 f+1 , which is
1
3 for f = 1 (our
setup). In MinBFT/JPBFT all clients are affected by a faulty primary, while in EBAWA only
the clients that have sent request to that faulty server can be affected. Moreover, in EBAWA a
client can detect that a server is slow and redirect its requests to another server.
dattack JPBFT MinBFT EBAWA
0 0.257 0.168 0.146
1 1.109 1.060 0.423
5 5.195 5.135 1.788
10 10.102 10.023 3.192
Tabela 6.4: Latency of 0/0 operations (in seconds) for JPBFT, MinBFT and EBAWA under different
levels of attacks (dattack of 1, 5 and 10 seconds, on the WAN-America scenery).
6.5 Related Work
There are a few BFT algorithms in the literature that were proposed specifically for WANs
(Amir et al., 2006; Mao et al., 2009). Steward is a hierarchical state machine replication
architecture (Amir et al., 2006). Each site has a group of servers that play the role of a single
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participant in a wide-area algorithm. Steward’s main protocol is a lightweight, crash fault-
tolerant consensus algorithm executed between sites, while within each site runs PBFT. In order
to avoid that malicious replicas misrepresent decisions taken in their site, messages exchanged
between servers at different locations carry a threshold signature attesting that the site agrees
with the content of the message. Comparing the architecture of both BFT algorithms, EBAWA
is clearly simpler than Steward. It does not have a hierarchical structure, clients and servers
can be localized in the same site or dispersed geographically, thus providing a more flexible
architecture. EBAWA has only two sub-algorithms that deal with the normal case operation and
merge operation. Steward has over ten specialized algorithms that run within and among sites,
most of which are associated with global view changes. Besides, EBAWA tolerates f malicious
servers that can be localized in different sites. Steward can withstand f out of 3 f +1 Byzantine
failures within each site but cannot survive even a single site compromise.
Mencius is an algorithm for efficient state machine replication in WANs that also changes
the primary for each agreement (Mao et al., 2008). There are several important differences
between Mencius and EBAWA. Mencius only tolerates replica crashes, while EBAWA tolerates
Byzantine faults. In Mencius servers other than the primary do not exchange messages among
themselves, while EBAWA follows PBFT’s all-to-all communication pattern. In EBAWA clients
can be scattered geographically, while Mencius uses a “fate-sharing” model where clients can
only communicate through their local servers via a LAN. A service is replicated in a set of
servers scattered through several data centers with clients. The drawback of this model is
that clients are unable to use the service if the local server is faulty. EBAWA uses several
mechanisms that do not exist in Mencius but are important for tolerating malicious behavior and
increasing performance: asynchronous views, batches of messages, merge operation, timeout
reset, and blacklisting of faulty servers.
Mao et. al (Mao et al., 2009) describe the design principles of a low-latency BFT algorithm
for WANs, the RAM algorithm, by exploring the use of the A2M trusted service (Chun et al.,
2007) and a rotating primary. When compared to RAM, EBAWA requires fewer replicas (2 f +1
instead of 3 f + 1) and uses a trusted service that is simpler, easier to implement and make
trustworthy. The USIG service provides an interface with operations only to increment a counter
and to verify if counter values are correctly signed, while RAM’s A2M provides a log that can
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grow considerably and an interface with functions to append, lookup and truncate messages
in the log. Besides, EBAWA presents a flexible model, while RAM follows the “fate-sharing”
model, just like Mencius.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents and evaluates EBAWA, a novel BFT algorithm to be used in WANs.
When compared with other BFT algorithms for WANs, EBAWA is more flexible in the sense
that clients and servers can be located in the same site or dispersed geographically. EBAWA also
reduces the numbers of communication steps and replicas by assuming a hybrid fault model with
a minimal trusted service. This reduced number of replicas and communication steps among
servers increases considerably the system’s performance.
In summary the main contributions of this chapter are the following:
• A new BFT algorithm suitable for supporting the execution of wide-area replicated ser-
vices. EBAWA has a reduced number of communication steps, is the first BFT algorithm
for WANs that requires only 2 f +1 replicas, and introduces a set of mechanisms focused
in providing a better performance in large-scale environments.
• A thorough evaluation of the performance of EBAWA in several settings and conditions:
in a LAN; in real and emulated WANs; with clients close to servers and dispersed
geographically; with similar and different communication latencies between clients and
servers. In particular, it presents, for the first time, a performance evaluation of BFT state
machine replication algorithms on a real wide-area network (PlanetLab). The results of
these experiments show that the techniques employed on building EBAWA make it an
efficient wide-area replication algorithm.
The content of this chapter was partially reported in (Veronese et al., 2009a).
7
Conclusion
This thesis presents novel BFT algorithms that are efficient on wide-area networks. These
algorithms are based on mechanisms and techniques that cope with the limitations of current
BFT algorithms in large-scale environments. Prototypes were implemented and thorough
performance evaluations have showed that they are competitive with the baseline algorithm
in the area in LAN environment, while outperforming it in several WAN settings, especially
with the higher heterogeneity of a real WAN.
The thesis begins by showing that it is possible to implement a 2 f + 1 asynchronous
Byzantine consensus algorithm using a 2 f + 1 reliable broadcast algorithm that requires
a minimal wormhole. This is an important contribution once consensus is an important
component of many replication algorithms. The Unique Sequential Identifier Generator (USIG)
service provided by the wormhole is arguably minimal so it is simple to verify and implement,
which is possible even using commercial trusted hardware (TPM). This simplicity is important
as complexity is the cause of most design and implementation vulnerabilities, which allow
successful attacks. We implemented several versions of the USIG service with different
cryptographic mechanisms and protection solutions. All these versions isolated the service
from the rest of the system, but the levels of isolation were different (through virtual machines
or using trusted hardware)(Chapter 3).
Using COTS trusted hardware to implement the USIG service is an obvious benefit in
relation to previous solutions found in the literature, but also a challenge: we can not define
the tamperproof abstraction that better suites our needs, but are restricted to those provided by
the TPM. Our performance evaluation shows that the versions of our algorithms that use the
TPM have very poor performance. We discuss how the TPM design and implementations can
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evolve to become usable for practical BFT algorithms in the future.
The thesis also presents the design of several BFT state machine replication algorithms
supported by the USIG service. We show that using a minimal trusted service it is possible to
reduce the number of replicas to 2 f + 1 preserving the same properties of safety and liveness
of traditional BFT algorithms. Furthermore, we present three BFT algorithms that are minimal,
not only in terms of number of replicas and trusted service used, but also of communication
steps in nice executions: 4 and 3 steps, respectively without and with speculation. This is an
important aspect in terms of latency, especially in networks with non-negligible communication
delays. The minimality of the presented BFT algorithms in terms of number of replicas, trusted
service and number of steps, leads to a simplicity that we believe, based on the performance
results, makes them practical to a level only comparable with crash fault-tolerant algorithms
(Chapter 4).
Other important contribution of this thesis is the design of BFT algorithms that are less
vulnerable to performance degradation attacks caused by faulty primaries. We propose the use
of a rotating primary that, besides letting the BFT algorithms more resilient to these attacks,
also reduces the latency by piggybacking messages, and increases the throughput by balancing
the load of ordering requests. Avoiding performance degradation attacks is especially important
in large-scale environments where detecting a faulty primary takes much longer than in LANs,
due to the long communication delays and large conservative timeouts (Chapter 5).
Finally, in order to tolerate natural disasters, power outages and physical attacks, we
propose an algorithm based on a flexible architecture where clients and servers can be located
in the same site or dispersed geographically. Some current BFT algorithms for WANs assume
that clients and servers are in the same data center. The problem of this model is that all clients
within a site area become unable to use the system if the local server is faulty. Our model is
more resilient once clients can forward their requests to other sites/servers when the nearest
server is faulty (Chapter 6).
Present and future work is being and will be pursuit in several areas.
As mentioned before, critical infrastructures depend on services as storage of critical
information from the monitoring systems, which if modified by cyber-criminals may impair
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the normal operation of the infrastructure. Our algorithms allows the implementation of highly-
resilient services, like storage of critical monitoring data, DNS or PKI services, even if there are
cyber-attacks, intrusions or the physical destruction of some of the service replicas. Besides of
the benefits that these algorithms bring in the construction of services for critical infrastructures,
we intend to apply one of our algorithms in the construction of highly-resilient services
distributed in clouds environments. Clouds environments are becoming increasingly popular.
They allow users to leave their local storage and access data from any location connected to the
Internet which can significantly reduce the cost of maintaining such resources locally. Although
the advantages of using clouds are unarguable, there are many risks involving loss of privacy,
integrity and availability. Our goal is to apply the EBAWA algorithm in this context. The basic
idea is to maintain in each cloud a single replica, and clients access the service by sending
requests to the nearest server via WAN. Servers agree about the sequence of requests running
our efficient distributed agreement algorithm. Even with the benefits of the EBAWA algorithm
(low latency and high throughput), there are still open issues that should be addressed.
In order to avoid significant outages that impact end users, replicas should be replaced or
recovered when their performance declines. How to introduce and remove replicas keeping
EBAWA’s properties is an issue that will be addressed in our future work. Our BFT algorithm
provides safety and liveness if fewer than 1/2 of the replicas fail during the lifetime of the
system. These guarantees can be insufficient for long-lived systems because this bound may be
exceeded in these systems. The ideal goal would be the complete removal of vulnerabilities but
it is well known that such goal is very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Therefore, we
intend to develop a proactive recovery mechanism that periodically rejuvenates replicas even if
there is no reason to suspect that they are faulty (Castro & Liskov, 2002; Sousa et al., 2005).
This mechanism makes BFT algorithms tolerate any number of faults over the lifetime of the
system, provided that less than a subset of the nodes become faulty within a small window of
vulnerability.
Rejuvenating replicas requires a timely and reliable recovery mechanism. This recovery
support cannot be directly integrated in a traditional middleware layer because a malicious
intruder could easily disable the recovery mechanism. Therefore, our recovery service needs
to be implemented inside of the wormhole. How this recovery mechanism should be designed
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and implemented without increasing the complexity of our current wormhole is an issue that we
need to evaluate.
A
Correctness proofs
A.1 MinBFT Correctness
This section sketches proofs of the correctness of MinBFT. We have to prove that the safety
property is always satisfied (i.e., that all servers execute the same requests in the same order)
and the same for liveness (i.e., that all clients’ requests are eventually executed).
The proof that MinBFT satisfies the safety properties is the following.
Lemma 1 In a view v, if a correct server executes an operation o with sequence number i, no
correct server will execute o with sequence number i′ 6= i.
Proof (sketch): If a correct server s executes o with sequence number i, it must have
received f + 1 valid COMMIT messages for 〈o, i〉 from a quorum Q of servers. The proof
is by contradiction. Suppose there is another correct server s′ that executes o with sequence
number i′ > i. By the MinBFT algorithm, this can only happen if it receives f + 1 valid
COMMIT messages for 〈o, i′〉, from a quorum Q′ of f + 1 servers. Since n = 2 f + 1 and
|Q|+ |Q′| = 2 f + 2 ≥ 2 f + 1, there must be at least one server r (called intersection server)
that sends COMMIT messages both for 〈o, i〉 and 〈o, i′〉. Assuming that the primary on view v is
the server p, we have to consider four cases:
1. the primary and the intersection server are correct: in this case it is trivial to see that the
primary will not generate two UIs for the same request operation o, so the intersection
server will never send two valid COMMIT messages for 〈o, i〉 and 〈o, i′〉.
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2. the primary is correct and the intersection server is faulty: The (faulty) intersection server
would only be able to send valid COMMIT messages for 〈o, i〉 and 〈o, i′〉 if these messages
contained UIp = 〈i,H(o)〉p and UI′p = 〈i′,H(o)〉p, respectively. Since the primary is
correct, it will never invoke createUI for the same operation o twice and consequently
it will never produce these two UIs.
3. the primary is faulty and the intersection server is correct: Now the primary will create
PREPARE messages containing UIp = 〈i,H(o)〉p and UI′p = 〈i′,H(o)〉p and send them to
the intersection server in order to try to make it send COMMIT messages both for 〈o, i〉
and 〈o, i′〉. However, due to the verification of the seq field of the request operations,
which is part of o, the intersection replica will not accept the second PREPARE for the
same operation o, issued by client c, because o.seq =Vreq[c], and the servers only accept
operations from clients if their sequence number is greater than their previous number
(i.e., if o.seq >Vreq[c]).
4. the primary and the intersection server are faulty: Now both the primary and the
intersection server are in collusion to make two servers execute the same operation with
different numbers. Suppose that the intersection server r sends 〈COMMIT,v,r,s,UIp,UIr〉
message to s for 〈o, i〉 and 〈COMMIT,v,r,s′,UI′p,UI′r〉 message to s′ for 〈o, i′〉. Suppose
UIp = 〈i,H(o)〉p and UI′p = 〈i′,H(o)〉p such that i < i′. In this case, there are two cases
to consider:
(a) s′ executed some operation with sequence number i. In this case its sequence of
operations does not contain a “hole”, but since the USIG service does not allow
the primary p to generate two UIs for different message with the same sequence
number, the operation with sequence number i must be o (the same executed by s),
and thus s′ will not execute o again with i′ because o.seq≤Vreq[c];
(b) s′ did not execute some operation with sequence number i. In this case the server will
only execute o with sequence number i′ if it executed all operations with sequence
number < i′, and since it did not execute any operation with sequence number i, it
will halt waiting for this operation to be executed.
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Consequently, it is not possible for two servers to executes the same operation with different
sequence number in view v. Lemma 1
Lemma 2 If a correct server executes an operation o with sequence number i in a view v, no
correct server will execute o with sequence number i′ 6= i in any view v′ > v.
Proof (sketch): If a correct server s executes o with sequence number i in a view v, it must have
received f + 1 valid COMMIT messages for 〈o, i,v〉 from a quorum Q of servers. The proof is
again by contradiction. Suppose there is another correct server s′ that executes o with sequence
number i′ > i in a view v′ > v. By the MinBFT algorithm, this can only happen if it receives
f + 1 valid COMMIT messages for 〈o, i′,v′〉, from a quorum Q′ of servers. Since n = 2 f + 1
and |Q|+ |Q′| = 2 f +2 ≥ 2 f +1, there must be at least one server r (called again intersection
server) that sends COMMIT messages both for 〈o, i,v〉 and 〈o, i′,v′〉.
Now let us prove that this leads to a contradiction. For simplicity we start by considering
that v′ = v+1, then we expand the proof for arbitrary values of v′.
First we show that the primary of the new view (p) must assert that o was accepted/executed
before v′, i.e., that it can not deny this fact. This assertion is done explicitly or implicitly
in the new-view certificate Vvc that it sends in the NEW-VIEW message that starts view v′:
〈NEW-VIEW, p,v′,Vvc,S,UIi〉. This certificate is composed by f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages
that p received from a quorum Q′′ with that many servers, one of which must be correct.
Consider a server r ∈ Q′′ for which the VIEW-CHANGE message included in Vvc is 〈VIEW-
CHANGE,r,v′,Clast ,O,UIs〉. We have to consider four cases:
1. the primary p is correct and there is a correct server r ∈ Q′′ that executed o: if p is
correct it inserts in Vvc f + 1 VIEW-CHANGE messages, including the one that comes
from r. There are two possibilities:
(a) o was executed after the last stable checkpoint: r is correct so O contains the
COMMIT message that r sent for o, therefore Vvc and S assert explicitly that o was
executed.
(b) o was executed before the last stable checkpoint: the execution of o is implicit in
Clast so Vvc asserts implicitly that o was executed.
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2. the primary p is correct but there is no correct server in Q′′ that executed o: In this
situation at least one faulty server r∈Q′′ accepted o because |Q|+ |Q′′|= 2 f +2≥ 2 f +1.
Again there are two possibilities:
(a) o was executed after the last stable checkpoint: r might be tempted to not include
the COMMIT message for o in O but if it did it p would not put the VIEW-CHANGE
message from r in Vvc. The reason is that for not putting o in O r would have to do
one of two things that would be detected by p: (1) if r executed a request o′ after
o, r might put the COMMIT message for o′ in O but not the message for o, which
would leave a “hole” in O that would be detected by p; (2) if r sent the COMMIT
message for o with a UI with counter value cv, it might not put in O any COMMIT
with cv′ ≥ cv, but that would be detected by p because r would have to sign the
VIEW-CHANGE message with a UI with counter value cv′′ > cv+1. Therefore, for
the VIEW-CHANGE message from r to be inserted in Vvc by p, r must include the
COMMIT message for o in O, falling in case 1a above.
(b) o was executed before the last stable checkpoint: in this situation the execution
of o is implicit in the certificate of the last stable checkpoint (see case 1b above).
The faulty server r may attempt to put an older checkpoint in the VIEW-CHANGE
message but p will never insert this message in Vvc because r would have to do one
of the two detectable things pointed out in case 2a. Therefore, we fall in case 1b.
3. the primary p is faulty but there is a correct server r ∈ Q′′ that executed o: in this case
the faulty primary may attempt to modify the content of O that it inserts in Vvc. If it
simply removes o from O it leaves a hole, which is detectable. If it removes o and all later
messages this is also detectable because p can not forge a UI from r with the following
counter value. If p tries to substitute the checkpoint certificate Clast for an older one it
also can not forge the UI. Even if it substitutes the checkpoint for an older checkpoint
sent by r, this is detectable (servers known that r sent messages afterwards). This shows
that these attacks are detectable so we have only to show that they are indeed detected.
This is the case because when a correct server receives a NEW-VIEW message it checks
the validity of Vvc. Therefore, a faulty primary can not tamper the content of the correct
server VIEW-CHANGE message so we fall in case 1.
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4. the primary p is faulty and there is no correct server that executed o in Q′′: even if there
is no correct server that executed o in Q′′, there must be one faulty server r ∈ Q′′ that
executed o because |Q|+ |Q′′| = 2 f + 2 ≥ 2 f + 1. For case 2, we already showed that
r can not make the primary believe that it did not execute o. However, in this case the
primary p is faulty so p can insert the VIEW-CHANGE message sent by r in Vvc anyway.
However, this falls in case 3 because correct servers will validate Vvc when they receive
the NEW-VIEW message from p. Therefore we end up falling in case 1.
This shows that the primary p of the new view v′ must assert that o was accepted/executed
before v′ in the new-view certificate Vvc. Now we prove that no correct server will execute o
with sequence number i′ 6= i in view v′. We have to consider two cases:
1. the primary is correct: as already shown, the primary must know that o was executed so
it will never generate a second UI for the same request and correct servers will not send a
COMMIT message for o in view v′.
2. the primary is faulty: in this case the primary can create a new PREPARE message
containing UI′p = 〈i′,H(o)〉p and send it to the servers, say, to r. However, r will verify
the request number in the seq field of o and discover that o.seq≤Vreq[c] meaning that the
request was already executed, so it will not execute it again.
This proves the lemma for v′ = v+ 1. Now we have to expand for arbitrary values of v′.
There are two cases:
1. v′ = v+ k but no requests were accepted in any view v′′ such that v′ < v′′ < v+ k: this
situation can be caused by an instability in the network that leads to several consecutive
executions of the view change algorithm. It is trivial to understand that this case falls into
the case of v′ = v+1 because nothing relevant happens in the views v′′.
2. the generic case where there are “real” views between v and v′: an analysis of the proof
for the case of v′ = v+ 1 shows that the information that is propagated from view v to
v+1 about requests that were executed is also propagated to later views, either explicitly
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in the O sets while there are no checkpoints, or implicitly in the checkpoints. This is the
information used to prevent requests from being re-executed so this case falls into the
case of v′ = v+1 .
Lemma 2
Theorem 1 Let s be the correct server that executed more operations than all correct servers
up to a certain instant. If s executed the sequence of operations S = 〈o1, ...oi〉, then all other
correct servers executed this same sequence of operations or a prefix of it.
Proof (sketch): Let prefix(S,k) be a function that gets the prefix of sequence S containing
the first k operations, with prefix(S,0) being the empty sequence. Let ‘.’ be an operator that
concatenates sequences.
Assume that the theorem is false, i.e., that there is a correct server s′ that executed some
sequence of operations S′ that is not a prefix of S. More formally, assume that prefix(S′, j) =
prefix(S, j−1).〈o′j〉 and prefix(S′, j−1).〈o j〉 = prefix(S, j), with o′j 6= o j. In this case o′j is the
j-th operation executed in s′ and o j is the j-th operation executed in s. Assume that o j was
executed in view v by s and o′j was executed in view v′ by s′. If v = v′, this contradicts Lemma
1, and if v 6= v′ it contradicts Lemma 2. Consequently, the theorem holds. Theorem 1
In the following we present the proof of liveness for the MinBFT algorithm. We say that
an operation request issued by a client c completes when c receives the same response for the
operation from at least f + 1 different servers. We define a stable view as a view in which the
primary is correct and no timeouts expire at correct replicas.
Lemma 3 During a stable view, an operation requested by a correct client completes.
Proof (sketch): If the client c is correct it will send its operation o with a sequence number
greater than any of its previous requests to all servers. Since, in a stable view the primary p is
correct, it will generate an UI = 〈i,H(o)〉p and send it to all servers in a PREPARE message. A
correct server will receive this message, verify the validity of UI by calling verifyUI, and send
a COMMIT message for 〈o, i〉. Since there are at most f faulty servers on the system, there are
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at least f +1 correct servers (the primary plus other f servers) that will produce these COMMIT
messages and send them to all servers. When a correct server receives f +1 COMMIT messages,
it executes o1 and send a reply to the client c. When c receives f +1 equal replies the operation
completes, which must happen since there are f +1 correct servers and all of them will produce
the same result when executing o as their i-th operation. Lemma 3
Lemma 4 A view v eventually will be changed to a new view v′ > v if at least f + 1 correct
servers request its change.
Proof (sketch): To request a view change, a correct server s sends a 〈REQ-VIEW-
CHANGE,s,v,v′〉 to all servers, where v is the current view number and v′ = v + 1 the
new view number. Consider that a quorum of f +1 correct servers Q requests this view change
from view v to view v+1. The primary for the view is by definition p, (v+1) mod n. There
are two cases:
1. the view is stable: this means that all servers in Q receive the REQ-VIEW-CHANGE
messages from each another. When one of these servers (s) receives the f +1th of these
messages, it sends to all other servers a message 〈VIEW-CHANGE,s,v′,Clast ,O,UIs〉. All
the VIEW-CHANGE messages sent by servers in Q are received by all servers. The primary
p for view v+ 1 is correct so it sends a message 〈NEW-VIEW, p,v′,Vvc,S,UIp〉 to all
servers. No timeouts expire (the view is stable) so all servers receive this message and
the view changes to v+1.
2. the view is not stable: this case can be divided in two cases:
(a) p is faulty and does not send the NEW-VIEW message, or p is faulty and sends
an invalid NEW-VIEW message that is discarded by all correct servers, or p is not
faulty but the communication is slow and the timeout expires in all correct servers:
when the servers send a VIEW-CHANGE message they start a timer that expires after
Tvc units of time. In this case this timeout expires at all correct servers, which start
another view change.
1Since the primary p is correct, when it was elected it disseminated any pending requests of the previous
view, and thus this server will not have holes in its sequence of operations and will be able to execute the request
immediately.
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(b) p is faulty and sends the NEW-VIEW message but only to a quorum Q′ with at
least f + 1 servers but less than f + 1 correct, or p is correct and the same effect
happens due to communication delays: in this case faulty servers in Q′ can follow
the algorithm making the correct servers in Q′ believe that the algorithm is running
normally. More precisely, the servers in Q′ can exchange PREPARE and COMMIT
messages following the algorithm. At the correct servers that are not in Q′, a timer
will expire after Tvc units of time and these servers will send REQ-VIEW-CHANGE
messages, but there will not be f +1 one of them so a view change will not happen.
When faulty servers start to deviate from the algorithm, requests will stop being
accepted and the correct servers in Q′ will send REQ-VIEW-CHANGE messages and
a view change will start.
In these last two cases (2a and 2b), when another view change starts the system can fall again
in one of the cases 1 or 2. However, eventually the view will become stable, the system will fall
in case 1 and the view will be changed to a new view v′ > v. Lemma 4
Theorem 2 An operation requested by a correct client eventually completes.
Proof (sketch): The proof comes from the previous lemmas. In stable views, operations
requested by correct clients eventually complete (Lemma 3). If the view v is not stable, there
are two possibilities:
1. timers expire and at least f + 1 correct servers request a view change: in this case the
view will be changed to a new view v′ > v (Lemma 4).
2. timers expire but less than f +1 correct servers request a view change: this case is similar
to case 2b of Lemma 4. If there is a quorum Q of at least f +1 servers that do not request
the view change and that go on following the algorithm in view v, exchanging PREPARE
and COMMIT messages, then the system will stay in view v and requests from correct
clients will be executed. When there is no such a quorum or requests are not executed
within Texec, all correct servers request a view change and we fall in the previous case.
Theorem 2
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A.2 MinZyzzyva Correctness
The two properties that we have to prove about MinZyzzyva are the same that were proved
for Zyzzyva (Kotla et al., 2007). These properties are defined from the point of view of what is
observed by a client. Informally, a request is said to have complete if the client can use the reply
to that request, i.e., if the client can be certain that the (speculative) execution of that request
will not be rolled back. Formally, a request is said to have complete at a client if the client
received 2 f + 1 matching RESPONSE messages or f + 1 matching LOCAL-COMMIT messages
for the request. The properties that MinZyzzyva has to satisfy are:
Safety: If a request with sequence number seq and history hseq completes, then any request that
completes with a higher sequence number seq′ > seq has a history hseq′ that includes hseq as a
prefix.
Liveness: Any request issued by a correct client eventually completes.
The proof that MinZyzzyva satisfies the safety properties is the following.
Lemma 5 In a view v, if a correct server executes an operation o with sequence number i, no
correct server will execute o with sequence number i′ 6= i.
Proof (sketch): Despite the differences of MinZyzzyva and MinBFT, the proof of this lemma
is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. The basic idea is that replicas process the primary messages
by order of counter value in UI and the primary can not associate the same UI to two different
requests due to the properties of the USIG service. Lemma 5
Theorem 3 If a request with sequence number seq and history hseq completes, then any request
that completes with a higher sequence number seq′ > seq has a history hseq′ that includes hseq
as a prefix.
Proof (sketch): Consider that the request o with sequence number seq completes in view v and
o′ with sequence number seq′ in view v′. We have to consider two cases:
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1. v = v′: the proof is by contradiction. Assume that hseq′ does not include hseq as a prefix.
This is in contradiction with Lemma 5.
2. v 6= v′: suppose that v′ = v+1 (the expansion for an arbitrary relation v′ > v is simple and
similar to the one done in the proof of Lemma 2). First we have to show that the primary
of the new view (p) must assert that o was completed before v′, i.e., that it can not deny
this fact. This assertion is done explicitly or implicitly in the new-view certificate Vvc
that it sends in the NEW-VIEW message that starts view v′. However, the view change
operation of MinZyzzyva is almost identical to the same operation of MinBFT so the
proof is the same as the one made in the proof of Lemma 2 and we skip it here. Then, we
have to consider two cases:
(a) o′ is the first request executed in view v′: when the new view is installed the NEW-
VIEW message serves as a commit certificate to the requests completed in view
v′− 1. Therefore, hseq′−1 is committed and is a prefix of hseq′ (the theorem states
that o′ completes).
(b) o′ is not the first request executed in view v′: this is trivially proved by induction
considering case 2a as the base case and using Lemma 5 to prove the induction step.
Theorem 3
Now we prove the liveness of MinZyzzyva.
Lemma 6 During a stable view, an operation requested by a correct client completes.
Proof (sketch): If the client c is correct it will send its operation o with a sequence number
greater than any of its previous requests to all servers. Since, in a stable view the primary p
is correct, it will generate an UI = 〈i,H(o)〉p and send it to all servers and to the client. A
correct server will receive this message, verify the validity of UI by calling verifyUI, and
send a RESPONSE message for 〈o, i〉 to the client. Since there are at most f faulty servers on
the system, there are at least f + 1 correct servers (the primary plus other f servers) that will
produce these RESPONSE messages and send them to the client. There are two cases:
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1. no faulty servers: the client receives 2 f + 1 RESPONSE messages and the operation
completes.
2. there are faulty servers: the client receives between f +1 (stable view) and 2 f RESPONSE
messages. When the timer expires, the client sends a COMMIT message to the servers, all
correct servers reply with a LOCAL-COMMIT message, and the operation completes.
Lemma 6
Lemma 7 A view v eventually will be changed to a new view v′ > v if at least f + 1 correct
servers request its change.
Proof (sketch): The view change operation of both algorithms is similar so this proof is similar
to the proof of Lemma 4. Lemma 7
Theorem 4 An operation requested by a correct client eventually completes.
Proof (sketch): The proof comes from the previous lemmas similarly to the proof of Theorem
2. In stable views, operations requested by correct clients eventually complete (Lemma 6). If
the view v is not stable, there are two possibilities:
1. at least f + 1 correct servers suspect of the primary and request a view change: in this
case the view will be changed to a new view v′ > v (Lemma 7).
2. less than f + 1 correct servers suspect of the primary and request a view change: this
case is similar to case 2b of Lemma 4. If there is a quorum Q of at least f +1 servers that
do not request the view change and that go on following the algorithm in view v, then the
system will stay in view v and requests from correct clients will be executed. When there
is no such a quorum or requests are not executed within the timeout, all correct servers
request a view change and we fall in the previous case.
Theorem 4
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A.3 Spinning Correctness
This section sketches a proof of correctness of the Spinning algorithm. We have to prove
that the safety property is always satisfied (i.e., that all correct servers execute the same requests
in the same order) and the same for liveness (i.e., that all clients’ requests are eventually
executed).
Before the proofs, we present pseudo-code of the algorithm (Algorithm 4). For simplicity
we omit details about garbage collection and timeout configuration. We also make the
simplifications mentioned in Section 5.2.1: requests are processed one at a time (no batches);
n = 3 f +1; signatures are used instead of authenticators.
The format of the pseudo-code is a common one so we do not introduce the notation in
detail. We use an operator ‘.’ (dot) to refer to elements of messages and rather informally
from sets (e.g., in line 25 where the vector VP is filled with digests from the P field of MERGE
messages). Table A.3 presents the meaning of structures and variables, and Table A.4 shows
the auxiliary functions used by the algorithm. Recall that Table 5.1 summarized the labels of
fields of the messages.
Name Meaning
n the number of servers
f the number of servers that can be faulty
myv the view number on server s
vmin the lowest view number in M
vmax the highest view number in M
vlast the view number of the last request accepted by s
mlast the view number of the last valid PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message
received by s
blacklist a set of f faulty primaries
unordered a set of clients’ requests
pending a set of PRE-PREPARE messages with view number > myv
processing a set of PRE-PREPARE/PRE-PREPARE-MERGE messages with
view number ≤ myv
myP a set of PREPARE certificates
state the server state (normal or merge)
isPrePrepared indicates if s has sent its PRE-PREPARE message (boolean)
isPrepared indicates if s has sent its PREPARE message (boolean)
Tabela A.1: Variables and structures at a server s.
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Name Functionality
exec(req) executes a request
oldestRequest(unordered) returns the oldest request in the unordered set, if unordered is
empty, null is returned
min(M) returns the lowest view number in M
size(VP) returns the size of the vector P
stateTransfer() brings the server’s state up to date
startTimer() starts the timer
stopTimer() stops the timer
restartTimer() restarts the timer
D(m) calculates the digest of a message m
insertHead(s) inserts the server s in the first position of the blacklist. If the
blacklist’s size is equal f removes the element of the last position
before to insert s
replaceHead(s) replace the first element of the blacklist for s
Tabela A.2: Auxiliary functions used in the algorithm.
The proof that Spinning satisfies the safety property is the following.
Lemma 8 In normal operation, if a correct server executes an operation o in view v, no correct
server will execute o′ 6= o in view v.
Proof (sketch): The proof is by contradiction. Assume the contrary: two correct servers s
and s′ execute respectively o and o′ in view v in normal operation (or normal state), i.e., in
line 46. A correct server only executes that line if it receives 2 f + 1 COMMIT messages from
different servers (line 41) and a correct server only sends a COMMIT message if it receives
2 f + 1 PREPARE messages with the same message digest dm (lines 32-37). Therefore, for
s and s′ to execute o and o′ there must be 2 f + 1 PREPARE messages carrying 〈v,D(o)〉 and
another 2 f +1 carrying 〈v,D(o′)〉, which gives a total of 2× (2 f +1) = 4 f +2. This is clearly
impossible because there are only 3 f +1 servers and at most f of them are faulty and may send
two different PREPARE messages (3 f +1+ f < 4 f +2). A contradiction. Lemma 8
Lemma 9 If the timers expire in f +1 correct servers, eventually all correct servers enter the
merge state.
Proof (sketch): When the timer expires in a server s j in view v, it enters the merge state and
sends a message 〈MERGE,s j,v,P〉σs j to all servers (lines 89-100). If that happens in f + 1
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correct servers, eventually all correct servers receive the f +1 MERGE messages and enter the
merge state in line 83, if they did not enter that state before in lines 89 or 100. Lemma 9
Lemma 10 If all correct servers are in normal operation in view v, a correct server s executes
an operation o, and the timers expire in other f + 1 correct servers, then all correct servers
eventually execute o.
Proof (sketch): For s to execute o it must have received 2 f +1 COMMIT messages (lines 41-46),
at least f +1 sent by correct servers. For a correct server, say s′, to send a COMMIT message it
must have received 2 f +1 PREPARE messages (lines 32-37). If the timer of s′ expires, s′ inserts
these 2 f + 1 PREPARE messages in myP (line 91). The timers expire in f + 1 correct servers,
therefore f +1 correct servers enter the merge state (lines 89-100), therefore all correct servers
eventually enter the merge state (Lemma 9) and send MERGE messages to all servers (lines
82-88 or 89-100). There are two cases to consider:
1. The primary of view v + 1 sends the PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message following the
algorithm (lines 15-26): that message contains a vector VP that must contain the digest
of o because: (a) that vector is filled using the data from 2 f +1 MERGE messages (lines
20-26); (b) at least f +1 correct servers insert 2 f +1 PREPARE messages with o in myP
(like s′ above); and (c) the intersection of the quorum of 2 f + 1 that sent the MERGE
messages of (a) and the f + 1 correct servers of (b) contains at least one correct server
((2 f +1)+( f +1) = n+1). VP contains the digest of o, so o is executed when the request
of view v+1 is accepted (lines 41-46, 49-52).
2. The primary of view v+1 is faulty and does not send the PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message,
or the communication is slow and the timers expire: in this case the timers expire in all
(correct) servers, they increment the view number and we have again to consider the same
two cases, 1 and 2.
Eventually the communication will not be slow (partial synchrony model, Section 6.1) and the
primary will not be faulty (it changes for every view and only f are faulty), so the system will
fall in case 1. Lemma 10
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1: // initialization
2: myv = 1
3: mlast = 0
4: vlast = 0
5: blacklist = []
6: unordered = {}
7: pending= {}
8: processing= {}
9: state= normal
10: isPrepared = false
11: isPrePrepared = false
12: when si receives 〈REQUEST,c,seq,op〉σc from client c do
13: unordered = unordered∪{〈REQUEST,c,seq,op〉σc}
14: startTimer()
15: when si becomes the primary of myv do
16: if myv−1== vlast ∧state== normal∧ isPrePrepared== false then
17: dm= D(oldestRequest(unordered))
18: send 〈PRE-PREPARE,si,v,dm〉σsi to all servers
19: isPrePrepared = true
20: else if (p received at least 2 f + 1 MERGE messages sent by different
servers in v−1) then
21: M = {the 2 f +1 MERGE messages}
22: vmax = highest view number received in P of MERGE messages
23: for each MERGE message ∈M do
24: if P in the MERGE message has view number ≥ vmax−n then
25: VP[MERGE.P.v] = MERGE.P.dm
26: send 〈PRE-PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M〉σsi to all servers
27: when s j receives 〈PRE-PREPARE,si,v,dm〉σsi do
28: if v == myv ∧ 〈PRE-PREPARE,si,v,dm〉σsi is valid ∧ myv − 1 ==
vlast ∧ isPrepared == false∧ state== normal then
29: send 〈PREPARE,s j,v,dm〉σs j to all servers
30: processing= processing∪{〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,v,dm〉σs j }
31: isPrepared = true
32: when s j receives 2 f +1 〈PREPARE,sx,v,dm〉σsx from different servers do
33: if v== myv ∧ state== normal then
34: if (s j is the primary of myv+1) then
35: send 〈〈COMMIT,s j,v〉〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,v + 1,dm〉〉σs j to all
servers
36: else
37: send 〈COMMIT,s j,v〉σs j to all servers
38: when s j receives 〈〈COMMIT,s j,v〉,〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,v′,dm〉〉σs j do
39: if v == myv ∧ v′ == myv + 1 ∧ 〈〈COMMIT,s j,v〉〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,
v′,dm〉〉σs j is valid then
40: pending= pending∪{〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,v′,dm〉}
41: when s j receives 2 f +1〈COMMIT,sx,v〉σsx from different servers do
42: if v== myv ∧ state== normal then
43: stopTimer()
44: if 〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,v,dm〉σs j ∈ processing then
45: if ∃req ∈ unordered : D(req) = dm then
46: reply= exec(req) // requests accepted
47: send 〈REPLY,s j,reply〉σs j to req.c
48: unordered = unordered−{req}
49: else if 〈PRE-PREPARE-MERGE,s j,v,VP〉σs j ∈ processing then
50: for x= 0 to size(VP)−1 do
51: if ∃req ∈ unordered : D(req) = VP[x] then
52: reply= exec(req) // requests accepted
53: send 〈REPLY,s j,reply〉σs j to req.c
54: unordered = unordered−{req}
55: vlast = v
56: repeat
57: myv = myv+1
58: until blacklist has myv mod n
59: isPrepared = false
60: isPrePrepared = false
61: if 〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,v,dm〉σs j ∈ pending ∧ myv == v ∧
〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,v,dm〉σs j is valid then
62: send 〈PREPARE,s j,v,dm〉σs j to all servers
63: pending= pending−{〈PRE-PREPARE,s j,v,dm〉σs j }
64: isPrepared = true
65: when s j receives 〈PRE-PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M〉σsi do
66: if v ≥ vlast ∧ 〈PRE-PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M〉σsi is valid∧ isPrepared == false then
67: processing= processing∪{〈PRE-PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP, M〉σsi }
68: vmin = min(M)
69: if ∀dm ∈ VP,∃MERGE ∈M : dm ∈M.P∧ vlast +1≥ vmin then
70: myv = v
71: dm= D(VP)
72: send 〈PREPARE,s j,v,dm〉σs j to all servers
73: isPrepared = true
74: state= normal
75: if mlast < vlast then
76: insertHead((v−1) mod n)
77: else
78: replaceHead((v−1) mod n)
79: mlast = v
80: else
81: stateTransfer()
82: when s j receives f +1〈MERGE,sx,v,P〉σsx from different servers ∧ ∀v≥
vlast do
83: state= merge
84: isPrePrepared = false
85: isPrepared = false
86: if ∃req ∈ processing that has 2 f +1 PREPARE messages ∧ has the view
number ≥ vlast −n then
87: myP = {the 2 f +1 PREPARE messages received}
88: send 〈MERGE,s j,v,myP〉σs j to all servers;
89: when timer expires on a server s j do
90: if ∃req ∈ processing that has 2 f +1 PREPARE messages ∧ has the view
number ≥ vlast −n then
91: myP = {the 2 f +1 PREPARE messages received}
92: if state == normal ∧ ∃myv ∈ processing that has f + 1 PRE-
PREPARE/PREPARE messages from different servers then
93: send 〈MERGE,s j,myv+1,myP〉σs j to all servers
94: else
95: send 〈MERGE,s j,myv,myP〉σs j to all servers
96: state= merge
97: isPrepared = false
98: isPrePrepared = false
99: myv = myv+1
100: restartTimer()
Algorithm 4: Spinning algorithm
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Lemma 11 After a merge operation, eventually 2 f +1 servers have the same blacklist.
Proof (sketch): When a correct server receives a valid PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message (line
65) it keeps the view number of this message in the mlast variable (line 79). When a correct
server receives a valid PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message it verifies if this message succeeds a
normal case operation or if this message is a result of successive merge operations. To effect
this verification it compares the value kept in mlast with the view number of the last request
executed kept in vlast (line 75). If mlast < vlast then the received PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message
succeeds a normal case operation and the server inserts the primary of v−1 in the head of the
blacklist (line 76). If mlast ≥ vlast then the received PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message succeeds
other merge operation and the server replaces the head of the blacklist for v−1 (line 78).
Assuming two subsets of servers Q and R, where |Q|< 2 f +1 and |R|> f servers in order
to proof the algorithm correctness we have to consider two cases:
• Q servers accept the PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message for v− 1 (lines 49-52), the timer
expires in R servers (lines 89-100) and all correct servers enter the merge state. When
the Q servers receive the next PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message with view number v they
replace the first position in the blacklist for v− 1 because the lowest possible value of
mlast is v− 1 and the value of vlast is v− 1 (lines 75 and 78). All servers in R have
received PRE-PREPARE-MERGE with v− 1 that was accepted by Q therefore, when they
received the next PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message they also replace the first position in
the blacklist for v−1. Consequently, all correct servers in Q and R converge to the same
blacklist.
• There were successive merge operations the Q servers have lost PRE-PREPARE-MERGE
messages and R servers have received them but as Q servers did not send PREPARE
messages the timer expires on R servers and there are no accepted PRE-PREPARE-MERGE
messages. When a correct primary of view v sends a valid PRE-PREPARE-MERGE
message that is received by Q and R servers, the Q servers insert the primary of v−1 in the
head of their blacklists. Previously, the R servers have received PRE-PREPARE-MERGE
messages therefore they replace the first position in the blacklist for v−1. Consequently,
all correct servers in Q and R converge to the same blacklist. Lemma 11
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Theorem 5 Let s be the correct server that executed more operations than all correct servers
up to a certain instant. If s executed the sequence of operations S = 〈o1, ...oi〉, then all other
correct servers executed this same sequence of operations or a prefix of it (Safety).
Proof (sketch): Let prefix(S,k) be a function that gets the prefix of sequence S containing
the first k operations, with prefix(S,0) being the empty sequence. Let ‘.’ be an operator that
concatenates sequences.
Assume that the theorem is false, i.e., that there is a correct server s′ that executed some
sequence of operations S′ that is not a prefix of S. More formally, assume that prefix(S′, j) =
prefix(S, j−1).〈o′j〉 and prefix(S′, j−1).〈o j〉 = prefix(S, j), with o′j 6= o j. In this case o′j is the
j-th operation executed in s′ and o j is the j-th operation executed in s. Assume that o j was
executed in view v by s and o′j was executed in view v′ by s′. We have to consider two cases:
1. v = v′: in this case o j = o′j due to Lemma 13.
2. v′ > v: without lack of generality this case assumes that s executes o in v but the timers
expire in other f +1 correct servers, including s′. This is the case considered in Lemma
14 that shows that o is eventually executed by s′. An inspection of the algorithm shows
that: (1) s′ does not execute any operation in view v; and (2) s′ does not execute any
operation between view v and v′. Therefore, the j-th operation executed in s′ is o′ = o.
Theorem 5
Next we present the proof of liveness of the Spinning algorithm. We say that a request
issued by a client c completes when c receives the same response for the operation from at least
f +1 different servers. We define a stable view as a view in which the primary is correct and no
timeouts expire at correct replicas. In this proof, we consider the general case in which in each
view a batch of requests is agreed upon and executed.
Lemma 12 During a stable view, an operation requested by a correct client completes.
Proof (sketch): The client is correct so it sends the REQUEST message with the operation o
to all servers. The primary is correct (by definition of stable view) so it sends o in the PRE-
PREPARE message (lines 15-19), all correct servers send PREPARE and COMMIT messages with
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o (respectively, lines 27-31 and 32-37), so all correct servers eventually execute o (lines 41-48).
After executing o each correct server sends a REPLY message to the client (line 47). The client
receives at least the REPLY messages from 2 f + 1 correct servers, so the operation completes.
Lemma 12
Theorem 6 An operation requested by a correct client eventually completes (Liveness).
Proof (sketch): The proof comes from the previous lemmas. We have to consider 4 cases:
1. In stable views operations requested by correct clients eventually complete (Lemma 17).
2. If all correct servers are in normal operation in a view, a correct server executes an
operation o, and the timers expire in other f + 1 correct servers, then all correct servers
eventually execute o (Lemma 14), all correct servers send a REPLY message to the client
(line 47) and o completes.
3. If all correct servers are in normal operation in a view, a correct server s executes an
operation o but the timers expire in a quorum Q of less than f + 1 correct servers, there
are 4 possibilities:
(a) If the number of correct servers in Q plus the number of faulty servers are more than
f and the faulty servers also send (valid) MERGE messages, we fall in case 2 above.
(b) If the number of correct servers not in Q are more than 2 f , we fall in case 1 above.
(c) If the number of correct servers not in Q plus the number of faulty servers are more
than 2 f and the faulty servers follow the algorithm, we fall in case 1 above.
In cases (b) and (c) the servers in Q will stop accepting and executing requests until they
receive a PRE-PREPARE-MERGE message or execute a state transfer (lines 65-81).
4. If the correct servers are in merge operation when the request with the operation o is
received, o is executed when the correct servers go back to the normal state, something
that we have already shown to eventually happen in the proof of Lemma 14. Theorem 6
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A.4 EBAWA Correctness
This appendix sketches a proof of correctness of the EBAWA algorithm. We have to
prove that the safety property is always satisfied (i.e., that all correct servers execute the same
requests in the same order) and the same for liveness (i.e., that all clients’ requests are eventually
executed).
Before the proof, we present pseudo-code of the algorithm (Algorithm 5). For simplicity we
omit details about checkpoint mechanism, garbage collection and timeout reset. Requests are
processed one at a time (no batches). We consider a valid message sent by a server s j when the
UI j in the message m follows the sequence number expected by other servers and the function
verifyUI(UIj,m) returns true.
The notation of the pseudo-code is a common one so we do not introduce it in detail. We
use an operator ‘.’ (dot) to refer to elements of messages and rather informally from sets (e.g.,
in lines 86-89 where the vector VP is filled with requests from the P field of MERGE messages).
Table A.3 presents the meaning of structures and variables, and Table A.4 shows the auxiliary
functions used by the algorithm. Recall that Table 6.1 summarized the labels of fields of the
messages.
Name Meaning
n the number of servers
f the number of servers that can be faulty
myv the view number on server s
vmin the lowest view number
vmax the highest view number
vlast the view number of the last request accepted by s
mlast the view number of the last valid PREPARE-MERGE message
received by s
blacklist a set of f faulty primaries
unordered a set of clients’ requests
pending a set of PREPARE messages with view number > myv
processing a set of PREPARE/PREPARE-MERGE messages with view number
≤ myv
myP a set of PREPARE messages
state the server state (normal or merge)
req clients requests
Tabela A.3: Variables and structures at a server s.
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Name Functionality
exec(req) executes a request
oldestRequest(unordered) returns the oldest request in the unordered
size(VP) returns the size of the vector P
stateTransfer() brings the server’s state up to date
startTimer() starts the timer
stopTimer() stops the timer
restartTimer() restarts the timer
insertHead(s) inserts the server s in the first position of the blacklist. If the
blacklist’s size is equal f removes the element of the last position
before to insert s
replaceHead(s) replaces the first element of the blacklist for s
Tabela A.4: Auxiliary functions used in the algorithm.
The proof that EBAWA satisfies the safety property is the following.
Lemma 13 In a view v, if a correct server executes an operation o with sequence number i, no
correct server will execute o with sequence number i′ 6= i.
Proof: If a correct server s executes o with sequence number i, it must have received f + 1
valid COMMIT messages (lines 32-39) for 〈o, i〉 from a quorum Q of servers. The proof is by
contradiction. Suppose there is another correct server s′ that executes o with sequence number
i′ > i. By the EBAWA algorithm, this can only happen if it receives f + 1 valid COMMIT
messages for 〈o, i′〉, from a quorum Q′ of f + 1 servers. Since n = 2 f + 1 and |Q|+ |Q′| =
2 f + 2 ≥ 2 f + 1, there must be at least one server r (called intersection server) that sends
COMMIT messages both for 〈o, i〉 and 〈o, i′〉. Assuming that the primary on view v is the server
p, we have to consider four cases:
1. the primary and the intersection server are correct: in this case it is trivial to see that the
primary will not generate two UIs for the same request operation o, so the intersection
server will never send two valid COMMIT messages for 〈o, i〉 and 〈o, i′〉.
2. the primary is correct and the intersection server is faulty: The (faulty) intersection server
would only be able to send valid COMMIT messages for 〈o, i〉 and 〈o, i′〉 if these messages
contained UIp = 〈i,H(o)〉p and UI′p = 〈i′,H(o)〉p, respectively. Since the primary is
correct, it will never invoke createUI for the same operation o twice and consequently
it will never produce these two UIs.
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3. the primary is faulty and the intersection server is correct: Now the primary will create
PREPARE messages containing UIp = 〈i,H(o)〉p and UI′p = 〈i′,H(o)〉p and send them to
the intersection server in order to try to make it send COMMIT messages both for 〈o, i〉
and 〈o, i′〉. However, due to the verification of the seq field of the request operations,
which is part of o, the intersection replica will not accept the second PREPARE for the
same operation o, issued by client c, because o.seq =Vreq[c], and the servers only accept
operations from clients if their sequence number is greater than their previous number
(i.e., if o.seq >Vreq[c]).
4. the primary and the intersection server are faulty: Now both the primary and the intersec-
tion server are in collusion to make two correct servers execute the same operation with
different numbers. Suppose that the intersection server r sends 〈COMMIT,v,r,s,UIp,UIr〉
message to s for 〈o, i〉 and 〈COMMIT,v,r,s′,UI′p,UI′r〉 message to s′ for 〈o, i′〉. Suppose
UIp = 〈i,H(o)〉p and UI′p = 〈i′,H(o)〉p such that i < i′. In this case, there are two cases
to consider:
(a) s′ executed some operation with sequence number i. In this case its sequence of
operations does not contain a “hole”, but since the USIG service does not allow
the primary p to generate two UIs for different message with the same sequence
number, the operation with sequence number i must be o (the same executed by s),
and thus s′ will not execute o again with i′ because o.seq≤Vreq[c];
(b) s′ did not execute some operation with sequence number i. In this case, the server
will only execute o with sequence number i′ if it executed all operations with
sequence number < i′, and since it did not execute any operation with sequence
number i, it will halt waiting for this operation to be executed.
Consequently, it is not possible for two servers to execute the same operation with different
sequence number in view v. Lemma 13
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1: //initialization
2: W is some constant value
3: n number of process
4: mynextv = s starts with the process id
5: myv = 0
6: mlast = 0
7: vlast =−1
8: blacklist = []
9: unordered = {}
10: pending= {}
11: processing= {}
12: state= normal
13: when si receives 〈REQUEST,c,seq,op〉σc from client c do
14: m= 〈REQUEST,c,seq,op〉σc
15: if mynextv ≤ myv+W ∧ state== normal then
16: send 〈PREPARE,si,mynextv,UIi,m〉 to all servers
17: mynextv = mynextv+n
18: else
19: unordered = unordered∪{m}
20: when s j receives 〈PREPARE,si,v,UIi,m〉 do
21: if v == myv ∧ 〈PREPARE,si,v,UIi,m〉 is valid ∧ myv − 1 == vlast ∧
state== normal then
22: if ∃req ∈ unordered∧mynextv ≤ myv+W then
23: send 〈〈COMMIT,s j,v,UIi〉〈PREPARE,s j,mynextv,m〉,UI j〉 to all
servers
24: pending= pending∪{〈PREPARE,s j,mynextv,m〉}
25: mynextv = mynextv+n
26: else if 6 ∃req ∈ unordered∧mynextv ≤ mynextv+W then
27: send 〈〈COMMIT,s j,v,UIi〉,〈SKIP,s j,mynextv〉,UI j〉 to all servers
28: pending= pending∪{SKIP,s j,mynextv〉}
29: mynextv = mynextv+n
30: else
31: send 〈COMMIT,s j,v,UIi,UI j〉 to all servers
32: when s j receives f +1〈COMMIT,sx,v,UIi,UIx〉 from different servers do
33: if v== myv ∧ state== normal then
34: stopTimer()
35: if 〈PREPARE,si,v,m,UIi〉 ∈ processing then
36: reply= exec(m) // requests accepted
37: send 〈REPLY,s j,reply〉σs j to req.c
38: processing= processing−〈PREPARE,si,v,m,UIi〉
39: vlast = v
40: else if 〈PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,UIi〉 ∈ processing then
41: for x= 0 to size(VP)−1 do
42: if ∃m ∈ processing : m= VP[x] then
43: reply= exec(m) // requests accepted
44: send 〈REPLY,s j,reply〉σs j to req.c
45: processing= processing−〈PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,UIi〉
46: vlast = v
47: myv = vlast
48: repeat
49: myv = myv+1
50: until blacklist has myv mod n
51: startTimer()
52: if 〈PREPARE,sx,v,m,UIx〉 ∈ pending ∧ myv == v ∧
〈PREPARE,sx,v,m,UIx〉 is valid then
53: send 〈COMMIT,sx,v,UIx,UI j〉 to all servers
54: pending= pending−{〈PREPARE,sx,v,m,UIx〉}
55: processing= processing∪{〈PREPARE,sx,v,m,UIx〉}
56: else if 〈SKIP,sx,v,UIx〉 ∈ pending∧myv == v ∧ 〈SKIP,sx,v,UIx〉 is
valid then
57: pending= pending−{〈SKIP,sx,v,UIx〉}
58: vlast = v
59: repeat
60: myv = myv+1
61: until blacklist has myv mod n
62: startTimer()
63: when s j receives 〈〈COMMIT,s j,v〉,〈PREPARE,s j,v′,m〉,UI j〉 or
〈〈COMMIT,s j,v〉,〈SKIP,s j,v′〉,UI j〉 do
64: if v == myv ∧ v′ > myv ∧ 〈〈COMMIT,s j,v〉,〈PREPARE,s j,v′,m〉,UI j〉 is
valid then
65: pending= pending∪{〈PREPARE,s j,v′,m〉}
66: else if v==myv∧v′ >myv∧〈〈COMMIT,s j,v〉,〈SKIP,s j,v′〉,UI j〉 is valid
then
67: pending= pending∪{〈SKIP,s j,v′〉}
68: when si becomes the primary of myv ∧mynextv == myv do
69: if ∃req ∈ unordered then
70: m= oldestRequest(unordered)
71: send 〈PREPARE,si,mynextv,m,UIi〉 to all servers
72: else
73: send 〈SKIP,s j,mynextv,UI j〉 to all servers
74: mynextv = mynextv+n
75: when s j receives 〈SKIP,si,v,UIi〉 do
76: if v== myv ∧〈SKIP,si,v〉σsi is valid ∧ state== normal then
77: vlast = v
78: repeat
79: myv = myv+1
80: until blacklist has myv mod n
81: startTimer()
82: when si is the primary of v and has received at least f+1 MERGE messages
sent by different servers in v−1 do
83: M = {the f +1 MERGE messages}
84: vmin = view number of the latest checkpoint received in Clast of MERGE
messages
85: vmax = highest view number received in P of MERGE messages
86: for each MERGE message ∈M do
87: if P in the MERGE message has v ≤ vmax ∧v ≥ vmin then
88: VP[MERGE.P.v] = MERGE.P.m
89: send 〈PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M,UIi〉 to all servers
90: when s j receives 〈PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M,UIi〉 do
91: if v≥ vlast ∧〈PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M,UIi〉 is valid then
92: processing= processing∪{〈PREPARE-MERGE,si,v,VP,M,UIi〉}
93: vmin = lowest view number in M
94: if ∀dm ∈ VP,∃MERGE ∈M : dm ∈M.P∧ vlast +1≥ vmin then
95: myv = v
96: send 〈COMMIT,s j,v,UIi,UI j〉 to all servers
97: state= normal
98: if mlast < vlast then
99: insertHead((v−1) mod n)
100: else
101: replaceHead((v−1) mod n)
102: mlast = v
103: else
104: stateTransfer()
105: when s j receives f + 1 〈MERGE,sx,v,Clast ,P,O,UIx〉 from different
servers ∧ ∀v≥ vlast do
106: state= merge
107: Clast = the last stable checkpoint certificate
108: myP = {the PREPARE messages received with v greather than Clast .v }
109: O = {all signed messages sent by s j after Clast .v }
110: send 〈MERGE,s j,v,Clast ,myP,O,UI j〉 to all servers;
111: when timer expires on a server s j do
112: Clast = the last stable checkpoint certificate
113: myP = {the PREPARE messages received with v greather than Clast .v }
114: O = {all signed messages sent by s j after Clast.v }
115: send 〈MERGE,s j,myv,Clast ,myP,O,UI j〉 to all servers
116: state= merge
117: myv = myv+1
118: restartTimer()
Algorithm 5: Ebawa algorithm
A.4. EBAWA CORRECTNESS 173
Lemma 14 If all correct servers are in normal operation in view v, a correct server s executes
an operation o, and the timers expire in other f +1 servers, then all correct servers eventually
execute o.
Proof: For s to execute o it must have received f + 1 valid COMMIT messages. For a correct
server, say s′, to send a COMMIT message it must have received a valid PREPARE message. If
the timer of s′ expires, s′ inserts this PREPARE message in myP. The timers expire in f + 1
servers, therefore all correct servers eventually enter the merge state (lines 106 and 116) and
send MERGE messages to all servers (lines 110 and 115). There are two cases to consider:
1. The primary of view v+ 1 sends the PREPARE-MERGE message following the algorithm
(lines 82-89): that message contains a vector VP that must contain o because: (a) that
vector is filled using the data from f +1 valid MERGE messages (lines 86-88); (b) at least
f + 1 correct servers insert the PREPARE message with o in myP (like s′ above); and (c)
the intersection of the quorum of f +1 that sent the MERGE messages of (a) and the f +1
correct of (b) contains at least one correct server (( f +1)+( f +1) = n+1). VP contains
o, so o is executed when the PREPARE-MERGE of view v+1 is accepted (lines 40-47).
2. The primary of view v+ 1 is faulty and does not send the PREPARE-MERGE message,
or the communication is slow and the timers expire: in this case the timers expire in all
(correct) servers, they increment the view number and we have again to consider the same
two cases, 1 and 2.
Eventually the communication will not be slow (partial synchrony model, Section 6.1) and the
primary will not be faulty (it changes for every view and only f are faulty), so the system will
fall in case 1. Lemma 14
Lemma 15 If all correct servers are in normal operation in a view v, a correct server s skips
the view v but the timers expire in other f +1 servers, all correct servers eventually skip view v
and no operation is executed in this view.
Proof: For s to skip v it must have received a valid SKIP message. If the timer of a correct server
s′ expires and s′ does not receive the SKIP message, s′ inserts no operation in myP for this view.
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The timers expire in f +1 servers, therefore all correct servers eventually enter the merge state
(lines 106 and 116) and send MERGE messages to all servers (lines 110 and 115) as proved in
the Lemma 14.
The primary of view v+ 1 sends the PREPARE-MERGE message following the algorithm
(lines 82-89): that message contains a vector VP that must not contain operations for view
v because: (a) that vector is filled using the data from f + 1 valid MERGE messages (lines
86-88); (b) to insert operations requested by clients in a MERGE message a server must have
received a valid PREPARE message with view v and with a valid sequence number (UI). Since
the USIG service does not allow a primary to generate two UIs for different messages with the
same sequence number and also because the messages are processed following the UI, a faulty
primary cannot create a PREPARE and a SKIP message to the same view. Thus, each server
inserts in the MERGE message a valid SKIP message or no message is included for v in case of
the server have not received the SKIP message before the timer expires. Therefore, when the
merge operation is concluded no operation is executed in the view v. Lemma 15
Lemma 16 After a merge operation, eventually f +1 servers have the same blacklist.
Proof: When a correct server receives a valid PREPARE-MERGE message (lines 90-104) it keeps
the view number of this message in the mlast variable (line 102). When a correct server receives
a valid PREPARE-MERGE message it verifies if this message succeeds a normal case operation or
if this message is a result of successive merge operations. To effect this verification it compares
the value kept in mlast with the view number of the last request executed kept in vlast (line 98). If
mlast < vlast then the received PREPARE-MERGE message succeeds a normal case operation and
the server inserts the primary of v−1 in the head of the blacklist (line 99). If mlast ≥ vlast then
the received PREPARE-MERGE message succeeds other merge operation and the server replaces
the head of the blacklist for v−1 (line 101).
Assuming two subsets of servers Q and R, where |Q| < f +1 and |R| > f servers in order
to proof the algorithm correctness we have to consider two cases:
• Q servers accept the PREPARE-MERGE message for v−1 (lines 90-104), the timer expires
in R servers (lines 111-118) and all correct servers enter the merge state. When the
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Q servers receive the next PREPARE-MERGE message with view number v they replace
the first position in the blacklist for v− 1 because the lowest possible value of mlast is
v− 1 and the value of vlast is v− 1 (lines 98 and 101). All servers in R have received
PREPARE-MERGE with v− 1 that was accepted by Q therefore, when they received the
next PREPARE-MERGE message they also replace the first position in the blacklist for
v−1. Consequently, all correct servers in Q and R converge to the same blacklist.
• There were successive merge operations the Q servers have lost PREPARE-MERGE
messages and R servers have received them but as Q servers did not send COMMIT
messages the timer expires on R servers and there are no accepted PREPARE-MERGE
messages. When a correct primary of view v sends a valid PREPARE-MERGE message
that is received by Q and R servers, the Q servers insert the primary of v−1 in the head
of their blacklists. Previously, the R servers have received PREPARE-MERGE messages
therefore they replace the first position in the blacklist for v−1. Consequently, all correct
servers in Q and R converge to the same blacklist. Lemma 16
Theorem 7 Let s be the correct server that executed more operations than all correct servers
up to a certain instant. If s executed the sequence of operations S = 〈o1, ...oi〉, then all other
correct servers executed this same sequence of operations or a prefix of it (Safety).
Proof: Let prefix(S,k) be a function that gets the prefix of sequence S containing the first k
operations, with prefix(S,0) being the empty sequence. Let ‘.’ be an operator that concatenates
sequences.
Assume that the theorem is false, i.e., that there is a correct server s′ that executed some
sequence of operations S′ that is not a prefix of S. More formally, assume that prefix(S′, j) =
prefix(S, j−1).〈o′j〉 and prefix(S′, j−1).〈o j〉 = prefix(S, j), with o′j 6= o j. In this case o′j is the
j-th operation executed in s′ and o j is the j-th operation executed in s. Assume that o j was
executed in view v by s and o′j was executed in view v′ by s′. We have to consider two cases:
1. v = v′: in this case o j = o′j due to Lemma 13.
2. v′ > v: without lack of generality this case assumes that s executes o in v but the timers
expire in other f +1 correct servers, including s′. This is the case considered in Lemma
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14 that shows that o is eventually executed by s′. An inspection of the algorithm shows
that: (1) s′ does not execute any operation in view v; and (2) s′ does not execute any
operation between view v and v′. Therefore, the j-th operation executed in s′ is o′ = o.
Theorem 7
Next we present the proof of liveness of the EBAWA algorithm. We say that a request
issued by a client c completes when c receives the same response for the operation from at least
f +1 different servers. We define a stable view as a view in which the primary is correct and no
timeouts expire at correct servers. In this proof, we consider the general case in which in each
view a batch of requests is agreed upon and executed.
Lemma 17 During a stable view, an operation requested by a correct client completes.
Proof: The client is correct so it sends the REQUEST message with the operation o to the
nearest server. The primary is correct (by definition of stable view) so it sends o in the
PREPARE message (lines 13-19 and 68-74), all correct servers send COMMIT messages with o
(respectively, lines 32-39), so all correct servers eventually execute o (line 36). After executing
o each correct server sends a REPLY message to the client (line 37). The client receives at least
the REPLY messages from f +1 correct servers, so the operation completes. Lemma 17
Theorem 8 An operation requested by a correct client eventually completes (Liveness).
Proof: The proof comes from the previous lemmas. We have to consider 4 cases:
1. In stable views operations requested by correct clients eventually complete (Lemma 17).
2. If all correct servers are in normal operation in a view, a correct server executes an
operation o, and the timers expire in other f +1 servers, then all correct servers eventually
execute o (Lemma 14), all correct servers send a REPLY message to the client (line 37)
and o completes.
3. If all correct servers are in normal operation in a view, a correct server s executes an
operation o but the timers expire in a quorum Q of less than f + 1 correct servers, there
are 4 possibilities:
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(a) If the number of correct servers in Q plus the number of faulty servers are more than
f and the faulty servers also send (valid) MERGE messages, we fall in case 2 above.
(b) If the number of correct servers not in Q are more than f , we fall in case 1 above.
(c) If the number of correct servers not in Q plus the number of faulty servers are more
than f and the faulty servers follow the algorithm, we fall in case 1 above.
In cases (b) and (c) the servers in Q will stop accepting and executing requests until they
receive a PREPARE-MERGE message or execute a state transfer (lines 104).
4. If the correct servers are in merge operation when the request with the operation o is
received, o is executed when the correct servers go back to the normal state, something
that we have already shown to eventually happen in the proof of Lemma 14. Theorem 8
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